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This study presents an analysis of the dilemma of the Islamic world and the
struggle between religion, secularism, and nationalism in Turkey and Sudan. In fulfilling
this task, the following issues were selected: 1) Islam and secularism, 2) Turkey's secular
experience, 3) Islam and secularism in Sudan, 4) Islam and nationalism, 5) Islam and
nationalism in Turkey and the Kurdish problem, and 6) Islam and nationalism in Sudan
and the southern problem. These issues tested the impact of religion and nationalism on
Turkey's and Sudan's public life.
The study was done through the use of both primary and secondary sources. The
study examined Turkey's and Sudan's problems of identity and national unity, the
challenges to both countries, along with options available for addressing these problems.
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The findings reveal that the cause of Turkey's and Sudan's problems of identity
and national unity are at their root internal, and that anti-Islamic Western policies were
significant in exacerbating these problems. However, the researcher emphasizes the role
of leadership in Turkey and Sudan in addressing the problems of their respective
countries. The researcher is convinced that the future of these countries depends on the
role of both political and intellectual leadership, in reconciling Islam with the realities
and needs of Turkey and Sudan. The solution to the problems of identity and national
unity of Turkey and Sudan can only be found inside these countries by the Turkish and
Sudanese people.
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The Islamic world has not been a blissful, prosperous, or successful place for the past
hundred years or so. Following World War I, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, almost
all the Islamic world was subjugated by the various European colonial powers. The
Caliphate system, which used to stand as a symbol of unity for Muslims, was abolished.
Palestine was reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people based on the "Balfour
Declaration."1 Since that time, the Islamic world has been moving from one crisis to another.
Muslims' projects of development and modernization, unity and nationalism, and finally
democratization and peace have thus far come to nothing.2
Whether we like it or not, the twentieth century demonstrates a bitter fact: all the
Islamic countries, from the islands of Indonesia in Southeast Asia to the shores of Morocco
1 The document was adopted by the British government during its mandate of
Palestine and it was backed by all the European powers and the United States. For terms
of the Balfour Declaration see George E. Kirk, A History ofthe Middle East (New York,
1960).
2 While most of the Islamic countries are under authoritarian regimes of one sort
or another, those countries that attempted to join the third wave of democratization were
unable to live with the experiment. Algeria is just one horrible example in this regard.
See for instance, Kay Adamson, Algeria: A Study in Competing Ideologies (London and
New York: Cassell, 1998).
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in North Africa, have been unable to deal with the political realities of their societies as well
as with the fact that we live in a globally interdependent world.' At the internal level, war.
poverty, corruption and oppression, military and personal rule are the standard fare in the
Islamic world. The misery and frustration of the people are best manifested by the exodus
of millions ofMuslims to the outside world. They crash Europe's and America's gates in
search of liberty, safety, and employment. As the Islamic world has become a place of
punishment and subjection, the West has become a safe haven for many Muslims.
Tragically, the best educated, most qualified, and most needed people are seduced from their
countries by the West. Many have left forever to avoid the fates of those who remained at
home.
At the external level, the agony of the Islamic world is buttressed by the new
developments in what former U.S. President George H. W. Bush termed the "New World
Order." With the collapse ofthe "Evil Empire" and the death ofcommunism, many Western
scholars and policy makers have identified Islam as a new threat to the West. Thus, the
Islamic countries of Sudan, Iran, and Pakistan with its nuclear power, became the new "Evil
Empire." The Islamic revival, or political Islam, is being portrayed as a black plague or
3 Morocco and Indonesia are good examples to clarify part of the crisis of the
Islamic world. In 1985, Morocco withdrew its membership from the Organization of
African Unity (OAU). In 1986, it marginalized its membership in the Arab League, and
in the same year Morocco applied for membership in the European Economic
Community (EEC), which was rejected.
Indonesia is the most populous and most prosperous Islamic country; with the
independence of East Timor, the remaining united islands are threatened by further
disintegration due to their ethnic complexity.
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cancer spreading around the world and posing a dangerous threat to the West.4 This hostility
to Islam culminated in Huntington's thesis in "The Clash of Civilizations'"' warning the West
that the Third World confrontation (if there is going to be one) will come from the Islamic
world.
However, an objective and careful view ofthe Islamic world, from Kashmir through
Afghanistan and Iraq to Kosovo and Chechnya, demonstrates that, more often than not, it is
the Muslims who have been seized, tortured, bullied, and butchered.
As we ponder the causes behind this bleak picture of the Islamic world, we ask
questions such as: "What went wrong in the Islamic world?" "How can Muslims get out of
the situation they are in?" "Who is responsible: the West that allegedly plots against the
Islamic world or should Muslims be held responsible for their own crisis?"
A major crisis in the Islamic world was precipitated by the advent of nationalism
in the eighteenth century. This secular, European idea remains a serious philosophical
and ideological challenge to the Muslims. Throughout the last two centuries, Muslim
intellectuals have been examining and debating the fundamentals of Muslim beliefs and,
4 For more information about political Islam in the Western view, see for instance
Olivier Roy, The Failure ofPolitical Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).
Also, Martin Kramer, "Islam vs. Democracy," Commentary, vol. 95, no. 1 (January
1993).
5 Huntington's writings raise the blood pressures of most Muslims. After
publishing his well-known and most provocative work, "Clash of Civilizations," his
works are'viewed as anti-Islamic. For the full text of his theory, see Samuel Huntington,
"The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no.3 (Summer 1993). Huntington
expounded the argument in his work, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
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most importantly, the idea of reconciling secular ideas such as nationalism, democracy.
and development with the Islamic faith. How to bridge the gap between the Islamic faith
and secular ideas or how Muslims can accommodate their religion with contemporary
political, social, and moral issues are significant themes in Muslim discourse and debate.
Intellectuals such as Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammed Abduh, al-Kawakibi,
Said Nursi. and many others, argued the compatibility of Islam with secular ideas such as
nationalism. They were eager to learn from and imitate the West in order to develop and
prosper. These intellectuals saw the unification of Italy and Germany, mergers based on
nationalism as an ideology, as a source of inspiration that should be adopted by Muslims.
The Islamists, such as Hassan al-Banna, Mawlana Abu Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid
Qutb, and currently Hassan Turabi, advocate complete rejection of the West and its ideas
and values. For this group, the solution is simply to return to Islamic teachings and to
refuse to deal with the West, "the historical enemy of Islam." Therefore, religion remains
the historical basis of identity and cannot be replaced by any other element of loyalty
such as language, race, and territory.
If the Islamists preached rejection and resistance, secular voices such as Qasim
Amin, Zia Gokalp, and Ataturk, to name just a few, followed the opposite route. They
advocated abandoning Islamic ways in favor of Western ones. To those voices,
nationalism, for example, though a Western, secular ideology, represents an alternative
source of legitimacy to Islam and offers a second path of identity.
As a result, the Islamic world is being torn by conflicting arguments. Furthermore,
none of these schools was able to reach a clear-cut vision ofhow Muslims can accommodate
5
their religion within the realities of their societies as well as with the outside world.
An objective study of two Islamic countries is illuminating and helpful in fathoming
the roots of the endless plight of the Islamic world. While the Islamic world contains more
than 50 sovereign states that make up the International Islamic Conference (IIC), Turkey and
Sudan have unique characteristics that make them very attractive for discussion and
comparison.
Turkey is one of the most considerable states in the Islamic world. Its significance
lies in its Islamic historical record. Turkey was the last Jihad state in the Islamic calendar.
As an ideological state devoting all of its resources and activities in the path of God,
Turkey—the former Ottoman Empire—expanded and defended the frontiers of Islam. Its
troops advanced deeply into Christian Europe and struck the West with a sense of doom.
Richard Knolles, the historian of the Turks, was expressing the common feeling of Europe
when he described the Turkish Empire in the sixteenth century as "the present terror of the
world."6
Contemporary Turkey is the only secular state in the Islamic world. In spite of its
large size, huge natural resources, and rich cultural heritage, Turkey is the poorest country
in Europe. Thus far, its struggle to catch up with the West has been fruitless and it is still
outside the European club. Turkey's democratic experiment is fragile. The Kurdish problem
is a continuous headache for Turkey, as it has failed to suppress efficiently the Kurdish
insurgency and, at the same time, has been unable to integrate the Kurds into Turkish society.
6 In Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope (New York and London:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1982), 32.
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Turkey's foreign policies are very hostile towards its Arab and Muslim neighbors. Finally.
most of the Turkish government's attempts to boost the country's image have failed. Turkey
still shares with the Third World most of its problems and aspirations in terms of
development, unity, and stability.
It is in the above context that Islam began to return to the scene. The rise of the
Islamic movement in Turkey demonstrates that, after more than 76 years of secularization,
the country has been unable to accomplish its objectives based on the ideology of secularism.
Consequently, the Islamic model became attractive to the Turkish masses. However, such
aspirations are not tolerated by the military junta supported by the West. Therefore, Turkey
is still at a crossroads in search of a lost identity.
Sudan, in Northeast Africa, is the largest country on the continent. As an immense
geographical unit, it contains huge cultural diversity. There are more than 300 ethnic groups
speaking about 115 languages. In general, the country is divided between the north and the
south. In the north, the majority are Muslims and Arabs, while in the south, people share the
civilization of black Africa. Sudan gained independence from Egypt and Britain in 1956.
However, during 45 years of self-rule, its leaders have often mismanaged its resources and
abused its people. Sudan experienced several periods of democracy, brought about in large
part by popular uprisings that overthrew military regimes. In 1989, a military junta
overthrew the civilian government and imposed martial law. The junta decided to use
religion as a device of governance. The regime is currently trying to reconstruct the society
in both the north and south according to a narrow vision of Islamic law and culture. Thus,
it imposed an Islamic legal system on a state where one third of its population is non-
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Muslim. Policies of Islamization and Arabization have escalated the savage civil war that
has been going for years. After more than a decade in power, the accomplishments, if there
are any, of the Sudanese Islamic experiment are few. Sudan, a prosperous African state in
the 1970s, is now a candidate for Live Aid support. Its people live in a grinding poverty
exacerbated by a brutal civil war and an authoritarian regime.
As mentioned earlier, both Sudan and Turkey share similar characteristics. Both
countries have significant potential and huge natural resources; however, they are falling
behind most of their neighbors. The government in Sudan has alternated between military
regimes (beginning in 1959,1969, and 1989) and civilian regimes (beginning in 1957,1964,
and 1965). By the same token, the Turkish military seized power three times, in 1960, 1974,
and 1980 and then returned to the barracks. The threat ofmilitary takeover is always present
in both countries. Sudan and Turkey share the crisis of national identity, with its devastating
consequences of economic chaos and civil war. Finally, both Sudan and Turkey have tension
with their neighboring countries and unstable external relations as well. By the same token,
the previous similarities do not conceal the sharp differences between Africa's largest
country and Turkey, making the discussion and comparison more challenging.
This study focuses on the fundamental causes that led to such profound crises in
Sudan and Turkey. It explores the role ofboth external and internal factors behind the agony
of those two Islamic countries. It details their experiments with the competing ideologies
of Islamization and secularization. It looks at the roots and dynamics of their ethnic
problems, and civil wars and their consequences. Also, it highlights the love-hate
relationship that characterizes their involvement with the outside world. Finally, the study
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concludes with an evaluation of the prospects for change in those two countries and attempts
to answer questions such as whether Sudan and Turkey will be able to come to grips with
their problems and achieve peace, stability, and prosperity.
Statement of the Problem
From the advent of Islam in the Arab peninsula 1,500 years ago until now. the
relationship between Islam and the West has been marked by mutual enmity, confrontation,
and rivalry. From the very first, the West viewed the new faith in terms of violence,
conquest, destruction, polygamy, the veil, and segregation.'
Islam has a universal message; thus, it must be spread all over the world.
Consequently, Muslim armies overran the lands of the Middle East, Central Asia, North and
Central Africa, and Eastern Europe. The West, however, did not submit to what it
considered Imperial Islam. Both Islam and Christianity have universal messages, yet
religious competition between the cross and the crescent has become the center of the
relationship between the rival groups.
Western fears and hostilities toward Islam reached their peak during the apogee of
the Ottoman Empire. Since its rise in the fourteenth century, the Ottoman Ghazi troops
advanced deeply into Christian Europe. Constantinople became the gate of Islamic
conquests in Europe. The city, once the capital of the Byzantine Empire, was conquered in
1453 by the Sultan Mehmed II, known henceforth as the Conqueror. The fall of the city
7 Daniel Pipes, In the Path ofGod: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic
Books, Inc. Publishers, 1983), 85.
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shook every throne in Europe.8 Islamic troops drove further into Europe, besieged Vienna
in 1529 for more than two weeks, and retreated under the pressure of a ferocious resistance
from the defenders.
That great Empire was established by an administration that was once organized,
humane, just, and relatively free from both fanaticism and corruption. However, at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, the seeds of decline began to grow in the Ottoman
Empire. The decay started in the Sultan's court and extended to the military and to other
institutions in the state. According to the English proverb, "There is nothing so ill as the
corruption of the best." The Sultan, himself, set the example of corruption when he became
accessible to bribes. The depth of corruption reached a level to where the Sultan was ruled
by his harem and by frivolous moods and desires with little interest in the affairs ofthe state."
On the other side, the West was under the influence of the liberal values spread by
the French Revolution. With its rising nation-states, the West outstripped the Ottoman
Empire in all fields of life. Thus, the moment had come to settle a historical score with the
Ottoman Empire that had caused fear for Europe for more than three centuries.
The process of decline was very slow, due to rivalry between the European powers.
However, by the end ofWorld War I, the Ottoman Empire became part of history. Turkey,
the heartland of the Ottomans, was occupied by Allied forces, closing an epoch in the history
8 Steven Runciman, The Fall of Constantinople 1453 (Great Britain: Cambridge
University Press, 1965), 133-144.
9 Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923 (London
and New York: Longman, 1997), 162-163.
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of the Islamic world and marking a new phase in the modem history of Turkey and the whole
Middle East."
After gaining independence under the leadership of Ataturk in 1923, Turkey—the
former Jihad state—became the first secular state in the modern history of Islam. With the
object oftransferring Turkey into a modern state, Ataturk decided to cut its links with Islam.
Ataturk's divorce from Islam reached its peak in the constitution of 1928." The clause
referring to Islam was deleted from the constitution.
However, Ataturk was ambivalent and opportunistic in his secular and nationalist
program. He initially appealed to Islam to gain the support of the Turkish and Kurdish
peoples. Thus, Islam was a rallying cry in the War of Independence, and it was a crucial
component of Turkish nationalism in the early days of the republic. Nevertheless, Ataturk's
goal was to establish a secular, modern state, not to restore an Islamic empire. Ataturk
played the Islamic card only when it suited his purposes. Ataturk believed that his goal of
establishing a new, modern state could only be achieved if he disestablished Islam. Thus,
his secular nationalist program was, at its base, a policy of de-Islamization strictly enforced
by the state apparatus. It was forced on both the Turks and Kurds from above. Neither the
secularization nor the Turkification of the nation was negotiated with the people of Turkey.
10 M. Philips Price, A History of Turkey: From Empire to Republic (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1956), 87.
11 Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in
Turkey," Middle East Journal, vol. 50, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 41.
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Furthermore, Ataturk's dream of integrating Turkey into the Western world has not yet been
achieved.
For the last seven decades. Turkey has been struggling to become part of the West.
Despite numerous attempts and decades of interaction and imitation of Europe, Turkey
remains in a deadlock. The country has neither been able to catch up with Europe's
development nor to be accepted by the European Union (EU).
Contemporary Turkey is torn between the advocates of secularization and
Islamization. The first group believes that Turkey belongs to the West; therefore, one day
it will become a European nation. The other side argues that Turkey was, and remains, an
Islamic state; thus, it will never become part of Christian Europe. Therefore, it is not
surprising that since the early 1950s, the Turkish people continue to struggle and debate over
the identity of their country.13
The rise ofthe Islamic movement in Turkey could be explained partly by the failure
of the Westernization process in the country and its rejection by Europe as well. Therefore,
when the political climate became more relaxed for religious expression, the Turkish people
with their strong religious sentiments took the opportunity to establish Islamic political
parties and associations.
However, the military leaders supported by the West could not tolerate such
aspirations and attempts at re-lslamization. Turkey's experiment with democracy is still
threatened by military interventions. However, the pressures on the secularists in Turkey
12 Sami Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identities," Middle East Report,
vol. 26, no. 2 (April, June 1996): 10-14.
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will continue, especially with its current economic deterioration and the civil war with the
Kurdish people.
The Kurds are a nation without a state. Turkish politicians have found the solution
to this problem in the use of military force. Although military methods are indispensable to
suppress the military activities of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PPK), they are not enough
to find a solution to this problem. While Kurdish aspirations for an independent state could
not be considered an acceptable demand by Turkey, cultural independence and economic
equality for the Kurds might be more readily received and accomplished than policies of
assimilation and destruction of the Kurdish people.13 The Turkish politicians did not realize
that arresting the leader of the PPK, Ocalan, and sentencing him to death will never solve the
problem of a people who struggle for self-determination. Finally, as foreign policy is largely
influenced by domestic affairs, Turkey's relations with the outside world are also in a deep
crisis. The list of Turkey's enemies and rivals is a long one, and includes Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Cyprus. Greece, and Russia. In its neighborhood, Israel may be Ankara's closest ally. The
list of adversaries includes Western critics of Turkey's human rights record and its war
against the Kurds.
The Islamic resurgence in Turkey is not an isolated phenomenon in the Islamic
world. In fact, since the early 1980s, the Islamic revival became a well-known issue in the
Islamic world. The Islamic revolution that took place in Iran in 1979 has an impact on
almost all the Islamic world. While most of the Islamic countries struggle against political
13 David McDowal, A Modern History ofthe Kurds (London and New York: I. B.
Tauvis, 1996), 418-426.
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Islam, Sudanese leaders, by contrast, have chosen Islam as a system of government.
regardless of the consequences, including civil war.
While the north of Sudan became part of the Islamic world early on, the south
remains religiously and culturally independent. The dichotomization of the country into
Arab Muslim north and African Animist/Christian south is in part a legacy of the British
policy of separating the south from the north during colonization.14
Islam initially spread in Sudan and much of sub-Saharan Africa through the peaceful
and gradual migration of Muslim peoples from north Africa. In other words, Islam spread
in Sudan and much of Africa without the application of Sharia. In a country where one third
ofthe population was non-Muslim, religion became a divisive ideology. However, Islam as
a religion cannot be blamed for the current crisis in Sudan. Rather, it is the manipulation of
religion and the practices and policies of the Sudanese ruling elite that bear immediate
responsibility for the present crisis in that country. After independence, the northern
Sudanese desired a unitary state under their control. On the other side was the deepening
fear among southern Sudanese of their subordination to a state that defined itself as having
Arab and Muslim identities they do not share. Their reaction was revolt. The civil war has
continued for nearly four decades, punctuated by a ten-year pause.
As the country has alternated between military and civilian regimes, stability and
peace have became unknown for the Sudanese people. With the failure of the civilian
governments to run the country and solve its problems, especially the war in the south, the
14 John W. Harbeson and Donald Rotchchild, eds., Africa in World Politics
(Boulder: Westview, 1991), 32-34.
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military officers found the pretext to step in several times so as to bring peace and prosperity
to the country, but to no avail. As both the north and south continued to take hard positions,
the country continued to bleed. Moreover, the country became open to foreign intervention,
which crippled all efforts to solve the problem.
In 1989, a combination of military leaders and Islamic fundamentalists overthrew the
civilian government and established a new Islamic Republic in Sudan. Not surprisingly, the
new Islamic government of Sudan was faced by challenges from all directions. At the
internal level, as the military leaders believed that the only solution for the problem of the
south to be military, the regime stepped up the civil war. It demonstrated that it was
conducting a deliberate policy of genocide. Since it seized power in 1989, the regime
adopted very repressive measures against the political opposition, causing the exodus of
hundreds of thousands of people to neighboring countries and to the Western world as well.
As the war in the south has worsened, the economy has collapsed."
At the regional and international levels, the regime supported Iraq in 1990, and so
most Arab states joined the West in their antagonism towards Sudan. Arab oil-producing
countries decided to sever aid to Sudan and shifted their support to the Sudan People
Liberation Movement (SPLM).16 Relations with neighboring countries such as Egypt,
15 Judy Mayotte, "Civil War in Sudan: The Paradox of Human Rights and
National Sovereignty," The Journal ofInternational Affairs, vol. 47, no. 2 (Winter 1994).
16 In fact, Saudi Arabia was the major donor to Islamic groups in the Middle East.
As most of these groups stood with Saddam during the Gulf War, the war persuaded
Saudi Arabia to abandon its policy of trying to co-opt Islamic groups by buying them off.
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Somalia, Ethiopia, Libya, and Algeria were nearly cut off.'7 Being isolated regionally and
hated internationally, the government of Sudan decided to search for new allies outside the
region. In addition to Iraq, relations with Iran were strengthened. Both Iran and Sudan
exchanged visits at a very high level. With such friends, Sudan did not need enemies.
Moreover, Sudan's revolutionary regime followed the path of Iran. Sudan started to export
the Islamic revolution to other Arab countries. Islamic movements in countries such as
Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia received support from the government of Sudan. Sudan became
a harbor for the fugitives of other Islamic countries. With such policies, Sudan became a
friendless regime.18 The antagonism between Sudan and the West culminated in 1998 when
the United States forces conducted air strikes against the country.19
Apparently, the Islamic experiment in Sudan is not promising. After 12 years in
power, Sudan's crisis has worsened. In fact, Sudan's Islamic experiment discredits the
Islamists' promises of.a better alternative under their rule. Sudan, once the potential food
basket for the Arab world, now suffers from famine. The country is also threatened by the
possibility of disintegration. The current plight of Sudan is brought about in part by unwise
policies followed by its government and its poor leadership.
17 Hilal Khashan, "The New Arab Cold War," World Affairs, vol. 159, no. 4
(Spring 1997): 164-166.
18 Samuel M. Makind, "Iran, Sudan and Islam," The World Today (June 1993).
19 For more information about Sudan's relations with the West since the military
coup of 1989, see for instance the work ofDonald Petterson, U.S. Ambassador to Sudan
in the 1990s, Inside Sudan, Political Islam, Conflict and Catastrophe (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1999).
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To summarize, today both Turkey and Sudan are facing gridlock. The question is.
of course, to know if the government ofboth countries will be able to overcome the situation
or not. While it is not possible to answer the previous question, one can speculate about
future possibilities based on the previous facts. There are some reasons to be optimistic, but
even more reasons to be quite skeptical
Assumptions
Western anti-Islamic attitudes have not changed throughout histoiy. Since the advent
of Islam in the seventh century, the West viewed the new religion as a threat to Christianity
and Western civilization. Therefore, the West had adopted and implemented hostile
positions toward the Islamic world. From the early encounters between those two rivalries,
through the crusades and imperialist periods to the Gulf War,20 and its consequences,
specifically the so-called peace process, until the present, Western perceptions of Islam have
never changed. Though the perception has its roots in the early clashes between Islam and
Christianity in Europe, the United States has inherited Europe's antagonism towards the
Islamic world. The United States has shaped its strategies and policies with the Islamic
world based on the European legacy. Muslims are haunted by this legacy inside and outside
20 In fact, the Gulf War marked a crucial turning point, not only in relations
between Islam and the West, but more profoundly among Muslims themselves and
specifically the Arabs. Moreover, the war, with its devastating consequences—
specifically the so-called peace process, which turned out to be a sell out—closed the
century with the bitter realization that this is an age of Muslims' inferiority, weakness,
and division.
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the United States.21 However, the Western powers would not succeed if the Islamic world
had not been afflicted by many internal stresses. These include ever-increasing corruption,
lack of legitimacy, bankruptcy of leadership, abuse of power, and backwardness. With such
afflictions, definitely, it seems that nothing could prevent penetration, influence, and finally,
domination by the West.
One also assumes that the current turmoil in the Islamic world could be measured
by its failure to employ the power of Islam to encounter the challenges that face this part
of the world. Islam is a religion of forgiveness, peace, and dignity. It inspires in its
followers the mood of tolerance. It is not against development and modernity.
In Turkey, where 99 percent of the population is Muslim, Islam was and still
remains the historical basis of identity. National territory as the basis of identity, as
adopted by Ataturk, had neither succeeded in integrating the Kurds within the new state
nor met the aspirations of the people of Turkey.
In Sudan, the policies and practices of the Sudanese ruling elite, and the present
regime in particular, constitute a radical departure from the historical, peaceful Sudanese
Islam and the wishes ofthe population at large. Many Sudanese Muslims and non-Muslims
oppose the present Sudanese Islamic experiment and view it as a distortion of Islam. The
Sudanese ruling elite failed to understand Islam in a way that would better respond to the
present needs of the Sudanese society.
21 For analysis of the relationship between America and the Islamic world in the
last two decades, see for instance Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash
ofCultures or Clash ofInterests? (London: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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Therefore, the underdevelopment and instability of Sudan, where Islam plays a
central role, and Turkey, where religion is on the periphery, cannot be explained by the
incompatibility of Islam with modernity and development. In fact, it is the author's belief
that both Sudan's Islamic experiment and Turkey's secular experiment have failed due to
misguided policies followed by both countries. Finally, one also assumes that the current
turmoil in both countries could be explained by their lack of leadership with a vision to
reconcile the differences in the said countries. Neither Sudan nor Turkey has been blessed
with great leaders in the closing decades of the twentieth century.
Hypotheses
Two major hypotheses guide this work. First, Islam and politics are inseparable in
the political process of Sudan and Turkey. However, both countries have failed to utilize
religion, or its counterpart secularism, in accord with the political, ethnic, and cultural
identities of their societies. This failure had largely contributed to the underdevelopment and
instability of the said countries.
In Turkey, Ataturk's secular nationalist program was unsuccessful. The rise of
the Islamic movement in Turkey in the last two decades is a product of the failure of
Ataturk's program, and thus represents a crisis of Ataturk's legacy. By the same token,
the Kurdish uprisings throughout the last century were an outcome of a mixture of
religious and nationalist motivations.
Consequently, it is the author's belief that Islam can accommodate nationalism,
and it could be the core of identity for both the Kurds and the Turks. Had Ataturk
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integrated Islam into Turkish nationalism, the basis of such a nation would have been
more encompassing and the crisis of identity in Turkey would have been eliminated.
Thus, a reasonable argument can be made that secularism, rather than religion, is the one
to be blamed for Turkey's current crisis of national identity.
In Sudan, after independence, the Sudanese ruling elite adopted an ambivalent
program in which it declared Islam to be the official religion of the state while providing
equal citizenship rights to all people. From 1956 until the present, with the exception of the
period from 1973 to 1983 following the Addis Ababa agreement and the relatively more
secular constitution of 1973, the Sudanese ruling elite had sought to mold the diverse
population of the country according to their understanding of Islam. The National Islamic
Front (NIF) and the present regime declared Sudan as an Islamic state and enforced the
application of Sharia. Furthermore, it declared holy war against its own non-Muslim
population in the name of Islamic Jihad in defense ofthe Islamic faith. The Sudanese ruling
elite failed to reconcile Islam with the realities of their country.
Had Sudan and Turkey been able to use religion as a power to unite the efforts to
build stable, developed, and strong national states and political systems that enjoy the
support of their citizens, problems of identity, stability, democracy, and under-development
would have been marginalized and the benefits would be maximized.
Secondly, the Western powers had adopted and implemented negative position?
towards the Islamic world including Sudan and Turkey. Furthermore, the Western powers
exploited the crises in these countries to promote their interests and expand their influence.
The West employs human rights, democracy, political Islam, terrorism and several other
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means to promote its own interests rather than to help the people of those countries.
However, the Western powers would not have been successful if Sudan and Turkey had noi
been in deep domestic crises. Consequently, we have an international environment hostile
to the said countries, and a domestic environment that has set the stage for foreign
penetration, hegemony, and hostility.
Research Questions
This study aimed to provide answers to the following questions:
Primary Questions
1. Can Islam be separated from politics, and if not, why not?
2. What is the role and place of Islam in the political processes, both domestic
and foreign, of Sudan and Turkey?
Secondary Questions
1. What are the underlying reasons for hostility and rivalry between Islam and
the West? How does the West view Islam with the end of the Cold War?
Does the West use double standards when it comes to Islamic issues? What
roles have Western powers played in the crisis of Sudan and Turkey9
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2. What are the original causes for the failure of Europeanization in Turkey?
Why was Turkey able to develop a military relationship with the West, thus
becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but
could not build a political, economic, and social relationship with the West
or join the European Union? Is there a correlation between Turkish attempts
of Westernization and the return of Islam in Turkey? Finally, can Turkey
reconcile Islam with modernity?
3. Should the government of Sudan favor Islam and the Arabic language or
accord equal citizenship to people of all faiths and races? Are the Sudanese
people satisfied with the Islamic experiment, and if not, how do they express
their discontent with their government?
4. What are the prospects for establishing nation states for the Kurds in
Kurdistan and the southern people of Sudan? What roles do regional and
foreign powers play in those ethnic conflicts? What are the humanitarian,
economic, and political impacts of these civil wars? Is there a possibility for
reconciliation between these conflicting parties, and if not, why not?
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Definitions
The key concepts pertinent to this study are corruption, conspiracy, ethnicity, civil
war, Islamization. secession, Westernization, crisis of national identity, the Islamic state, and
the secular state. The concepts presented below will be defined either by a relevant source
or by the author of this study, and followed by a brief discussion.
Corruption
Corruption can be defined as the acceptance by public officials of money or an
equivalent for doing something that he is under obligation not to do, or exercising a
legitimate discretion for improper reasons." In this study, corruption seems to be an evil
deeply rooted in the culture of the Islamic world: In the old Ottoman Empire, given its
vastness, the Ottoman bureaucratic system, and the practices ofthose at the center of power,
all these factors contributed to the rampancy of corruption. As the Empire grew, so did
corruption, and it figured no less prominently in the decline and fall of the Empire. As old
habits die hard, the modern political system in Turkey continued to be rocked by political
scandals. The former Turkish president Sulayman Demirel was in deep personal political
trouble in 1971, while prime minister, in part due to scandals surrounding his brother.2'
22 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative
Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1970), 5.
23 New York Times, January 15, 1971.
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In Sudan, as in most Middle Eastern countries, given its economic and political
hardships, people take refuge in the so-called "back door." In order to meet their needs, or
to avoid severe punishments, they bribe, beg, and barter.24
Conspiracy
We can define conspiracy as an agreement between two or more parties to act
together to achieve an illegal or improper object.25 In this work, the conspiracy is the
Western hostility toward the Islamic world. Thus, Muslims see themselves as surrounded
and under attack, thus most oftheir defeats and failures the inevitable consequences of the
Western conspiracy against them. The collapse ofthe Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth
century, and the crisis of both Turkey and Sudan as Islamic countries in the present are
explained as part of a Western conspiracy to divide and weaken the Islamic world, thus to
facilitate its exploitation, penetration, and domination.
Ethnicity
The concept of ethnicity is often employed to identify a group with a common
cultural tradition and a sense of identity, which exists as a subgroup of a larger community.26
In the research, the southern people of Sudan are different ethnic groups that suffer from
24 James A Bill and Carl Leiden, The Middle East: Politics and Power (Boston:
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), 181.
25 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. "conspiracy."
36 John Hutchinson and Antony D. Smith, Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 43.
24
cultural oppression, social discrimination and exploitation. The oppressed southern
Sudanese started fighting against the north with the objective of establishing an independent
state. However, in the last two decades, they turned their back from the ultimate goal of an
independent state in favor of a united, democratic secular Sudanese state.
Islamization
Islamization is a call for a return to the root values of Islam. It emphasizes the
necessity of applying Islamic laws in the society. It is a new phenomenon in the history of
Islam. It could be partially explained as a reaction to the failure of secular ideas to solve the
problems of the Islamic world. Until the late 1970s, Islam had little influence in the
important realms of political and economic development. However, in the last two decades.
Islam reemerged as a potent force in Muslim politics and society. This resurgence
encompassed much of the Muslim world from Algeria to Indonesia. The Iranian Revolution
of 1979 is one of the events that demonstrate the power of a resurgent Islam.2'
While the call for a return to the roots in Turkey came from the masses and took the
form of establishing Islamic political parties, the Sudanese Islamic experiment is unique. It
was the military regime that took refuge in Islamic laws as a source of legitimacy. This
amounts to the exploitation of religion for political ends. Unfortunately, so far the
experiment is not promising.
27 For an analysis of this issue, see James P. Piscatori, ed., Islam in the Political
Process (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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Secession
Secession can be defined as an attempt by a community to break away from a larger
political organization and to gain self-determination. This withdrawal is usually
accomplished by force. In this work, the Kurds, like the southern people of Sudan, started
their struggle as a separatist movement with the objective of establishing an independent
state. After years of fighting, the Kurds gave up the objective of an independent state and
began to call for a modest solution within the boundaries of Turkey that ensured justice and
freedom. Thus, Kurdish nationalism is no longer a separatist movement fighting for
independence.
Westernization
As a concept, Westernization suggests that the West is the incarnation of
development, freedom, prosperity, and civilization. Thus, in order to catch up with the West,
the rest of the world must adopt Western values, which are the only way to salvation.
Therefore, Westernization as an attempt at reform is the aim of the whole non-Western
world. Turkey was the first Islamic country that sought to become like or part of the West
by adopting and implementing a secularist ideology. Turkey did not realize that
Westernization could not be achieved only by abandoning the laws and principles of the
Islamic faith. Unfortunately, after more than seven decades of Westernization, Turkey's
experiment of Westernization is not inspiring.
Civil War
Civil war is a war fought between different geographical areas, political divisions,
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or ideological factions within the same country.28 The concept of civil war in this study
means the war between the Kurds and the Turkish state, and the southern people of Sudan
unleashed against the central government ofKhartoum. Although these civil wars took place
within the boundaries of Turkey and Sudan, other states have intervened.
Crisis of National Identity
The crisis of national identity is defined as the inability of individuals and groups to
define who they are and how they are different from other groups on the basis of language,
religion, race, territory, and culture. In this work, the crisis of national identity can be seen
in the existence of contested national identities in Sudan and Turkey. In Sudan, religious and
ethnic differences between the north and the south have nearly destroyed the country. The
northerners view Sudan as an Arab state that belongs to the Islamic Middle East; thus, they
struggle to stamp Sudan according to their image. However, the southerners have a different
vision as they view Sudan as an African country and resist the policies of Arabization and
Islamization.
In Turkey, many Turkish people perceive themselves as Muslim Turks; thus, they
belong to the Islamic Middle East. However, those who wish to integrate with Europe
believe that Turkey is part of the Christian West or Europe. Therefore, the search for
national identity will continue to be a major problem for the above-mentioned countries.
28 Jack C. Piano, The International Relations Dictionary (California: Santa
27
Tslamic State
The Islamic state can be defined as the state in which Islamic law is applied in all
spheres of life. Its sovereignty belongs to God and the legitimacy of its ruler, whether
caliphate, sultan, or mullah, is derived from his adherence to Islam. While Islam continued
to play an important role in Sudanese politics throughout the country's history, Islamic law
was applied in Sudan only in 1983 and, in 1989, Sudan was declared fully an Islamic state.
Thus, Islam became the primary source of identity, ideology, and values. After more than
a decade of Sudan's Islamic experiment, the continuation of the civil war and the power
struggle between President Bashir and Sudan's ideologist of an Islamic state, Turabi,
reinforce the perspective of the failure of such an experiment.
Secular State
The secular state separates religion from politics and limits it to the private sphere
of life. Its sovereignty belongs to people and the legitimacy of its ruler, whether
president, king, or emperor, is derived from his ability to satisfy the needs of his people.
Turkey was the first state in the Muslim world to embark upon a comprehensive process
of secularization. After more than seven decades of Turkey's secular experiment, Islam
remains central in Turkish politics and continues to be the historic basis of identity for the
Turkish people. The current resurgence of Islam in Turkey is considered as a
representation of the crisis of secularism in Turkey.
Barbara, 1982), 206.
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Methodology and Data Collection
The basic method of research for this study is historical and descriptive analysis. The
historical approach explores past trends in relationship to the subject of interest with the goal
of providing systematic and comprehensive understanding of the present. The historical
context brings out features that are crucial to an understanding of the present. Therefore, it
could be used as a solid base for speculation in the future. Furthermore, this study uses a
descriptive approach, which helps to scrutinize and explore the obtained information, as
thoroughly as possible with a view to providing material and guidance for subsequent
research.
The major sources of data for this research include both primary and secondary
sources. Primary information was collected from government documents of Sudan, Turkey,
and the United States, as the leader of the Western world. In fact, valuable materials were
derived from actual actions of the previous countries, which include internal and foreign
policy declarations, statements by key leaders in those countries, and hearings before
Coneress. Data were generated from other primary sources, such as World Bank reports,
Amnesty International reports, and U.S. Department of State publications.
Secondary data were gathered from such sources as specialized works on the Islamic
world in general, and Sudan and Turkey in particular. Scholarly journals such as World
Politics, Middle East Policy, Foreign Affairs, and Middle East Studies were used. Also,
information on the research topic was collected from African, American, Turkish, and British
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magazines and newspapers such as: New Africa, Middle East Times, The Turkish Times, New-
York Times, The Economist and the Washington Post.
Materials for this study were collected from various library resources, specifically,
the libraries at the Atlanta University Center, Georgia State University, and Emory
University. However, with the development of computers and in the era of internet, valuable
information in remote places has became accessible; thus, frequent research visits were made
to the web sites of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., the U.S. Department of
State, and the governments of Turkey and Sudan.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
The controversial relationship between the Islamic world and the West, and the
experience of failure and the quest for identity in Sudan and Turkey are complex issues that
cannot be explored in detail in one work. Certainly, it is nearly impossible to examine in
depth a fifteen hundred year-old conflict. Furthermore, this long clash is further complicated
by the involvement of different nations and various regions that have developed different
responses to the challenge of the West. Therefore, to keep the study in a managable
proportion, this work focuses on a number of issues associated with the topic at hand and the
hypothesis advanced.
As the historical approach helps to capture certain common or repeated patterns
relevant to the contemporary status of Sudan and Turkey, this study starts with a historical
background of both countries. Nevertheless, the study is primarily concerned with Sudan
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and Turkey's contemporary politics, their religious, ethnic, and regional complexities, their
relations with the outside world, and finally, their future chances of survival as nation states.
The study focuses on the developments of the past two decades (1980-2000). This time
frame was chosen because there were significant domestic, regional, and international
developments that took place between 1980-2000.
At the internal level, the 1980s marked the renewal of civil war in Sudan in 1983 and
the beginning ofthe armed Kurdish conflict in Turkey in 1984. Also, the 1980s were marked
by the reversal of democracy and return of military rule in both countries. Two military
coups took place in Sudan in 1985 and 1989. Similarly, the military overthrew civilian rule
in 1980 in Turkey. In 1998, the government of Turkey, influenced by the military, forced
its nation's first Islamist prime minister to resign and dissolve his political party. The 1990s
were marked by continuous political and social unrest in both countries, and the deeply
embedded conflict of secularism versus religiosity. At the regional level, the 1990s were the
years of tension between Sudan and Turkey and the outside world. Turkey almost entered
a war with Syria over the activities ofthe PPK. Moreover, its relations with Greece, Egypt,
Iran, and Iraq were deteriorating due to Turkish alliance with Israel. By the same token,
Sudan's disputes with Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria, and its other African neighbors
worsened.
At the international level, with the end of the Cold War, the world had a period of
profound changes with direct impact for Sudan and Turkey as nonhomogeneous countries
with ethnic conflicts and undemocratic governance. Among the features of change that took
place in the last decade are the following:
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• The practice of humanitarian intervention for the purpose of protecting human
rights from government oppression. This principle was practiced in Iraq and
Somalia; both are close neighbors to Turkey and Sudan.29
• The world's movement towards more accountable democratic governance.
During the Cold War, the West, in its quest for allies, ignored considerations of
human rights. Now the West celebrates its victory by making democracy and
liberalism the wave of the future.
• The reassessment of the West's political and economic aid priorities. This
feature goes hand in hand with the previous features.30
There is no doubt that this new international climate will have long-standing effects
on Turkey which is classified among the three top recipients of USAID, after Israel and
Egypt. It will also affect Sudan, where the principle ofhumanitarian intervention is enforced
bv the United States.31
29 Alex de Wool and Rakiya Ommar, "Can Military Intervention be
Humanitarian?" Middle East Report, vol. 24, no. 187 - 199 (March-April/May-June
1994): 3.
30 Mark Dufheld and John Prendergast, "Sovereignty and Intervention after the
Cold War," Middle East Report, vol. 24, no. 187-188 (March-April/May-June 1994): 10.
31 In fact, the humanitarian intervention that the United States is now practicing in
Sudan is a pretext to cover the U.S. hostility toward that country, especially after the
bombing of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The United States blocked all the
attempts of reconciliation between the SPLM and the government of Khartoum. Until the
end of President Clinton's administration, the U.S. was determined to divorce the north
from the south and almost issued a "Balfour Declaration" for the southern people of
Literature Review
A vast body of literature has been written on the Islamic world and modern Turkey
and Sudan. The task of exploring this tremendous body of literature is further complicated
by the different arguments presented by the authors. In fact, from 1979 when the Ayatollah
Khomeini came to power until 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, the
developments and events in the Islamic world became cardinal in the minds of most Western
scholars and politicians. This unobjectively marked most of their writings with a bearing on
the crisis of the Islamic world. However, to keep the review to a compact size, the researcher
reviewed some exigent literature that shed light on the subject. Also, as the subject is huge
and complicated, the literature was divided into three main categories. The first category
covers the Ottoman Empire and its struggle with both external enemies and internal troubles.
The second category detailed the current trends in modern Turkey. It is necessary to review
some of these studies that focus on the new nation that was formed from the heart of the
Ottoman Empire. Finally, the researcher reviewed the most prominent works that deal with
Sudan, a major part of the study.
Literature on the Ottoman Empire
While the vast majority ofMuslims believe in the conspiracy theory and argue that
the Western powers are the source of evil in the Islamic world, there are many studies in
Sudan to establish their independent state. See for instance Al-Hawadeth, Dec. 17, 1999,
No 2250,16.
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which the Western role is marginalized, and Muslims are seen as accountable and
responsible for their own misfortune. In other words, the roots of the plight lie.in the internal
environment. The breakdown of the Ottoman Empire supports this argument. In his
pioneering study, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall ofthe Turkish Empire, Lord
Kinross presented an objective analysis to the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire/-
Kinross noted that the Empire began in 1300 under the legendary Osman I. It reached the
zenith of its power and glory in the sixteenth century. As the author argued, during that
glorious period, the rulers of the Empire were over-occupied by its affairs. However, as
Kinross affirmed, the seeds of decline began to grow in the Empire as its rulers neglected
their duties and were ruled by harems and pleasures. The author noted that the depth of
corruption and disorder reached a level when imbeciles, sots, and children were put on the
throne. Therefore, Kinross attributed the disintegration ofthe Empire to its leadership. The
late untalented rulers of the Empire left the path that their ancestors had trod.
In addition to corruption and disorder, inequality and oppression are other afflictions
that played a significant role in tearing apart the Empire. The Empire held together vast
lands with very different political traditions and numerous nationalities—Greeks, Serbs,
Bulgarians, Romanians, Kurds, Turks, Africans, and Arabs. By the same token, these
communities had various religious affiliations—Muslim, Christian, Jew, and Animist. The
Ottoman rulers failed to achieve equality and justice among their citizens, thus inspiring the
oppressed to struggle for self-rule. Roderic H. Davison argued that the Ottoman
32 Lord Kinross and Patrick Balfour, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of
the Turkish Empire (New York: First Morrow Quill, 1979).
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discrimination against non-Muslims and non-Turks was a fundamental reason for the
disruption of the Empire." In the opinion of Davison, the Turkish mind, conditioned by a
sense of superiority, was not willing to accept an absolute equality with non-Turks. The
Christians were viewed as second-class citizens and so pushed forward to separation. As the
author contended, neither the concept nor the practice of citizenship involving equal rights
and duties between citizens of different religious or ethnic groups existed in the Empire,
paving the way for the disadvantaged people supported by foreign power to disintegrate the
Empire.
In fact, in the late years of the Empire, inequality was not only between Muslims and
non-Muslims, but also among Muslims of different ethnic groups. Ernest Dawn, in his essay
"From Ottomanism to Arabism: the Origin of an Ideology,"34 asserts that the Arabs, though
the vast majority of them are Muslims, suffered from inequality and humiliation by the
Ottomans. The Arabs rejected the kind of Islam supported by the Turks. There were radical
calls that denied the Turks the right to rule the Arabs. Dawn saw that Arab nationalism
developed as a reaction against the atrocities of the Turks. Al Kawakibi, one of the Arab
intellectuals, in his quest to restore the purity of Islam and the past glory of the Arabs, argued
that the inferiority of the Islamic world was a natural result of religious defectiveness:
33 Roderic H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian Muslims in the
Nineteenth Century," American Historical Review, vol. 59, no. 4 (July 1954).
34 C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology," in
The Modern Middle East, eds. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury and Mary C. Wilson
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 375-393.
35
Is there anyone who doubts that the existing religion is not the
religion by which our ancestors were distinguished over the world? Nay,
unfortunate changes have fallen upon the religion which has changed its
foundations.35
In fact, the Arab's divorce from the Turks gives credit to theories of Turkish
oppression and corruption. The Turks undermined the pre-eminence of the Arabs and
pushed them toward separation. This separation was accomplished by the Great Arab Revolt
in 1914, led by Sherif Hussein ofMecca.
The former studies emphasized the role of the Turks in the decline and defeat of the
Empire. The studies that inspect the external factors represented by the anti-Ottoman
policies carried out by the European powers differ substantially. These studies assert that
the European powers, in the struggle to bring down a weaker opponent, were not, by any
means, reluctant to perform their objective. They directly attacked Ottoman domains
through military, economic, and diplomatic means. Moreover, they intervened in the internal
affairs of the Empire and blocked all attempts that were taken to remedy the sick Empire.
One of the works that examined the European antagonistic procedures towards the
Ottoman Empire is Barbara Jelavich's monograph, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers,
and the Straits Question, 1870-1887?6 With a solid diplomatic history based on extensive
35
Ibid., 385.
36 Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits
Question: 1870-1887 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).
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documentary research, Jelavich showed that the fate of the Ottoman Empire lay in the hands
of the European powers. They entered into a period of imperial expansion, one of whose
prime target was the possessions of the Ottoman Empire.
As Jelavich observed, the Ottoman Empire, as a weak state, was usually a stronger
supporter of legality in international relations and the sanctity of treaties. On the other side,
the European powers did not regard their agreements in a similar manner. In fact, the
European powers, regardless oftheir rivalry and conflicting interests, unanimously approved
repeated violations of the treaties. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire lost territories and
people through legal and illegal actions of European powers.
The aversion and hypocrisy of the European powers took other dimensions during
that period. The believers in liberalism were convinced that their principles and theories
could immediately be applied to all people and all places. Moreover, it was the duty of their
governments and troops to transfer such ideas all over the world. However, if such ideas
conflicted with their interests, they would quit supporting them.
The Ottoman Empire was subject to European criticism as it was an absolute
monarchy without a representative government. The European self-contradiction was clear
in the reaction toward the establishment of a constitutional government in the Ottoman
Empire, which started officially in 1876. In his work, The First Ottoman Constitutional
Period: A Study in Midhat Constitution and Parliament, Robert Devereaux37 observed that
the prejudiced Europeans did not even bother to wait to read the constitution before
37 Robert Devereaux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study in Midhat
Constitution and Parliament (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963).
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presenting their judgment. England, the dean of the constitutional states, had the most
hostile and disappointing reaction to the constitution. Devereaux wrote:
The constitution was widely viewed in England as a shame and an
outrageous defiance ofthe powers, which one newspaper termed as a reckless
and suicidal course foisted on the Sultan by a "blind and willful" minister and
his "carelessly acquiescent colleagues." The constitution as a project meant
nothing, for even if the Empire contained the elements necessary for an
independent parliament, which it strongly doubted, a parliament dominated
"by Asiatic and African barbarism would be quite unacceptable."38
According to Devereaux, the hypocrites could not admit that their objection to the
constitution lay on the grounds that it maintained Islam as the religion of the state. The
European powers had exploited the existence of Christians in the Ottoman Empire and
objected to the idea of a constitution. Devereaux concluded that European attitude showed
that it was Europe, not Turkey, where religious fanaticism was the guiding principle.
Apparently, the Ottoman Empire was harmed by the European policies and by the
dark picture that most of the people of Europe held of it, an attitude that was in a sense a
repetition ofthe old crusading spirit of the past.
The previous studies disagree on the argument to the question of the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, yet they remain valuable as they balance between the internal and external
factors that brought down the Empire. However, Turkey's relations with the West have
never been determined yet. Turkey is still at a crossroads. This fact will be examined in
exploring the literature about modern Turkey.
38
Literature on Modern Turkey
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire decided to enter the war on the side ofthe
central powers. The Ottoman Empire could have stayed neutral in that conflict; however,
this choice proved to be fatal to the empire. It resulted not only in its defeat, but also the
occupation of Turkey by the Allied troops. During the occupation, it was the nationalist
movement under the leadership of General Mustafa Kemal Ataturk that launched the War
of Independence. Ataturk mobilized the Turkish resistance to the invasion, and after three
years of bitter struggle, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923, with Mustafa Kemal
as its president and founder.39
With the object of transforming Turkey into a modern state, Ataturk had abolished
the Caliphate, and set off a program of secular reforms that made Turkey the first Muslim
country to disestablish Islam. The process of transformation is detailed in Bernard Lewis's
work, The Emergence ofModern Turkey.40 Lewis opened his work with the process of slow
decline of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then he moved
to the twentieth century and traced the roots of revolutionary change and the advent of the
Kemalist principles.
38 Ibid., 87, 88.
39 Ataturk's image is very contradictory. While the majority of Turks believe that
he is legendary and the man of the century, most Muslims view him as no more than an
illegitimate son who became the enemy of Islam in Turkey.
40 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 2nd Ed. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1968).
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Lewis believed that nationalism in the Turkey of the 1950s was based not just on the
Westernizing revolution of 1920, but also on nationalist sentiments, which had been
developing since the French Revolution. Among the ideas of the French Revolution that
were attractive enough to borrow, imitate, and adopt were individual freedom and
nationalism. According to the author, the evolution of the corporate senses of identity and
loyalty among Turkish people culminated in their divorce from their tradition and their
attempt to establish a national society and to follow the path ofWestern civilization. Lewis
had a word of explanation:
The basic change in Turkey, from Islamic Empire to a national
Turkish state, from a medieval theocracy to a constitutional republic, from a
bureaucratic feudalism to a modern capitalist economy was accomplished
over a long period, by successive waves of reforms and radicals.41
Lewis was very optimistic regarding the Turkish experience of Westernization. He
praised the experiment and compared it with the great European revolutions in England,
France, and Russia. Much had changed in Turkey during the rule of Ataturk, and few Turks
had a good word to say about the Kemalist principles. Ataturk had overthrown the Koranic
rules and thought that his action was the endorsement ofmodernity. However, Turkey is still
a Third World country. It is still more like most of its neighbors to the south or east. These
facts are not accepted by Lewis. His work indicates that Ataturk was a hero able to drag
Turkey from the eighteenth century to the 1920s. One wonders whether Lewis has modified
his views in the light of the recent tragic happenings in Turkey.
41 Ibid., 481.
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The crux of Turkish events from independence until the early 1990s is detailed in
Feroz Ahmed's work, The Making ofModern Turkey.42 Ahmed argued that Turkey did not
rise as a phoenix out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was made in the image of the
Turkish elite that responded to both internal and external inspirations. Ahmed agreed with
Lewis regarding the process of change and the role of the legendary Ataturk in this
transformation. As Ahmed pointed out, Turkey was transformed from a traditional Islamic
state to a modern secular one based on Ataturk's image. Ahmed believes that the process
ofmaking Turkey is still going on after more than seven decades.
Turkey gave priority to her relations with the West; however, the Western response
was cool and sometimes humiliating. Turkey is still denied membership in the European
Union. Therefore, Turkey might change its direction and knock at the doors ofthe East. As
Ahmed concluded, the history of modern Turkey shows that the Turks have the ability to
deal with changing situations in the world order.
While Ahmed admits the bitter fact that Turkey is still at a crossroads in terms of its
identity and its relation with the West, Ahmed did not offer any explanation for this crisis.
Turkey, for years and years, has been struggling to gain legitimacy in Western eyes. The
Turkish secular elite defines Turkey as a Western society; however, the Western elite refuses
to accept Turkey as such. Turkey is being considered as a client of, but never as a partner




Writing from this perspective, Brace R. Kuniholm in his article "Turkey and the
West," declared that Turkey's relationship with the West is determined by Western security
concerns rather than by mutual interests.43 According Kuniholm, during the Cold War era,
Turkey was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Thus, Turkey
became an active member in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Though the
Soviet threat ended with the Cold War, Turkey's strategic importance was never eliminated.
As the author pointed out, during the Gulf War, Turkey played a pivotal role in the anti-Iraq
coalition. However, the West paid lip service for mat favor and Turkey's membership in the
European Union was rejected. Kuniholm warned that if Turkey's struggle to join the West
continues to fail, the consequences would be a reversal in the Westernization process and a
revival of Islamic religion. Kuniholm explained the rise ofIslamic movement in Turkey by
the failure of the West to provide incentives to Turkey. In fact, this is a misleading and
superficial explanation for Islamic revival in Turkey. While Turkey's closeness to the West
was a product of the Cold War, communism's collapse and the relaxing of the political
climate opened the way for the Turkish masses to freely express their fears and expectations.
As they were no longer concerned about communism, they became more worried by the
spread of libertarian values and Western morality or immorality, and they seek a moral
framework that Islam can provide. The debate over this issue started in the early 1950s with
the country's transformation towards a multi-party system. Among the works on this topic
43 Brace R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70 (Spring
1991).
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is "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter Elites," written
by the Turkish sociologist Nilufer Gole.44 Gole, a Turkish scholar with deep knowledge of
his country, reviewed the arguments of both parties: the secularists and the Islamists. As
Gole mentioned, the secularists believe in a secondary role of religion in the society. They
consider the separation of the state and the mosque as a requirement for modernization,
democracy and other Western values. The Islamists, on the other hand, believe in a
fundamental role of religion in the society, so they struggle to move religion from the
periphery of the system to the center. They criticize and fight against the corrupting
influence of Western immorality. Gole called attention to the battle lines of this dispute.
These include lifestyle, world-views, gender relations, and other normative values.
According to Gole, the Islamists have been successful in many political and social areas.
The veiling ofwomen is just one example in this context. Veiling symbolizes Islamization
as a way of life. It also signifies the political participation and the active voluntary re-
appropriation of an Islamic identity by the Turkish women.
Literature on Sudan
The most fundamental fact about Sudan is its ethnic and cultural diversity.
Throughout history, the country's plight had been its failure to accommodate this diversity.
In the past, regional and foreign powers (mainly Britain and Egypt) had successfully played
the card of diversity to achieve their own interests. Unfortunately, the modern history of
44 Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and
Counter Elites," Middle East Journal, vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 1997).
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Sudan since independence in 1956 demonstrates that Sudan's successive regimes (both
military and civilian) have been unable to accommodate the diverseness of their people with
the same inclusivity. The outcome of such a situation is not only a legacy of total distrust
among the Sudanese people but also a continuous brutal civil conflict with devastating
consequences.
In a joint work by P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, the authors emphasized that two main
factors predominate in the modern history of Sudan.45 The first factor is the Arab- Islamic
influence that started with the early contacts between the Muslim Arabs based in Egypt and
the pagan and Christian Sudanese. While these contacts had begun hundreds of years ago,
their effects on Sudan are still visible. Though the crisis of identity in Sudan is one side of
this influence, Sudan's engagement with the Arabic world and Egypt's hegemony over
Sudan is another side. In fact, from the beginning of recorded history until this moment,
Egypt has been the most important regional power in Sudan's affairs.46
The second factor that has had deep influence on Sudan is the British legacy. British
policy aimed at the separation ofthe south from the north by economic and cultural methods.
Holt and Daly observed:
45 P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, A History ofthe Sudan: From the Coming ofIslam
to the Present Day (London and New York, Longman, 1988).
46 The Egyptian influence on Sudan has not been terminated by the country's
independence. Egypt still views Sudan's affairs as part of its internal affairs. It is
difficult for a Sudanese regime to gain regional and international legitimacy without
Egyptian support.
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Religious policy in the south differed markedly from that pursued in
the Muslim north. Obsessed with the dangers posed to the internal security
by fanatic Islam, Wingate and his subordinates sought to exclude Muslim
influence altogether from southern provinces. Christian missionary
organizations were allotted spheres for proselytization in the South.
Education, in English language, was entrusted to them. Efforts were made to
discourage the learning and use of Arabic and even wearing of Arabic dress.4
This viewpoint was shared by Richard Gray in his work, The History ofthe Southern
Sudan: 1839-1889, where he examined the motives of British policy.48 According to the
author, Christianity and commerce were the primary motives for European missionaries,
explorers and traders. Thus, these were the real objectives, not the so-called "white man's
burden" meant to bring European civilization to the isolated pagan tribes all over the world,
including southern Sudan. As commerce was not conducted on an equal basis, exploitation
and robbery of southern Sudan was achieved by prolonged oppression and ruthless
subjugation. The result of this policy left a legacy of bitter hatred towards those intruders.
The policy of divide and rule was used by the British Colonial Office. However, in
southern Sudan, this policy was destructive. The British were masters in stimulating existing
rivalries between the Arabs and Africans. Gray provides a vivid picture of this policy:
47 Ibid., 125.
48 Richard Gray, The History ofthe Southern Sudan: 1839-1889 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1961).
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Adoption to the outside world, took place through a farced mingling
of blood and a harsh turbulent disruption. The clash between pagan southern
and Arab northern has dominated the subsequent history of the area, but it
was decision and actions of European traders which inaugurated and
intensified the conflict.49
The earlier authors emphasized the role of the British policies of fostering divisions
within Sudanese societies. However, the authors did not explain the ethnic, internal warfare
that plagued Sudan long before the advent of European conquest. In fact, slavery is one of
the fundamental issues that poisoned the relationship between the Arabs and the Africans.
There is no doubt that the legacy of the slave trade continues to haunt modern Sudan.
If British colonization fostered the hostility between the northern and southern people
of Sudan, one might consider the post-independence period and raise such questions: As both
the Arabs and Africans of Sudan joined together in the struggle against colonization, why
could not the post-independence period bring an end to this antagonism? Why could not the
Sudanese people forge a sense of national identity and unity and achieve peaceful co
existence in modern Sudan? What is the missing link that the Sudanese lack to act as a
unifying force?
One way to address the previous questions is to review some of the literature that
covers this period. Furthermore, it is necessary to present the southern view. Francis M.
Deng, a prominent southern intellectual who has served as Sudan's minister of state of
foreign affairs, provided a penetrating analysis for the crisis that has shattered his country.





policies of Sudan's successive governments are the core of the conflict.3 According to the
author, after independence, the northern government carried out ruthless and suppressive
policies that reinforced the historical animosities and made the northern and southern peoples
view each other as foreigners if not enemies. Deng wrote:
The relationship between the north and the south ... has essentially
been one of the internal colonialism, in which northern culture and religion
were forcibly imposed on the southerners. Southerners did not regard any
government in Khartoum as having legitimacy over them. In their views,
northern rule was a transfer of colonial control from the British to south's
traditional enemies in the north.51
Deng contends that the sharp contrast and mistrust between the north and the south
was deepened by the failure of both military and civilian governments to respond to the
aspirations of the southerners. Deng goes further and points out that even the Addis Ababa
Agreement that ended the war in 1972 for ten years was not initially intended by Numeri to
achieve an everlasting peace. The accord, as political events later proved, was a tactical
move by Numeri, a desperate dictator in search of a political base of representative power.52
In fact, one cannot share this judgment with Deng on the grounds that after the
agreement, Sudan enjoyed stability for the first time after independence. The 1970s was a
decade ofhope due to the promise of stability and development in the whole of Sudan. The
50 Francis M. Deng, War of Visions: Conflict ofIdentities in Sudan (Washington,




reconciliation proved that no military solution is possible to the problem of the south.
Moreover, Numeri began to move regionally and internationally as an advocate for peaceful
settlements of disputes.53
With the renewal of the war and its tragic impacts on both the north and the south,
it is pertinent to present the view of the leader of the south, John Garang, the founder of
SPLM and the commander in chief of Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA).
In The Callfor Democracy in Sudan, which is a collection of letters, speeches, and
news conferences by the leader of (SPLM/A), Garang explained the motives for the
establishment of the movement, its genesis and objectives, and the ways and means of
accomplishing these objectives.54 According to Garang:
The ills of Sudan can be solved within the context of a united Sudan
under a socialist system that affords democratic and human rights to all
nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religious beliefs and outlooks. A
united and socialist Sudan can be achieved only through protracted
revolutionary armed struggle.55
In contrast to what most ofthe northern Sudanese think about the movement, Garang
53 Being successful in reconciling the conflict in his country, Numeri moved
regionally and played a vital role in ending the civil war in Chad. Numeri acted under the
auspices of the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) as peaceful settlements of disputes is
among its objectives. Moreover, Numeri tried to end the civil war in Lebanon. Finally,
Numeri was among the very few Arab leaders who maintained strong relations with
Egypt after it signed a peace agreement with Israel.
54 John Garang, The Callfor Democracy in Sudan, edited and introduced by




made it apparent that his movement is nationalist rather than regionalist. His movement is
committed to liberate or advance the interest of the whole Sudan, not those of the south in
any narrow sense. It is also a unionist not secessionist organization as it's committed to the
establishment of a "new united and integrated Sudan."
As these objectives can neither be asked from nor negotiated with the military regime
in Khartoum, Garang made it very clear that violent, not peaceful, struggle is the only way
to achieve the SPLM's objectives of freedom for the country as a whole.
In this context, one cannot fathom the reasons beyond Garang's optimism to achieve
peace by armed struggle. The longest African civil war has proved to be unwinnable.
However, both Garang and the Khartoum regime continue to believe in a military solution.
This ensures that the Sudanese people in the south as well as in the north will have
permanent sorrows and suffering and continue to pay the price for the madness of their
leaders.
In this war, the chief losers are the people of the south, where all the fighting takes
place. Part of the tragedy of the southern Sudanese people is told by J. Millard and Robert
0. Collin. In their work, Requiemfor Sudan: War, Drought, and Disaster Reliefon the Nile,
one can read a sad tale of brutality and despair about a tragedy that is still unfolding.56 The
authors shared most scholars' views about the impact ofthe misguided policies of Sudanese
leaders. Their policies, far from alleviating population tragedy, have actually intensified the
problem.
56 J. Millard and Robert O. Collin, Requiemfor Sudan: War, Drought, and
Disaster Reliefon the Nile (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).
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The authors provided a deep analysis of the impact of politics (local, domestic,
regional, and international) on relief operations. Using food as a weapon of war, water as
means of coercion, and the army as an instrument of revenge created a new situation for the
southern Sudanese people. Caught between the atrocities of the SPLA and the brutalities of
Sudanese government, they fled to neighboring countries as sanctuaries from war, drought,
hunger, and disease. By the end of 1989, nearly two million displaced persons were
registered in refugee camps.
While both belligerent sides used food as a weapon, and both are now being blamed
for the starvation and suffering oftheir own people, the lion's share of the blame must rest
on the Sudanese government. As the international community was outraged by these events,
finally it intervened and exerted pressures on the belligerent parties to accept a ceasefire to
enable the relief agencies to do their job. Their pressures resulted in the declarations of
Operations Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a crucial program designed to alleviate the suffering of
millions of southern Sudanese people. With the return of the military in 1989, the relief
efforts were blocked and the war escalated. The southern people remain the major victims
of these developments.
The situation in Sudan is best represented by the words of the English philosopher,
Thomas Hobbes, "They are in that condition called war, an such a war, as if every man,
against every man."57 In fact both belligerent parties have done little to contradict such
57 As later events proved, the military takeover in 1989 marked a new turning
point in the modern history of Sudan. The last eleven years for the Sudanese people were
a decade of despair.
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words.
Since the subject of this study deals specifically with the current crisis in Sudan, it
becomes imperative that a closer look should be focused on the literature that covers the
recent developments in Sudan with the return of the military in 1989. Thus, a number of
works that examine the current trends in Sudan with its new military-Islamic regime will be
selected to highlight Sudan's contemporary politics.
Abdel Wahab El. Affendi, in his work Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in
Sudan?* delineates with great clarity and broad scope the process whereby the leaders of the
Islamic project, initially the Muslim Brotherhood59 and later the National Islamic Front
(NIF), made a concrete attempt to elaborate the moral, economic, and political foundations
of coherent national governance.
While the NIF underwent nearly three decades ofpreparation in order to thoroughly
inscribe itself as a logical outcome to and emancipation from post-independence politics,
which was characterized by authoritarian rule, its current rule has proved to reflect the
disarray of the past with little difference. Hassan Turabi,60 the coordinator of the revolution,
58 Abdel Wahab El. Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan
(London: Grey Seal, 1991).
59 The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, an
Egyptian schoolteacher. His movement, which started as a small group in Egypt,
snowballed quickly to become a major political and social force not only in Egypt but
also throughout the Arab world.
60 Hassan Turabi is the mastermind of Sudan's current regime. He has a MA from
London and a doctorate from the Sorbonne. He is classified as a coordinator of
differences. For more information about Turabi's profile, see for instance Judith Miller,
"Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan Turabi and Mohammed Fadallah," Foreign Affairs,
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works at the level of philosophy and so was unable through his splendid formulations to
bridge the gap between high theory and the mundane practice. El. Affendi wrote:
The claims that Islam is powerful motivating force which can
revolutionize society and hasten economic development had been constantly
made since 1960's, argued at great length, but the political programs of the
movement did not translate these ideas into practical program to end Sudan's
economic dependency.61
El. Affendi observed that the NIF programs and policies have incorporated Sudan's
dependency and underdevelopment. Far from alleviating Sudan's misery, these policies have
profoundly intensified the agony of Sudan.
Although El. Afendi's history goes from the early Islamic reform movements in the
Arab world in general and Sudan in particular, he considers the current movement in Sudan
as one person's revolution. The critical question in this regard becomes to what extent was
it Turabi's revolution. There is no doubt that Turabi is an instrumental figure and played a
significant role in the revolution. However, one can argue that the modem Islamic
movement in Sudan, though it has unique characteristics, still shares a lot with the other
Islamic movements in the Arab and Islamic world. Part ofthe justification for the rise of the
Islamic movement is the ineffectiveness of established secular leadership in Muslim
societies. In other words, the justification relates to the fact that those charged with
vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994).
61 El. Affendi, Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan,\80.
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responsibility were not fulfilling it. The most important questions in this regard would be
how different was Sudan's Islamic project, and what, if any, are the accomplishments of such
a project.
In order to answer such questions, we must analyze both the internal and external
responses to Sudan's new regime. After 12 years of the Islamic experiment, the pressures
on and frustrations with the regime come from all sides. There were international pressures
from the Western powers and the United States specifically, from the United Nations, and
from major human rights organizations. There were regional pressures and criticism from
Sudan's neighbors, including Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia. Finally, there were internal
pressures from the Sudanese people, as they were fed up with the Islamists enjoying
economic and political privileges while the rest of the Sudanese people live in a grinding
poverty.
In fact, things have not gone very well with Sudan's regime from the very beginning.
A review of the regime's first year was made by Sadia Jamal.62 As Jamal observed, the
civilian government was overthrown on the grounds that it had neglected the armed forces,
failed to combat the deteriorating economic situation, corruption, and Sudan's increasing
isolation from its Arab and African neighbors. As Jamal argued, the military takeover was
hailed by both Arab and African countries; however, this initial welcome changed to almost
universal hatred due to the regime's unwise policies. After one year in power, Sudan was
expelled from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Civil war in the south worsened,
62 Sadia Jamal, "Under Bashir's Boot," New African, July 1990.
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relations with Sudan's neighbors—especially Egypt—deteriorated, and the Sudanese people
were silenced and intimidated.
The following years were even worse for the Sudanese people. As the proverb says,
"There is no smoke without fire." Sudan's tragedy is not without reasons. Having acquired
a reputation for hostility toward the West in general, and the United States in particular,
Sudan's regime now finds itselfbereft of friends in the developed world. In the Arab world,
Sudan's support of Iraq throughout the Gulf crisis has left it with few friends other than Iraq
and Libya. Increasingly, close ties with Iran have done little to contradict the fact that Sudan
with such friends does not need enemies.
Julie Flint commented on the misguided policies of Sudanese government as being
un-Sudanese.63 Since Al-Bashir has been in power, the government has stifled the majority
of the Sudanese people by death, torture, exile, and imprisonment.
As the regime has failed to create a popular base on democratic or human grounds,
it decided to rule through force and intimidation. These methods are unprecedented in
Sudan. However, Sudanese people continue to voice their grievances with the regime even
in this climate of fear. They speak angrily about the corruption of the regime. A member
of the National Assembly complained publicly:
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Julie Flint, "Under Islamic Siege," Africa Report (September/October 1993).
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There are many in this government who understand Islam in a
shocking and horrible and ugly and twisted way. Under the Islamic umbrella,
some have too free a hand to creep all over the place. They think that they
can do anything because they have beards. But being a devout Muslim does
not depend on pieces of hair hanging from your face. They are doing Islam
and Sudan a great disservice - and putting people who believe Islam can be
human in a very difficult situation.64
This statement demonstrates how little support Sudan's regime enjoys. If such a
statement was made by an ordinary Sudanese citizen, the Sudanese government could reply
by stating that he is a collaborator, but he is a member of Sudan's Parliament. On the other
hand, in such crisis of legitimacy, one might expect that such a regime will probably not last
for a long time; however, after more than 12 years in power, it seems that the Sudanese
people are suppressed and intimidated. Moreover, there appears to be little chance of change
for the foreseeable future and the silenced majority in Sudan knows this fact.
A review of the literature about Turkey seems to show that most scholars share one
specific view, and that is the view that Turkey's opening to the East follows the refusal of
Europe to open to it. However, these scholars were unable to provide a profound explanation
ofwhy Europe closes its gates to Turkey and yet builds a strong military relationship with
it. The argument that Turkey is an Islamic country and Europe wants to keep itself as a
Christian club is not adequate. In fact, the issue is more complex than that and there must
be other factors that have made Turkey appear not worthy to sit at the European Union (EU)
table.
64 Julie Flint, '"In the Name of Islam," Africa Report (May/June 1995).
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It is also observed that the existing literature misreads the Islamic revival in Turkey.
Most scholars argue that the reason for Islamic resurgence is the failure of integration with
Europe. To explain the Islamic revival in this way can be deceptive. It implies that Islam
has somehow disappeared or has been absent from Turkey. In fact, the Westernization
process and its poor achievements raised questions about the direction and accomplishments
of development, but religious sentiments were always strong among the Turkish people. It
was the political climate during the Cold War era that prevented the Turkish people from
voicing their aspirations and dissatisfaction with the perceived immorality of the West.
Finally, works on Turkey's relations with the outside world are insufficient. Where
they exist, Europe and the United States are the major areas under study.
A review of the above-mentioned body of literature on Sudan demonstrates that
Sudan's misfortune is oversimplified when it is explained by the incompatibility between the
Arab Muslim north and the African non-Muslim south. In fact, not all the Sudanese in the
north are Arab Muslims in harmony with the regime and its policies. Moreover, there are
northern Muslims who support southern demands. They joined the southerners with their
struggle for freedom and justice and opposed the promulgation of Islamic law. By the same
token, there are many southern people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, who disagree with
the policies and activities of the SPLM. As a very large country with complex ethnic
combinations, it is torn not only by the dichotomy of south and north. In fact, in both
regions, there is tension between the haves and the have-nots, religious versus secular,
traditional against modern, military versus civilian, and finally majority against minority.
All these cleavages have torn and complicated the crisis in Sudan.
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Moreover, this literature blames the Islamic experiment for all the ills of Sudan. His
explanation contradicts the fact that all the political systems that the Sudanese people have
tried since independence have failed. They have tried everything: Socialism, Marxism,
Islam, democracy, and military dictatorship. So far, none of these systems has worked in
Sudan.
Finally, it is also observed that no attempt was made to examine the role of foreign
powers in the war in the south. Regional and international actors have played the card of
southern Sudan to advance their own interests. They escalated the war and blocked all
attempts of reconciliation.
This study attempted to cover all the aspects of this subject. It was an attempt to
share with the scholars of contemporary Sudan and Turkey this author's views of the
countries' past and present problems, and air some thoughts with regard to their future.
Significance of the Study
As shown above, several studies have examined the politics of Sudan and Turkey,
but hardly any ofthem have compared those two countries with their contrasting experiment
of secularization and Islamization. Moreover, most of the previous studies on Sudan's
Islamic experiment and Turkey's efforts of secularization were primarily subject to the
authors' ideological position in evaluating each experiment. It is this author's belief that,
whatever the consequences of each attempt, the native people ofTurkey and Sudan should
be the core ofjudgment.
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The significance of this research lies in the fact that Sudan and Turkey need to re-
examine and reform themselves so as to alleviate the agonies of their people and minimize
the impact of the anti-position and policies of the foreign powers. Most especially, it is
concerned with the inability of both countries to accommodate their own people and the
outside world. It is very painful, disturbing, and disappointing that Turkey with its rich
historical record as the standard-bearer of Islam, strives to join the European club when the
cost is its faith and dignity. It is also painful that the Islamic experiment in Sudan has
resulted in a catastrophe for the country. How could both countries reconcile their internal
differences and avoid the dangers ofwar, disintegration, and antagonism with the external
world? Ifthere is no political will to work for these objectives, more decades of sorrow may
follow. Hopefully, this study brings to light policies, events, and activities that have not been
fully studied, but are essential to understand what went wrong in Turkey and Sudan.
Therefore, the present study makes some substantive, intellectual contribution toward this
goal by seeking to scrutinize the crisis in both countries and possibly come up with some
prescriptions for the policymakers of both countries. Any useful ideas generated in this
study might help change the course of events and offer an opportunity ofpeace, freedom, and
stability for all.
Finally, this study adds to the existing literature on the crisis ofthe Islamic world in
general, and in Sudan and Turkey, in particular. It also adds to the ongoing debate on the
rise of the Islamic movements and its impact on the West.
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Organization of the Study
This study is organized in seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the study. It
presents the statement of the problem, the methodology and data collection, the literature
review, and the significance of the study. It is in this introductory chapter that the general
guidelines, assumptions, definitions, research concerns, and hypothesis of this study are
established. Chapter Two seeks to provide a historical background of both Turkey and
Sudan. It starts with the Ottoman Empire, its rise and fall, and its cooperation and
confrontation with the European powers. Also, this chapter discusses Sudan's contacts with
the outside world. It starts with the Arabic and Islamic conquest and ends with the British
colonization and its deadly legacy. If history is a guide, this chapter is crucial to an
understanding of the current crises in Turkey and Sudan highlighted in the following
chapters. Chapter Three presents Muslims' different responses to secularism, and is followed
by a comparison outlining the arguments of all sides on many significant themes. Chapter
Four examines and discusses both countries' experiments of secularization and its
counterpart Islamization. The Kemalist principles, the rise of the Islamic movement in
Turkey, Sudan's experiment with both ideologies, and the people's reaction to such
ideologies in both countries are detailed. Chapter Five presents Muslims' reaction to
nationalism. The development of Turkish and Arab nationalisms is also analyzed in this
chapter. Chapter Six is devoted to the crisis ofnational identity in both countries. Priority
is placed on the struggle of the Kurds and the southern people of Sudan against the
governments ofAnkara and Khartoum. The reasons of the conflict, the role of the foreign
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powers, the impact of the conflict, and the prospects of reconciliation are among the major
components of this chapter. Chapter Seven, which is the final chapter, summarizes the





History indicates that the founders of the Ottoman Empire were originally Turkish
nomads who converted to Islam in the tenth century.1 Like the Arab peoples in the seventh
century in Arabia, the Ottomans were separate tribes settled in the region of Anatolia, with
slight contacts with the outside world. However, after their conversion, they welded together
and became a formidable force that has changed the course of events in world history.
As devout Muslims, the Ottomans began to fulfill their religious duties by extending
the Darul Islam (the world ofthe faithful). The Ottomans were able to take advantage ofthe
decay of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of social and religious discontent among its
people. Internal strife in the Byzantine Empire had minimized resistance to the Ottoman
troops. Clark comments:
1 Roderic H. Davison, Turkey: Short History (England: The Eothen Press, 1998),
20.
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This misgovernment and oppression produced its natural results.
The people of the provinces, especially those more remote from the capital,
were inspired with a bitter hatred ofthe imperial government, which prepared
them to welcome any foreign invader as a deliverer from the oppression
under which they groaned.2
Consequently, many Christian rulers in the outlying areas of the Byzantine Empire
agreed to surrender their cities to the Ottomans and welcomed them as liberators. Moreover,
some converted to Islam and later led the Ottoman armies to expand the rule of Islam.3
Islam served as a new bond among all those converts who professed it. As a religion,
it stressed the community of believers over ethnic, cultural, or social differences. Islam
accepted the Christian Greeks as brothers upon their conversion. However, this tolerant
nature of Islam was not the only reason for conversion. Conversion had several benefits,
such as access to trade and fewer taxes. It also was an opportunity to join a dominant social,
economic, and political group, and thus to have access to power and wealth.4
In the span of one hundred years, the Ottomans created a state that took over the core
of the Byzantine Empire. Inevitably, there must be an explanation for such rapid
transformation within one hundred years of a tiny state into a great Islamic Empire. No
explanation can be final, but there are several pertinent reasons. For one, as the European
Christians fought among themselves, there was no unified power to challenge the appearance
2 Edwon L. Clark, Turkey (New York: Peter Feleon Collier, 1878), 17.
3 Price, A History ofTurkey: From Empire to Republic, 36-37.
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of the Ottomans in Europe. "The Bulgarians, Servians, Bosnians, and Greeks were madly
jealous of one another; each ofthem preferred the extension of the Ottoman rule to that of
their rivals."5
Furthermore, Christian leaders, during their conflicts, appealed to the Ottomans for
aid against each other. This state of affairs was very favorable to the Ottomans. The best
example of Christian assistance to the Ottoman conquests came from the Byzantines. John
Cantacuzene, the Byzantine emperor, hired Ottoman troops to fight for him in 1343. He
offered his young daughter to the Ottoman Sultan for the aid of six thousand troops and gave
the Sultan a green light to expand at the expense of the Byzantine Empire in Europe. The
Sultan accepted the offer and sent his troops to Europe.6 It was the first time a Christian state
had sought the assistance of the Islamic Empire, but as events will demonstrate it would not
be the last.7
At that time, the Ottoman Sultans were a major source of power for the Ottoman
Empire. They were devout Muslims, concerned for the welfare and safety of their Empire
more than for privileges and pleasures. Furthermore, they were adroit politicians; they
played their enemies off each other and married into Christian royal families for political
4 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923, 30.
5 Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol, The Turkish Empire (London: T. Fisher
Unwin Ltd., 1924), 37.
6 Ibid., 26-27.
7 See for instance, Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 44.
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gain. The early history ofthe Ottoman Empire is full of names of gifted leaders including
Bayazid the Great Sultan, Selim the Just, Suleyman the Magnificent, or the Law Giver, and
Mehmed the Conqueror. Such leaders give much support to the "great man" theory of
history. There were also internal reasons for Ottoman success. The Ottoman Sultans created
military and administrative systems that proved highly workable. There was a professional
standing army to protect the borders of the state and keep order and security inside as well
as to conquer Christian lands outside.8 Also, there was a great naval force that dominated
the Mediterranean in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.9 This military institution became
one of the pillars of the Empire. "Throughout Ottoman history the army along with the
Sultan's palace establishment, remained the largest, most elaborate, and most expensive part
of the Empire's ruling institution."10
The Ottomans also created an organized administration that was free from corruption,
oppression, and injustice. The efficiency and justice in this administration can be seen by
its tolerance towards the non-Muslim religious communities and foreign subjects resident
in the Empire. These groups were able to go about their business without interference by
Ottoman authorities.11 The Ottomans were most tolerant of all religions in striking contrast
8 Stanford Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol. 1
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1976): 25.
9 Price, A History ofTurkey: From Empire to Republic, 50.
10 Dankwart Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic,"
World Politics, vol. II, issue 4 (July 1959): 514.
11 Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 164.
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to the bigotry and persecution that prevailed then among the East European Christians.12
In fact, according to Islamic teachings, religion, race, class, and color should not be barriers
to tolerance in the Islamic society. It seems that only when the Muslims fell away from their
religious teachings did they decline in tolerance.
In sum, the organized military and administrative machine, established in the early
years of the Ottoman Empire, provided stability and prosperity to the Empire.
The Decline of Ottoman Empire: Internal Problems and External Pressures
The Internal Problems
It is not an easy task to assign a specific date to the origin of the decline of a great
empire. However, the date September 1683 could be used, as it was then that the Ottoman
troops were forced to retreat from Vienna.13 After that, the Ottomans suffered hard from
continuous defeats at the hands of European powers until the Empire was dissolved after
World War I.
. In the beginning, the Ottomans saw the problems of their defeats and setbacks in
purely military terms. They had lost their old military supremacy and they propounded
military remedies. While the role of the military factor is essential in explaining the failure
12 Price, A History ofTurkey: From Empire to Republic, 48.
13 Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 33.
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of the Ottomans to conquer Vienna and advance more deeply into Europe, it was not the
sole factor. A variety of factors accounted for the defeat and decline ofthe Ottoman Empire.
At the internal level, the decline of the Empire started at the center of power. The
Sultans, once a major source of the strength of the Empire, later laid the foundation of its
downfall. The tradition of early days of great Sultans began to fade away, and indiscipline
to grow. The Sultans lost their power to govern efficiently. They ceased to take the field
with their troops, withdrew from public affairs, and devoted themselves to the pleasures of
their harem.14 From Sultan Selim (1566-1574), the Sot or the Drunk, to Sultan Abdulhamit
I (1774-1789), the Incompetent, Sultans were, with few exceptions, weak, corrupt,
incompetent, and in some cases mentally defective.15 As the Turkish saying has it "The fish
stinks from the head." Sultan Murad (1574-1595) set the example of corruption by selling
offices to his own favorites:16
As a result of this evil practice ofthe sale of offices, the whole system
ofgovernment, from top to bottom, was infected with bribery and corruption.
The judges, equally with the officers, were corrupt, and gave their judgments
to the highest bidder.17
14 For a historical analysis of the role ofwoman in the decline of a once mighty
empire, see the work of Leslie P. Pierce, The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in
the Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
15 Davison, Turkey: A Short History, 62-64.
16 Eversley, The Turkish Empire, 154.
17 Ibid., 154.
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As justice was sold and bought, oppression, corruption, theft, and social unrest
became standard fare in the Ottoman Empire. Under such conditions, it was inevitable that
other institutions of the Empire would be influenced. The bureaucracy, once noted for its
efficiency, became infused with nepotism, and the buying and selling of offices was a
common practice.18
The Janissaries, once the backbone ofthe Ottoman army, became a threat to the state
as they got involved in politics and became concerned only with their own privileges.19
Moreover, a succession of weak Sultans was conducive to regional governors,
especially in remote areas, gaming power at the expense of the central authority. In some
cases, as in that of Muhammad Ali in Egypt, the regional governors became completely
independent from Istanbul. This encouraged some subject nationalities in the Empire to
struggle against their Ottoman rulers to establish their own nation states.20
Finally, these political problems were accompanied by economic hardships. In an
empire that was geared to war,21 continuous military defeats and consequently territorial
losses, and little or no spoils, worsened the economic situation. They meant the loss of
18 William L. Cleveland, A History ofthe Modern Middle East (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994), 57.
19 Lewis, Turkey, 34.
20 Albert Hourani, A History ofArab Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
Bellenap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 273-275. Also, Cleveland, A History
ofthe Modern Middle East, 64.
21 Jason Goodwin, Lords ofthe Horizon: A History ofthe Ottoman Empire (New
York: A John Macreal, Owl Book, 1998), 65.
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sources of wealth and power. This produced over-taxation, corruption, and theft.
The economic situation was further affected by the high inflation in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.22
In sum, the institutions and traditions by which the glories of the past had been
achieved later lost their prestige and efficiency, thus setting the stage for the collapse and
disintegration of the Empire. Moreover, there was a reciprocal relationship between
domestic defects and the loss of power in the foreign field as will be discussed in the
following section ofthis study.
Intense External Pressures
With the failure of the second siege ofVienna in 1683 (the first unsuccessful siege
had been in 1529), Ottoman decline became irresistible. The defeat of the Ottoman army
was celebrated all over Christian Europe as a great victory. Among the consequences ofthe
victory, the European powers ceased to fear the Ottoman army, and further began to attack
Ottoman territories.23
The European powers set out to acquire territories from the Ottoman Empire. In the
span of 125 years (1683-1812), the Ottomans lost all their possessions on the north coast of
22 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 47.
23 John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965), 265-287.
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the Black Sea including Bukovina, southern Ukraine, and the Crimea.24
In the meantime, a new danger appeared on the eastern borders of the Ottoman
Empire that was destined to have profound effects upon the fortunes of the Empire and to
further its decline. It was the Russian Empire that started to expand southward into the
Caucasus at the expense of the weak Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were aware of this
danger, but their attempts to counter it were unavailing.25
From 1800 until its disintegration following World War I, the Ottoman Empire
became increasingly dependent on the European great powers for protection against Russia.
Russia considered the Ottoman Empire a "sick man" whose possessions could be divided
among the European powers. In 1853, in an interview with the British ambassador to Russia,
Sir Hamilton Seymour, the Russian tzar Nicholas I-told him:
We have in our hands a; sick man, a very sick man, it will be. I tell
you frankly, a great misfortune if" one of these day§ he should slip away
before all necessary arrangements were made.*6
However, the Russian desire to cooperate with Great Britain to divide the legacy of
the sick man was unavailing. Great Britain as well as other European powers regarded the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire as an indispensable element of the European balance of
24 Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (New York and
London: Martin Press, MacMillian, 1966).
25 Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: A BriefHistory ofthe Last 2000 Years (New
York: Scribner, 1995), 119.
26
William Miller, M.A., The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927
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power.27 Moreover, the European powers were suspicious of Russia's advances in
Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These suspicions continued until the collapse of the
Soviet Union in the 1990s.28
Thus, the survival ofthe Ottoman Empire from 1800 to 1919 was due to the rivalries
between the great powers and their failure to divide the legacy of the sick man rather than
to the sick man's determination to survive.29
Finally, as a result of this relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the European
powers, the Ottomans were compelled to allow the European powers to intervene legally on
behalf of Christian subjects according to the system of Capitulations.30 These not only
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), 203-204.
27 Ference A. Voli, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey
(Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 9.
28 The animosity between Russia on one side, and the Turks and the Western
Europeans was to renew after the end ofWorld Ward II. Turkey was viewed by the West
as a bulwark against the expansion of the Soviet Union in the Middle East; thus it became
a member ofNATO.
29 Marian Keut, ed., The Great Powers and the End ofthe Ottoman Empire
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984).
30 A Capitulation meant all subjects of a foreign power who happened to be
residing within the Sultan domains remained under the laws of their own country. Thus,
they enjoyed full exemption from Ottoman laws. These Capitulations became the cause
ofmuch evil and undermined the sovereignty of the Empire. See for instance Donald
Quatuert, The Ottoman Empire: 1700 -1922 (England: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 77 - 78.
70
increased European influence in internal Ottoman affairs, but also they gave the clearest
indication of the weakness and decadence of the Empire.31
The Attempts of Reform
Reform, modernization, Europeanization, and finally, Westernization are different
concepts that describe the continuous attempts ofthe late Ottoman Empire, now Turkey, to
copy the West. Reform or Westernization in the Ottoman Empire was a reaction to Western
domination and imperialism. Because the source of strength of the Christian European
powers was seen as their modern and professional armies, the Ottoman rulers tried to emulate
their Christian enemies.32 In other words, Christian armies had proved superior to Muslim
armies in the field; therefore, there might be some advantage in adopting European
techniques.33
The Ottomans were in desperate need to strengthen their army in order to end the
military defeats that threatened the very existence of the Empire. It is not surprising, then,
that military reforms started directly after the Ottoman's disastrous defeat at the hands of
Russia in 1774, and the humiliating peace ofKutchak Kainardj that gave Russia the right to
31 Lewis, Turkey, 32.
32 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press,
1991), 43.
33 Lewis, Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 49.
71
protect Orthodox Christians throughout the Empire.34 There is no doubt that the
agreement of Kutchak Kainardj marked the beginning of a series of abdications in favor of
the European powers.
As mentioned earlier, the reform program in the military field started in 1774, under
Sultan Abdulhamit I. This program was continued under the leadership of Sultan Selim II
(1789-1807), in which he tried to create a new European-style army.35 Military reforms
continued under successive Sultans until they ceased with the deposition of Sultan
Abdulhamit II in 1909.
The process of modernization that started in the military field in the eighteenth
century, later progressively expanded into other spheres of life. After the military, the
Ottomans tried to reform the system of government. The Ottomans responded to the external
threat of European expansion by military reforms; by the same token, they responded to
internal, social, and political pressures by reforming the political institutions and practices.
In 1839, Sultan Abdulmecid I proclaimed the Tanzimati Hayriye (beneficent reforms),
which ensured the equality ofMuslims and non-Muslims before the law, the security of life
and property, and several other legal reforms.36
34 The fatal treaty of Kutchak Kainardj has always been recognized by historians
and politicians as the starting point for further European intervention and
dismemberments ofthe Turkish Empire. For more details of the conditions of the treaty,
see for instance Eversley, The Turkish Empirefrom 1288 to 1914, 220-222.
35 William L. Cleveland, A History ofthe Modern Middle East, 62.
36 Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey ofAtaturk: Social Process in the Turkish
Reformation (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
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Furthermore, in 1876, the Ottomans adopted a constitution establishing an
assembly in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews were represented. Unfortunately, a year
later, the constitution was suspended.37 By that time, the atmosphere in the Empire was not
tolerant towards Western ideas of constitutionalism and liberalism. The conservative
elements in the Empire preferred anarchy and misrule to reform and liberation.
However, this atmosphere changed in the early part of the twentieth century. In
1908, the Young Turks, a younger generation of Turkish thinkers and statesmen, were not
satisfied with the practices of those in power. They were primarily concerned with
preserving the Empire. They feared that the Sultan's policies and practices, and European
interventions were endangering its existence. Therefore, they demanded reform in the center
ofpower, and a constitution, which meant a permanent check upon the power ofthe Sultan.38
Under such pressures, Sultan Abdulhamit II restored the constitution. In 1909, Abdulhamit
was deposed and replaced by Sultan Mehmet V (1908-1918). During Mehmet V's rule,
anarchy, internal strife and external pressures continued until the dissolution of the Empire
in 1918.39 It seems that the reform movement was too late to cure the sick man, who died
after World War I. In other words, the Ottomans did not accomplish much in the way of
reform and so they had to pay the price for their failure. As Toynbee put it, "Westernization
1939), 21.
37 McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, 302-306.
38 Lewis, Turkey, 46.
39 Ibid., 27-29.
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is an expensive process, and so a non-Western country like the Ottoman Empire could not
afford it."40
The Emergence ofModern Turkey
In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War as one of the Central
Powers, a decision that had fatal consequences for the Empire. By the end of the war, the
Empire was defeated. Furthermore, large parts ofthe Empire were occupied by the Allies.41
The Turks were ready to face the loss of their provinces outside Turkey, but not to
submit to foreign rule.42 Patriotic and religious feelings among the Turks paved the way for
the emergence of a great national hero who would emancipate their fatherland from foreign
occupation. It was under such circumstances when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came on the
scene and set about organizing national resistance in a War ofindependence. After two years
of resistance, Turkish troops under the leadership of Ataturk were able to drive the Greek
invaders out of Turkey. Furthermore, the Allies were forced to recognize the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Turkey according to the Treaty of Lausanne43 signed in July
40 Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1927), 50.
41 Harry N. Howard, The Partition ofTurkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 253.
42 Lewis, Turkey, 58.
43 Bulent Golcay, A Clash ofEmpires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and
British Imperialism 1918-1923 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 161-163.
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1923."" Then Ataturk, the founding father ofmodem Turkey set about his radical reforms
and plans to transform Turkey into a secular Western state.
In October 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a republic with Ataturk as its first
president. Ataturk continued his reforms, which culminated in the Kemalist principles:
elimination of Islamic law, abolition ofpolygamy, political rights for woman, introduction
ofthe Roman alphabet, etc.45 More details about these principles and their impact on modern
Turkey will be discussed in the following chapters.
The divorce between Islam and politics in Turkey became final with the adoption of
the constitution of 1928. The clause "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam" was deleted
from the constitution.46 hi doing so, Ataturk put an end to all hopes for the establishment of
an Islamic state in Turkey.
At the external level, Ataturk adopted the principle "peace at home and peace
abroad."47 Thus, confrontation and rivalry with the European powers were replaced by
cooperation and friendly relations. Turkey signed treaties of friendship with the Soviet
Union, England, and the United States.48 Turkey remained neutral in World War II, until it
44 Davidson, Turkey: A Short History, 386-387.
45 Price, A History ofTurkeyfrom Empire to Republic, 126-130. Also Webster,
The Turkey ofAtaturk, 129-130.
46 Davidson, Turkey: A Short History, 153.
47 Howard, The Partition ofTurkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923, 313. Also,
Bulent Gokay,^4 Clash ofEmpires, 101.
48 Voli, Bridge Across the Bosporus, 32-33.
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joined the Allies in February 1945 and declared war on Germany and Japan.49 Turkey
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.50
Much had changed since Turkey adopted secularism, and few Turks had gained the
fruits of this ideology. Political repression and economic depression had characterized the
years of 1955-1960. In the early 1960s, the failure of the civilian government to address
people's grievances pushed the army to intervene. In May 1960, the army carried out its first
bloodless coup so as to maintain unity of the country and integrity of the Kemalist
principles.51 The army leaders lived up to their promises, and elections were held the
following year. Then the civilian government was restored. In the following decades,
anarchy, violence, internal divisions, and severe economic problems shook the legitimacy
ofthe civilian governments and paved the way for the interventions ofthe army in 1971 and
1980.52
From 1980 to 2000 Turkey lived under conditions of varying degrees of instability.
During these years, two major developments took place that threatened its secular
experiment as well as its territorial integrity: 1) the rise of an Islamic movement opposed to
secularism and to Turkey's links with the West; and 2) the Kurdish conflict which led to
49
Ibid., 118.
50 Yasemin Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 1999), 36.
51 Omer Karaspana, "Turkey and U.S. Strategy in the Age of Glasnost," Middle
East Report, vol. 19, no. 5 (September, October 1989): 8.
52 Paul Kubicek, "Turkish European Relations: At A New Crossroads," Middle
East Policy, vol. VI, no. 4 (June 1999), 160-161.
guerrilla warfare between Kurdish fighters and the Turkish army. This conflict drew
criticism from the European Union, which Turkey wishes to join.53 In sum, Turkey, like
many Third World countries, enters the twenty-first century with both internal problems and
external pressures. The question is whether Turkey will be able to tackle all these
challenges.
Sudan: The Heritage of the Past
The Early History
While little is yet known about the ancient history of Sudan's southern region,
northern Sudan has a wealthy and well-chronicled history going back to the third millennium
B.C. The ancient history of northern Sudan can be traced to the Stone Age. The earliest
inhabitants were hunters and gatherers scattered along the banks of the Nile River, with
slight contacts with the outside world.54 However, in the following centuries, the region was
subject to Egyptian influence and occupation and it became an Egyptian province. It served
Egypt as a rich source ofgoods obtained through both trade and plunder. These commodities
included gold, ivory, and, most important, slaves. While slaves have been owned in black
Africa throughout recorded history, the ancient Egyptians were the first in the Middle East
who practiced slavery.55
53 Celik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 96.
54 Shillington, History ofAfrica, 9.
55 A detailed description of Sudan's relationship with Egypt at that time will be
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With the decline ofthe pharaonic empire in Egypt, the indigenous people in Sudan
were able to establish their first independent state known as Kush or Cush. Cush ruled
Sudan for almost 1000 years. It expanded northward and controlled Egypt to the shores of
the Mediterranean. It became a regional power, but it was not to last. In 350 A.D., it was
destroyed by the king of Axum, who marched down from the Ethiopian highlands. The
invasion resulted in the conversion ofthe majority of the population to Christianity.56
After the fall of Cush, two Christian kingdoms were established: Maqurra and Alwa.
Maqurra was the most powerful. It ruled Sudan until the fourteenth century, when it was
destroyed by Arab and Mamluk invasion from Egypt.57 With the destruction of Maqurra, a
new era in Sudanese-Egyptian relations began. From that time until independence in 1956,
Egypt's political claims in Sudan were based on the historical fact of occupation.
The Contacts with the Arabs and the Expansion of Islam
The connection between the two sides of the Red Sea had started from the earliest
dawn ofhistory. MacMichael's pioneering History ofthe Arabs in the Sudan58 has been the
found in the work of Robert O. Collins and Robert L. Tigner, Egypt and the Sudan
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).
56 On the spread of Christianity in Sudan and North Africa, see for instance
William V. Adams, Nubia: Corridor to Africa (New Jersey: Princeton Press, 1977), 433-
438. Also, Shillington, History ofAfrica, 66-68.
57 Collins, Egypt and the Sudan, 44-45.
58 H. A. MacMichael, A History ofthe Arabs in the Sudan, vol. 1 (New York:
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1922).
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baseline for the historical studies of Arab interaction with Sudan, and will be largely
followed here. According to MacMichael, from ancient time, trade in spices, ivory, gold,
and slaves flourished between Arabia and the ports of Egypt, Sudan, and East Africa.59
MacMichael concluded that Arab immigration, whether in search of trade or pasture had led
to the implanting of the definite Arab strain in the population of the northern Sudan.60
The Arabs did not try to penetrate into the interior of Sudan or Central Africa, or to
settle in these regions. Therefore, they stayed on the coastal plain, where they established
their centers of trade. In this context, one might question the Arabic reluctance or failure to
advance deep into the black continent. In fact, there are two main reasons that explain this
reluctance: first, the geographical obstacles. The Arabs were familiar with the desert, but not
with the equatorial forest. This was dense and unhealthy, and so was avoided by the camel
riders. Furthermore, this inaccessible interior was guarded by swamps, snakes, painful
insects, and finally a hot and humid climate.61
Second was the mundane motive. Before the advent of Islam, the Arabs were only
interested in trade and pasture. They were not inspired by an ideological motive such as
spreading the world of Islam. Therefore, as their interests could be achieved on the coast,
there was no need to push their way into the unsafe jungle. As it was not the responsibility
of traders to capture their slaves or hunt for ivory, they relied on indigenous African chiefs
59 Ibid., 3.
60 Ibid., 11. f
61 Z. A. Marsh and G. W. Kingsnorth, An Introduction to the History ofEast
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to supply them with the slaves and ivory they wanted. Thus, it was safer for them to
conduct their business on the coast, where the desired commodities would be brought by the
indigenous people.62
However, with the coming of Islam in the seventh century, things changed. The
Arabs, now united by the bond of religion, were determined to expand the land of Islam.
Muslim armies overran the lands to the east and the west. Egypt was conquered in 639 and
then became the military base for Muslim campaigns westward and southward in Africa.63
Two years after the conquest of Egypt, the Arabs tried to occupy Sudan. Twenty
thousand men were sent under the command ofAbdulla Ibn Sa'ad to conquer Sudan. The
Arab troops marched southward to Danqula, the capital ofthe Maqurra Christian state, but
they suffered heavy casualties and so retreated.64 However, as the spirit ofconquest was very
high among the Arab Muslims at that time, another attempt to conquer Sudan was made in
651. This time, Ibn Sa'ad's expedition was more successful. A peace treaty was signed
between the Arabs and the ruler of Maqurra in which the latter agreed to pay attribute to
Muslims:
Africa, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 49.
62 Ibid., 8,29, 32. Also, the nature of slavery is treated in Shillington's work
History ofAfrica, 174-178.





Each year you are to deliver 360 slaves which you will pay to the Immam
of Muslems from the finest slaves of your country, in whom there is no
defect, they are to be both male and female. Among them is to be no decrepit
old man or woman or any child who has not reached puberty. You are to
deliver them to the Wali ofAswan.65
While the treaty was in favor of the Arabs, it gave the state of Maqurra another 600
years of life, until it collapsed in the fifteenth century before Arab raiders and a Mamluk
military expedition from Egypt. The Arabs, then a dominant group, began to migrate and
settle southward, intermarrying with the Nubians and introducing to them both Islamic
religion and Arabic culture.66 However, it is evident that the power that won the victory for
Islam was not Arab soldiers, but Arab merchants and particularly missionaries, "Arab holy
men" who planted the seeds of Sufism in Sudan. The conversion of the Funj is the best
example of the success of those missionaries.67 What distinguished the work of those
missionaries is the kind of Islam they introduced to Sudanese people. The missionaries
emphasized the way of God through the mystical exercises of Sufism. J. Spencer
Trimingham writes:
They initiated their followers into the Sufi path they themselves
followed; but since Sufism at this time was at a very low ebb, for mysticism
in Islam is not only its highest but also its most degraded form, it was
materialized in the form ofthe cult ofmysterious powers, now Islamized in
the form of supernatural powers, therefore, personal allegiance and object
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reverence for the Shaileh was the thing that mattered.68
Two religious schools ofthought appeared in Sudan based on Sufi mystical ideas: the
Khatmaih and the Mahdist brotherhoods. Those two major religious movements have
dominated Sudan's political environment from their establishment in the nineteenth century
until this moment. Regardless of their rivalries and open hostility, the overwhelming
majority of Sudanese people belong to either the Khatmaih or Mahdist sects. More
discussion of these movements will be presented in the following pages as well as in the
subsequent chapters.
Egyptian - Ottoman Rule, and the Mahdist Revolution
In 1820, Muhammad Ali, viceroy of Egypt under the Ottoman Turks, sent an army
under the command ofhis son, Ismail, to occupy Sudan. There were personal, political and
economic reasons why Muhammad Ali invaded Sudan. His first motive was slaves that
Sudan could provide recruits for his army. In a letter to his treasurer, Muhammad Ali wrote:
"You are aware that the end of all our efforts and this expense is to procure Negroes. Please
show zeal in carrying out our wishes in this capital matter."69
A second motive was the exploitation ofthe resources of Sudan, such as gold, mines,
68
J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in the Sudan (London: Frank Cass & Co 1999)
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69 Ronald Oliver and Anthony Amore, Africa since 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge
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and ivory, for his schemes of modernization in Egypt. Third, there was the motive of
political expediency. In the early days of his rule over Egypt, Ali's most dangerous
opponents had been the Mamluks; after their power in Egypt had been destroyed, they had
taken refuge in Sudan where they started rebuilding their strength. Therefore, Ali decided
to eliminate their remnants in Sudan. Finally were the conditions of Sudan itself: weak and
vulnerable, but vast and rich. By adding Sudan to his authority, Ali would become a regional
power.70
By 1825, Egypt claimed most ofpresent Sudan. However, it was unable to establish
effective control of southern Sudan. Thus, that region remained an area of fragmented tribes
subject to frequent attacks by slave raiders.
While the conquest of Sudan was accomplished with little bloodshed, its
administration was not. As Ali occupied the country to exploit its human and natural
resources, he established a brutal administration that led to several uprisings including the
murder ofhis son Ismail.71 Describing part ofthe practices ofthe Egyptians in Sudan at that
time, Richard Hill writes:
There was an unsettling novelty about the practices of the new
masters of the north. The Egyptians interfered with everything, taxed
everybody. By applying a new system of taxation the Egyptians disrupted
the economic life ofthe people.72
Richard Hill, Egypt in the Sudan: 1820-1881 (London: Oxford University Press
1966), 7. .
71 Amore, Africa since 1800, 32, Also, Hill, Egypt in the Sudan, 16.
In the subsequent decades, the unhappy people of Sudan continued to groan under
the tyranny of Egypt. However, in the late years of the nineteenth century, two ominous
developments altered the course of events in Sudan. First, under Western pressures,
particularly from Great Britain, Egypt had to curtail slavery in Sudan. Ismail, the Khedive
of Egypt, commissioned English officer General Charles George Gordon to lead a crusade
against the slave trade and slavery.73 Gordon arrived in Sudan in 1877. He was received
enthusiastically by thousands of Sudanese people who looked upon him as their savior.74
The second development was the Madhist Revolution. In 1881, an Islamic preacher
named Muhammed Ahmed Ibn Abdulla proclaimed himself the Mahdi, "the rightly guided
person" who would fill the land with justice as it had been filled with injustice by the
Egyptian's oppression and misgovernment.75 Al-Mahdi was inspired by a vision of a truly
Islamic society. He was deeply offended by what he considered the infidelity ofthe Ottoman
and Egyptian rulers. Al-Mahdi's mission was to purify his country from the immorality of
the Egyptians and to establish an Islamic state similar to the first Islamic state founded by
72
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the prophet.76 ' 84
Al-Mahdi began to unify tribes in Western and Central Sudan. The Khatmiah as a
religious movement opposed Al-Mahdi as its followers had an interest in maintaining
Egyptian rule in Sudan. Khatmiah was not only a religious ally of the Egyptians, but also
benefited from the growing commercialism. The Mahdists put Khatmiah traders out of
business. Thus, Khatmiah adherents saw the Mahdists as a threat in both a spiritual and
commercial sense.77 The conflict between those two religious movements has not ended.
Al-Mahdi's followers were able to address the grievances of many Sudanese people and
convince them to join the movement. Moreover, some southerners cooperated with the
Mahdi in order to expel the Turkish-Egyptian garrison and free themselves from foreign
control and from predatory raids.78
In 1883, Mahdist forces armed, only with sticks and spears, destroyed a well-armed
Egyptian force of 10,000 men. The enthusiasm of the Mahdist troops more than made up
for their primitive weaponry. They were viewed as soldiers of God who could never be
defeated. Their victory was hailed as a miracle. Many Sudanese people saw that victory as
76 Rudolf C. Slatin Pash, C.B., Fire and Sword in the Sudan: A Personal
Narrative ofFighting and Serving the Dervishes, 1879-1895, Translated by Major F. R.
Wingate (New York: Negro University Press, 1969), 126-127.
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a sign of divine approval. Consequently, they joined the banner of the Mahdist
movement.79 Al-Mahdi became the virtual ruler of Sudan. The next step was to capture
Khartoum, the capital of the country. In 1884, Mahdist troops marched to the gates of
Khartoum and besieged the city. In an effort to save the Egyptian forces in Khartoum, the
British government sent General Gordon to Sudan.80 Gordon tried hopelessly to negotiate
with Al-Mahdi. His offer ofpeace and the recognition ofAl-Mahdi as the King ofKordofan
were rejected. The event added considerably to Al-Mahdi's power and prestige:
The Madhi was now honored almost as a god. The fear of his name
spread like wildfire throughout every province and district in Sudan. He was
now regarded as the true Mahdi, every Muslim believed in him and all doubt
was put aside.81
In June 1885, the Mahdist troops captured Khartoum, and Gordon was killed in a horrible
way. The fall of the city signaled the triumph of the Mahdist movement. Al-Mahdi died
shortly thereafter, his state survived for another 13 years.82 Moreover, members ofhis family
continued to play a significant role in Sudan's politics in the years to come.
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1898-1956
In 1882, England, occupied Egypt to suppress a nationalist movement, the Arabi
79 Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multi-Cultural State, 40-41.
80 Allen, Gordon and the Sudan, 239.
81 Ibid., 37.
82 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 95.
or
revolt, which was hostile to foreign interests in Egypt. Among the consequences was the
occupation of Sudan. After the occupation ofEgypt, Britain sought control over Sudan to
protect the sources of the Nile—without which Egypt would not survive—not from an
African state but from rival European powers, particularly France.83 When a French
expedition in 1898 reached Fashoda in southern Sudan, General Kitchener, the General
Governor of Sudan, set out for Fashoda, where he met the French commander Marchand and
told him that "the presence ofa French force in the valley ofthe Nile was regarded as a direct
infringement of the rights ofthe Egyptian government and of Great Britain."84 Eventually,
the French decided to leave. From that time until independence in 1956, Sudan remained
under Anglo-Egyptian rule. In sum, British interests in Egypt led to the occupation of
Sudan. In fact, Sudan has been called the key ofEgypt, for whoever controls the sources of
the Nile holds Egypt at his mercy.85
In 1898, an Anglo-Egyptian arrriy under the command of General Kitchener was sent
to occupy Sudan. Kitchener's army of about 25,000 men with steamboats, infantry, and
other modern equipment met 60,000 men armed with spears, sticks, and a few guns outside
the city of Omdurman. After a few hours, the battle was over. The Mahdist troops were
83 On the rivalry between Britain and France over Sudan, see for instance David
Levering Lewis, The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in
the Scramblefor Africa (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1987).
84 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 117.
85 Henry S. L. Alford and W. Dennistown Sword, The Egyptian Sudan: Its Loss
and Recovery (New York: Negro University Press, 1969), 40. It is not a coincidence that
the Aswan dam, "The first dam on the Nile River," was built in 1898 immediately
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decisively defeated with heavy casualties. More than 11,000 Sudanese were dead and
16,000 wounded. On the Anglo-Egyptian side, 49 killed and 382 wounded.86 Gordon was
avenged, and it was a glorious day for the imperialists. Winston Churchill, who took part
as a subaltern,87 rejoicing in the victory, left this comment about the battle:
The infantry fired steadily and stolidly, without hurry or excitement,
for the enemy were far away and the officers careful.... The rifles grew hot
- so hot that they had to be changed for those of the reserve companies. And
all the time out on the plain on the other side bullets were shearing through
flesh, smashing and splintering bone, valiant men were struggling on through
a hell of whistling metal, exploding shells, and spurting dust - suffering,
despairing, dying.88
Churchill went further to emphasize the Western superiority in firearms, noting
"Thus ended the battle of Omdurman - the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of
science over barbarians."89
Having occupied Sudan, the British had to administer it. The British were in a
dilemma. In the first place, they were not ready to recognize Egypt's claims in the country
on the grounds that they were convinced that the Mahdist revolution was the outcome of
sixty years of oppressive Egyptian rule in Sudan. At the same time, they could not annex
following the conquest of Sudan. Adams, Nubia: Corridor to Africa, 653.
86 Sword, The Egyptian Sudan, 236-279. Also, Adams, Nubia: Corridor to
Africa, 632 and Collins, Egypt and Sudan, 116-117.
87 Adams, Nubia: Corridor to Africa, 632.
88 Winston Churchill, The River War: An Account ofthe Re-Conquest ofthe




Sudan and administer it alone as this would violate Egypt's historical claims and its
substantial military contributions in the war.90 The solution to this dilemma was the
"condominium," which in theory meant a joint sovereignty over Sudan. Thus, both the
British and the Egyptian flags would be hoisted side by side. In fact, during the era of
condominium, Sudan was controlled by British officials. They formulated policies and
supplied most ofthe top administrators, especially the governor general, the highest authority
in the territory.91
In Sudan, as in most British colonies in Africa, the British adopted the system of
indirect rule through native chiefs and leaders. Since the ultimate aim of colonization was
the exploitation of the resources of colonies rather than the improvement of the lives of the
people, indirect rule or native administration proved to be workable. It was cheaper,
efficient, less coercive, and more popular. Kitchener, the first governor-general of Sudan,
had written of the necessity to gain the trust of the principal men and through these
collaborators to control the whole population.92
Kitchener, the hero of Omdurman, was preoccupied by the centrality of religion in
Sudan's political life, and this was influential in determining his policies toward Sudan and
90 M. W. Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1889-1934
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 13.
91 A number ofworks have been written on the British policy of Africa in general.
See for instance, Sir Andrew Cohen, British Policy in Changing Africa (Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1959). And also, George Padmore, Africa: How
Britain Rules Africa (London: Wishart Books Ltd., 1936).
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Islam in general. David Fromkin has given a vivid picture of Kitchener's understanding of
Islam:
Kitchener, like most Britons who have lived in the East, believed that
in the Muslim world, religion counts for everything.... They regarded Islam
as a single entity: as an "it" as an organization. They believed that it obeyed
its leaders. Kitchener and his colleagues believed that Islam could be bought,
manipulated, or captured by buying, manipulating or capturing its religious
leadership.93
There is no doubt that the conqueror of Sudan was haunted by the Mahdist movement
that had brought down Egyptian rule in Sudan. It was a religious movement aiming at
nothing less than establishing an Islamic state according to the principles of pure Islam.
Kitchener wanted to capture Islam and its symbols to ensure that no such religious movement
would challenge his rule in Sudan. Thus, it is not surprising that following Kitchener's
victory at Omdurman, he razed the Mahdi's tomb and scattered his bones in the Nile River.94
Indirect rule proved to be efficient for the British, but not for the Sudanese people.
More than preserving the traditional forms of political authority, it created and fostered
tribalism and rivalry among the different ethnic and religious groups in Sudan.
Finally, the British introduced Western values and practices. They introduced
92
Daly, Empire on the Nile, 360.
David Fromkin, A Peace To End All Peace: The Fall ofthe Ottoman Empire
and the Creation ofthe Modern Middle East (New York: Avon Books, 1989), 96-97.
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See Mark Huband, Warriors ofthe Prophet: The Strugglefor Islam (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), 145.
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Western education, civilian administration, and replaced Islamic laws with secular ones.
Thus, the first secularization of Sudanese society occurred under the British aegis.95
British Policy in the South
Much has been written about British policy in the south and its fatal legacy to the
Sudanese people. Most scholars and historians pointed to the closed-door policy that the
British implemented to separate the south from the north.
In the early years of the British rule, the British neglected the poor and remote south
as it was "inconvenient and expensive death traps, a buffer zone between the Nile and
Britain's African rivals."96 Consequently, the British made little attempt to administer a
region about whose history, societies, tradition, and most importantly language, they knew
nothing at all.97 Moreover, prolonged national resistance, poor communications, and
shortages of funds and supplies hampered the British control of the south.98
However, with the end ofWorld War I, the British formulated a new policy with the
ultimate aim of separating the north from the south. The ostensible reason for this policy of
isolation was to eliminate Islam and Arabic influences. According to the "Closed District
Order" of 1925, the south was declared a closed district into which outsiders could go only
95 Louis J. Cantori and Arthur Lawrie, "Islam, Democracy, the Sate and the
West," Middle East Policy, vol. 1, no. 3 (1992): 50.
96 Daly, Empire on the Nile, 133.
97 Ibid., 404.
98 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 119.
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with a special permit." Moreover, the British encouraged Christian missionaries to
proselytize and greatly restricted Islamic missionaries. English was the official language in
the south and efforts were made to discourage the learning and use ofthe Arabic language.100
The closed-door policy was a divide and rule strategy similar to those adopted by the British
imperialists in most of their colonies in Africa and the Middle East.
When the British left in 1956, they had sealed off the south from the north and
created a wide gap if not a barrier between the two regions. In sum, British policy was
problematic since it did not create and foster economic and political development in the
south to obtain self-determination. By the same token, it did not create an effective base for
south-north cooperation and integration. The scars of the British policy can be observed in
Sudanese politics today.
National Resistance and Independence
Given the historical association between Egypt and Sudan, Sudanese nationalist
aspirations were largely influenced by the nationalist sentiments in Egypt. Nationalist
aspirations in Egypt appeared in the early years ofthe twentieth century. Mustafa Kamil and
Saad Zaghlul were the undisputed leaders of the nationalist movement in Egypt until the end
of World War I. While the Egyptian nationalist movement was confined to the Western-
99 Lesch, The Sudan, 32. Also, Daly, Empire on the Nile, 405.
100 Daniel Boamah-Wiafe, "Physiographic and Cultural Diversities in Modern
Africa: The Case ofthe Republic of Sudan," Journal ofBlack Studies, vol. 13, no. 7
(September 1982): 93. See also, Shillington, History ofAfrica, 292-293.
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educated elite and had a secular stamp, the Sudanese nationalist movement had to invoke
the image of Islam so as to gain the support of the Sudanese people. The first nationalist
movement in Sudan arose in 1921, when Ali Abd al Latif founded the United Tribes Society
(UTS) to work for self-determination. Abd al Latifwas arrested and released in 1924. After
his release, Abd al-Latif founded the White Flag League (WFL), dedicated to driving out the.
British and establishing unity with Egypt. Demonstrations spread throughout Sudan and
were brutally suppressed. All hopes of independence were shattered.101
In 1942, a group called the Graduates General Congress, made up of graduates of the
Gordon College and the Secondary Schools, sent, a request to the British government
demanding self-determination. The request was rejected; however, national aspirations were
strong enough that the British government could not ignore them.
Later, the nationalist movement split into two factions: the pro-Egyptian camp whose
concern was to be free from British domination, so it advocated the unity of the Nile Valley;
and a second group that advocated full independence as it considered Egypt as imperial a
threat as Britain. This group received encouragement from the British authorities. In 1953,
after Nasir's revolution, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement provided for Sudan to become self-
governing and to have the choice to choose between unity with Egypt or to become
independent. In 1956, the Sudanese parliament voted unanimously for independence.102
101 Collins, Egypt and the Sudan, 91-126.
102 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 164. Also, Adams, Nubia: Corridor to Africa,
645.
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Sudan became independent after 57 years of British rule, a period shorter by far than any
previous period of imperial domination in Sudan's history. The post-independence period
will be detailed in the upcoming chapters.
CHAPTER 3
ISLAM AND SECULARISM
While much has already been written and said about Islam and secularism, there is
still no final answer to the question: "Is Islam secularizable?" The relationship between
religion and politics and the role and place of religion in society have long been hotly
debated subjects in the Islamic world among three schools of thought: the adaptationist
reformers, the secularist Westernizers and the Islamic fundamentalists.
Unlike the West, where the issue ofreligion had been settled for a long time,1 Islamic
intellectuals have been attempting to resolve this problem since the early eighteenth century,
so far to no avail. Therefore, the Islamic world, torn by the forces ofthese three schools of
thought, faces a profound dilemma. The deep-seated antagonism among the adherents of
these schools has made the Islamic world more divided today than it was three centuries ago.
1 The idea that religion and politics should be separated can be dated back to the
beginning of Christianity, "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to
God the things that are God's." The Holy Bible, New King James Version, Matthew
22:21. Inmodern times, the West came to view religion as an enemy to science, and as
an obstacle to modernization. Thus, secularism is a prerequisite for modernization and a
modern state is necessarily a secular state. There is a wealth of literature on religion and
development. For a full treatment see Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Political
Development (Boston: Little Brown, 1970). From another perspective, see Terrance G.




Following is a brief discussion of the main outlines of the ideas of these different
schools.
The Adaptationist Reformers
The adaptationist reformers emphasize the need to create a balance between Islamic
law and human realities. They want to reconcile the Sharia with Western culture. In other
words, they try to combine the two—a task that is very hard, if not impossible, as both
civilizations are contradictory in many fundamental ways.
The adaptationists argue that Islam is in harmony with reason, science, and
development. Thus, Muslims can and should profit from Western experience and remain
committed to their Islamic identity.
The earliest adaptationist thought iii the Islamic world can be dated back to the reign
of Sultan Selim HI (1789 -1807).2 Thence until the collapse ofthe Ottoman Empire in 1918,
successive Ottoman Sultans tried to emulate Europe, especially in the military field so as to
preserve the Empire.
A leading figure in the development ofthe adaptationist school was Jamal al-Din Al-
Afghani (1839-1897).3 Al-Afghani was highly critical of Islamic scholars who divided
2 Davidson, Turkey: A Short History, 78.
3 Al-Afgahni is a controversial figure in Islamic history. Elie Kedourie in his
work Afghani andAbduh (New York: The Humanities Press, 1966) questioned his
motives and his piety. Kedourie suggests that Al-Afghani was a freemason, a
homosexual, a troublemaker and a subverter of Islam. However, this doesn't negate the
fact that Al-Afghani was a reformer with a lasting influence on the reformist movement.
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scientific knowledge on religious lines into Muslim science and European science. Also,
he asserted that there is no contradiction between science and Islamic faith. Furthermore,
Al-Afghani put reason on at least an equal footing with divine aspiration. Finally, he argued
that the holy Quran should be reinterpreted in a way that fit the contemporary conditions of
Muslim society.4
The compatibility between Islam, reason, and modernity was central in the ideas of
Muhammed Abduh, an Egyptian scholar and a follower ofAfghani. In his work, he provided
a reinterpretation ofIslam, explaining how Islam could guide a modern society. He felt that
the basic purpose of his life was:
To liberate thought from the shackles of taqlid, and understand
religion as it was understood by the elders of the community before
dissension; to return, in the acquisition of religious knowledge to its first
sources, and to weigh them in the scales of human reason . . . and to prove
that, seen in this light, religion must be accounted a friend of science.5
Also, Abduh drew a distinction between duties of God, Ibadah and social duties
arising from interpersonal relations, Mumalat.6 He went further in reconciling Islam and
modernity and argued that each generation had the moral duty to interpret scripture for itself
See also Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious
Writings ofSayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1968).
4 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798 -1939 (Oxford:




and formulate new laws appropriate to its needs:
Quran and hadith laid down specific rules about worship; about
relations with other men; they laid down for the most part only general
principles, leaving it to men to apply them to all the circumstances of life7.
A key figure in the development of the reformist ideology is the writer and statesman
Khayr al-Din Pasha from Tunisia.8 Khayr al-Din's basic goal was to reform Islamic society
in a way that enabled it to achieve progress yet maintain its Islamic identity. He believed
that there is no reason to reject or ignore something that is correct or demonstrable simply
because it comes from others.9
This line of thought, begun by Afghani and Abduh in the eighteenth century, was
continued by other Islamic philosophers in the following centuries. Major reform leaders in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included Muhammad Rashid Rida in Syria,10 Taha
Hussayn ofEgypt and finally Said Nursi of Turkey."
The earlier intellectuals regarded Islam not as an absolute, constant system, but as a
7 Ibid., 148.
8 For a briefbut fine discussion ofthe ideas ofKhayr al-Din Pasha, see Leon Carl
Brown, The Surest Path: The Political Treatise ofA Nineteenth Century Muslim
Statesman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).
9 Ibid., 74-75. .
10 See Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arabic World (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1970).
11 A useful article on the ideas of Said Nursi is written by M. Hakan Yavuz, "The
Assassination of Collective Memory: The Case of Turkey," The Muslim World, vol. 89,
no. 314 (July - October 1999).
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dynamic and creative force compatible with science and development. They believed in
reconciliation between faith and reason. They argued that religion should be flexible to cope
with new challenges. Their goal was nothing less than a total reconstruction of Islamic
society. In other words, they wanted to adapt Islamic rules and general principles to
contemporary social, political, educational, and economic needs.
The adaptationists were criticized by both the Islamist conservatives and the radical
Westernizers. The conservatives criticized the adaptationists for the compromises that were
implicit in their adaptations. Furthermore, their adaptations did not influence the course of
events and could not halt the decline of the Islamic world, and Europe's military and political
interference. The radical Westernizers, on the other side, held the Islamists, both the
adaptationists and the fundamentalists, responsible for the weakness and backwardness of
the Islamic world. The radical Westernizers viewed Islam as an enemy of progress and
development, thus it should be disestablished. In the end, the conditions ofMuslims in the
twentieth century paved the way for the development of two ideologies: the secularist
Westernizers and the Islamic fundamentalists.
The Radical Westernizers: The Secularists
While a clear call for a divorce between Islam and politics did not appear in the
Islamic world until the beginning ofthe twentieth century, the earliest secular thought in the
Islamic world dated back to the ninth century. Al-Kindy (801-866), the philosopher with
whom the history of secular thought in the Islamic world begins wrote:
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We should not be shamed to acknowledge truth from whatever source it
comes to us, even if it is brought to us by former generations and foreign
people. For whom who seeks the truth there is nothing of higher value than
truth itself.12
Al-Razi, another classical Islamic philosopher, emphasized the role of reason to
attain knowledge.13 This line of thought was continued by other Islamic philosophers,
especially Al-Farabi.14 Like the earlier adaptationists, the early moderate secularists were
attempting to incorporate Islamic law and modern science and technology. To some
historians, these philosophers had planted the seeds of secularism in the Islamic thought,
though it took hundreds of years for these seeds to grow and produce pure secular ideas.
Another factor that contributed to the emergence of secularism in the Islamic world was the
French Revolution. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, there was no clear call for
complete separation between the mosque and the state. However, this began to change in
the nineteenth century. Qasim Amin (1863-1908), an Egyptian scholar, was the first Muslim
thinker to call for the secularization of society.15 Amin developed the social dimension of
the secularist movement by concentrating on the position ofwomen in Islamic society. He
vigorously advocated the emancipation ofwomen and supported education for them. Amin
12 Hourani, A History ofthe Arab Peoples, 76.
13 Ibid., 78.
14 Ibid., 72.
15 It is not surprising that most of the Islamic scholars in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries were from Egypt. Egypt was a major religious and intellectual center
in the Islamic world. The existence ofAl-Azhar University there had largely contributed
to this such role.
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also criticized Islamic customs and practices such as veiling, segregation, arranged
marriages and woman's lack ofpower over divorce. Amin went further in his secular ideas
and called for abolishing polygamy.16
After Amin, the secularist movement took a new direction. This time it was inspired
by the nationalist ideas.17 Secularism flourished in the Islamic world in the writings of a
generation ofnationalist figures who were Christians such as Shibli Shumayyil, Farah Anton,
Negib Azuri and Qustantin Zurayq.18 These writers professed socialism and nationalism as
new ideologies. Later, this line ofthought was continued in the works ofboth Muslims and
Christian nationalists such as Sati al-Husri, Ziya Gokalp, Taha Hussayn, and Michel Aflaq.19
They were active writers and scholars, and often were involved in politics. They came to
the conclusion that "society and religion both prospered best when the civil authority was
separated from the religious, and when the former acted in accordance with the needs of
human welfare in this world.20
■ :V-; -£* '^ i * * <: I '*"•■ U "r :; ■'■■:
To the earlier secularists, Islam, as a political force, had to be marginalized, if not
16 For a discussion of Amin's ideasgise.e for instance Hisham Sharabi, Arab
Intellectuals and the West, the Formative Years•1857-1914 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1970). Also John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds. Islam in Transition:
Muslim Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
17 Further discussion of the development of nationalism in the Islamic world will
be presented in chapter five, which covers Islam and Nationalism.




eliminated in Islamic society. Religion was just a personal matter and must be separated
from politics. The secularists believed that anything that stands in the way of modernity,
including faith, must be brushed aside.21 Unlike the fundamentalists, who relied on the
golden past to justify their arguments, the secularists took refuge in the present world.
Europe advanced, they argued, because of scientific knowledge and individual freedom.
They looked at France and its revolution as a source of inspiration.22
The secularists hold the fundamentalists responsible for the mass ignorance that
characterized the Islamic world from the fifteenth century onward. Islamists, who controlled
education, resisted such innovations as the printing of books as being un-Islamic. A
twentieth century historian provides an account of the reaction surrounding the introduction
ofprinting in the Ottoman Empire:
At the first rumor of the proposed innovation alarmed throughout
Constantinople. The many thousands of scribes, living by copying books,
saw their profession in peril. The theologians found the project profane; the
emotions of human intelligence, they alleged having always been handed
down to posterity by writing, ought not to be subjected to any less carefully
made transmission.23
Secularists view things in a way that is uninfluenced by Islamic values. They
advocate equality between men and women, Muslims and non-Muslims. Secularists go to
21 Pipes, In the Path ofGod: Islam andPolitical Power, 120.
22 Kirkwood, Turkey, 129
23 Ahmed Amin, The Development ofModern Turkey as Measured by its Press
(New York: Columbia University, 1914), 22.
war or make peace for reasons of state and national interest not for religious102
motivations.- In sum, the secularists view religion as an enemy of humanity and
development. They see a zero-sum relationship between Islam and secularism, and reject the
idea ofreconciliation between the two.
In the last one hundred years or so, secularism began to dig deep roots in the Islamic
world. It was under the impact of both Muslim intellectuals inside and European influence
outside that most Islamic countries adopted secular values, practices, and institutions.
However, in the middle of the twentieth century, secularism began to decline and lose its
prestige in the Islamic world. The reaction against the secularizing tendencies is expressed
in the emergence of Islamic radical movement throughout the Islamic world.
The Islamic Fundamentalists25
The fundamentalists' understanding of the nature of Islamic state and society has
been particularly influenced by the writings and teachings ofthree major ideologists: Hassan
al-Banna (1906-1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928;26 Al-
Banna's contemporary Mawlana Abu Ala Mawdudi, (1903-1979), the founder ofthe Jamaat-
i -Islami in Pakistan; and finally Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966).
Daniel Pipes, In the Path ofGod, 121.
25 The terms "fundamentalists" and "Islamists" are used synonymously.
26 The Muslim Brotherhood was established in Egypt in 1928. Later it had
branches in Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and most ofMiddle East countries, where it
a significant political role.
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Al-Banna was convinced ofthe total self-sufficiency of Islam and the dangers of
secularism and Westernization. This danger came from both the Egyptian secularized elite27
and the British occupation ofEgypt. Al-Banna rejected outright the concept of secularism
or the idea of separation between Islam and politics. On the contrary, Al-Banna and many
of the Islamists saw a union between the two. Al-Banna put it this way:
We believe the provisions ofIslam and its teachings are all-inclusive
encompassing the affairs ofthe people in this world and hereafter. And those
who think that these teachings are concerned only with the spiritual and
ritualistic aspects are mistaken in the belief because Islam is spiritual and a
ritual, a nation and nationality, a religion and a state, spirit and deed, holy
text and sword.28
A similar conclusion was reached by Ruhallah Khomeini forty years later:
As for those who consider Islam separate from government and
politics, it must be said to these ignoramuses that the Holy Quran and the
Sunnah ofthe Prophet contain more rules regarding government and politics
than in other matters.29
Therefore, Islam makes no distinction between the religious and political realms. As
John L. Esposito observed, the Islamic community was both spiritual and temporal, church
and state. "Islam is not only a system ofbeliefs, it is also a form of society and a way of life.
27 As mentioned earlier, the leading figures of secularism in the Islamic world
were mostly from Egypt.
28 Mark Huband, Warriors ofthe Prophet: The Strugglefor Islam, 83.
29 Dale F. Eckelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, New Jersey:
Muhammed was not only a Prophet, but also he was a statesman, a teacher, a ruler andlM
a soldier. He made war and he made peace.30
While the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood explained the decline of the Islamic
world as due to Westernization, he saw the cure for the disease in a return to Islamic
teachings. Al-Banna never advocated violence as a means of change in society.31 It was not
until the 1960s that the Islamists' struggle for the establishment of an Islamic state was
combined with violence to attain that goal. This change was under the influence of the
writings of Sayyid Qutb.32 Qutb is referred to as the true ideological father of modern
Islamic fundamentalism. QutbV book Signposts on the Road is viewed by the
fundamentalists as an Islamic version of Lenin's manifesto What Is to Be Done?33
Unlike Al-Banna, who believed in peaceful means to reestablish the Islamic state,
Qutb called explicitly for the overthrow of secular government with violence. In his work,
Princeton University Press, 1996), 49.
30 There is a substantial literature on the life and deeds ofProphet Muhammed
See for example, W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammed: Prophet and Statesman (London-
Oxford University Press 1961).
„ , A 3'See f°r eXample' Richard P" Mitchell> ?»* Society ofMuslim Brothers (London-
Oxford University Press, 1969).
32 Qutb was a prolific author. He wrote more than twenty four books Some of his
works were translated into English, Persian, Turkish and many other languages His
literary and ideological legacy formed the basis of fundamentalist thought in the Islamic
world.
33 Qutb is a main pillar in the formation of fundamentalist thought and activism
Gilles Kepel developed this point at length in his work, Muslim Extremism in Egypt- The
Prophet and the Pharaoh, Trans, by John Rothschild (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986).
Signposts on the Road" Qutb argued that many Muslim leaders like Nasir who called * °5
themselves Muslims were in fact nonbelievers; hence, their governments were un-Islamic.
Therefore, real Muslims had a religious duty to overthrow them by force.35
Qutb argued that Muslims are in a new era of Jahilyya-the pre-Islamic time, or
deviation from the right path. Therefore, an Islamic revolution is a necessary action so as
to eliminate this Jahilyya. The outcome of the Qutbist thought was the creation ofthousands
ofMoslem fighters and sirugglers against the tyranny ofJahili governments in Egypt as well
as in most Islamic countries. Secular governments, on the other side, led campaigns of
persecution and oppression, not to mention massacres against the followers of Qutb in most
Islamic countries.
Qutb was deeply influenced by the writings of Mawlana Abu Ala Mawdudi.
Mawdudi's works were translated from English into Arabic and deeply influenced Muslim
scholars in the Arab world, especially in Egypt.36
Like Al-Banna, Mawdudi asserted the self-sufficiency of Islam and the
comprehensiveness of Islamic life. This position was at the heart of his rejection of
nationalism and secularism. These Western ideas were alien to Islam and ill suited to be the
Qutb wrote this while imprisoned. There, he and many other Muslim Brothers
were tortured and persecuted. Naturally, the harsh prison experience profoundly
influenced his thought. Eventually, Qutb was executed with other members of the
Muslim Brotherhood on the grounds ofplotting against Nasir. Since then, Qutb has been
referred to as the martyr of the Islamic revival.
35 Judith Miller, Reporting From A Militant Middle East: God Has Ninety-Nine
Names (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 59.
basis of the Islamic state. Mawdudi believed that an Islamic revolution was necessary106
to establish an Islamic state and society. To achieve that goal, he established the Jamaat-i-
Islami, which became a significant political movement in Pakistan.37
The above-mentioned leading figures ofIslamic fundamentalism believed that Islam
is perfect, complete, comprehensive, and timeless. It can build a sound system of social
justice, economics, politics, education, and legislation. It is the right path and Muslims
should find solutions to all problems they face in its framework.
The Islamists rely on the golden past ofthe Islamic state to support their argument.
When Muslims adhered strictly to the teachings of Islam, they were superior to other
nations. They established a great and rich civilization, while Europe was in the " Dark Age."
The Islamists explain the decline of the Islamic world by the fact that Muslims deviated
from the right path and followed foreign ideas and laws. As the Islamists diagnose the
disease, they present the prescription: if Muslims want to restore their greatness, salvation
is in returning to the path of God:
If Muslims want to get out of all situations they are in, what they
must do is join forces, believe sincerely in God (He is exalted) act in
accordance with God's book and the teachings of his messenger38
36
Esposito, Islam and Politics, 146.
37 See for instance, Aziz Ahmed, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan 1857-
1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
38 ■
' Rudolph Peter, Jihad: In Classical and Modern Times (Princeton: Marks Winter
Publisher, 1996), 100.
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The Islamists discredit all man-made ideologies including liberalism, nationalism,
secularism and socialism. The failure of these ideologies can been seen in almost all the
Islamic world. In other words, the Islamists believe that whatever is made by humankind is
far from perfect. Therefore, Muslims should look for a spiritual cure for their problems. Not
surprisingly, the Islamic movement from the islands of Indonesia to the desert of North
Africa adopted the slogan "Islam is the solution, Quran is the constitution."
Like the secularists, the Islamists see a zero-sum relationship between secularism and
Islam and reject the idea ofreconciliation between the two. To the Islamists, secularism is
a pagan concept; it is alien to Islam, and so secularism will never be a deep-rooted ideology
in the Islamic world.
In sum, the Islamists and the secularists continue to struggle over the moral
leadership ofthe Islamic world. Their conflict is still going on today, and with much greater
intensity. Unfortunately, in contemporary times, the debate between the Islamists and
secularists has taken a violent form. From Egypt to Bangladesh, secular figures such
Nagib Mahfouz, Farag Foda, Taslima Nasrin and many others had been either attacked
assassinated by the Islamists. The Muslims' quest for an ideology, a purpose, and identity
in the modern world continues.
The following comparison outlines the arguments of all sides on many significant
themes:




The Islamists: Religion and politics are inseparable. Islam provides Muslims
with identity, guidance and authority. All Islam is politics.
The Adaptationists: While Islam plays an extraordinary role in Muslim politics, it must be
interpreted in a modern way that takes into consideration Muslims'
present needs. In other words, Islam makes no distinction between
religion and politics in theory; however, it does in practice.
The Secularists: Religion is a personal matter and must be separated from politics.
State and society should follow secular policies.
2. Sovereignty
The Islamists: Sovereignty belongs to God, who is the source of legitimacy.
Therefore, Muslims must apply only God's laws in their daily life.
The Adaptationists: Muslims must pick the most attractive ideas of sovereignty such as
justice, equality, accountability and so forth. By the same token,
Muslims must avoid the worst aspects of sovereignty such as
secularism and racism.
The Secularists: Sovereignty belongs to the people, who are the source of legitimate
authority. Thus, the people must set out their own rules if they want
to become rich and powerful. In other words, man-made laws take
precedence over God's laws.
3. Nationalism
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The Islamists: The Islamists reject nationalism as a Western idea alien to Islam.
It is another Western conspiracy to weaken and divide the Islamic
community. Islam binds Muslims together regardless of their race,
language, territory, class, etc.
The Adaptationists: Nationalism is compatible with Islam. Therefore, Muslims must
reconcile this ideology with their faith. If nationalism is a political
force, Muslims should retain this force in their quest for strength and
The Secularists:
progress.
The secularists have a strong belief in nationalism as a powerful force
to unite and mobilize people. It is a European gift for the world, as
it was the vehicle for self-determination and nation building.
4. The West
The Islamists: The Islamists are anti-Western. The West is the historical enemy of
Islam. There is a huge chasm between Islam and the West and so
Muslims must always be alert to threats from the West, and its ideas.
The Adaptationists: The adaptationists advocate selectivity in dealing with the West.
Muslims should not view the West as a rival and threat only, but also
as an example and a source of inspiration. In other words, Muslims
must know what to take and what to reject from the West.
The Secularists: The secularists are pro-Western; they admire the West as the
incarnation of modern civilization. Thus, Muslims must view the
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West as a friend, a source of inspiration and guidance in all
aspects of life.
5. The Decline of the Islamic World
The Islamists: The Islamists explain the collapse and decline of the Islamic world in
theological terms. Muslims' failure is explained by their departure
from Islamic teachings. Consequently, it can be cured by return to
the sources of its strength: the path of God or the Islamic teachings.
The Adaptationists: The adaptationists explain the decline in a combination of internal
factors related to Muslims themselves such as corruption, oppression
and instability and external factors that can be summed up by an
international environment hostile to Muslims.
The Secularists: Muslims' decline is the outcome of theocracy, oppression and
corruption. Muslims' strength can be achieved by adoption of
science and technology.
6. International Relations
The Islamists: The world is divided into territory ofIslam (Darul Islam) and territory
of war (Darul-Harb) and there is a permanent state of war between
the two. Therefore, it is impossible for Muslims to cooperate or
integrate with the territory of war.
The Adaptationists: The Islamic division of two worlds is insufficient, as Muslims are not
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united in one world or in a single state. At the same time,
Western classification of an ethnic, ideological or territorial basis is
not completely accepted. Regardless of these classifications,
Muslims must view each other as brethren.
The Secularists: The world is divided into different nations and states. Muslim states
should integrate into the world and promote peace and security.
7. War
The Islamists: War is Jihad or holy war. It is an obligation for all Muslims to fight
against the infidels. War can be waged only in the path of God and
dying in that path is a glorious death.
The Adaptationists: Adaptationists have a strong belief in just war. They believe that a
just war is a war to end exploitation, oppression, or corruption. Thus,
a war can be waged based on its legality, not on its holiness.
The Secularists: States and armies go to war for national interest, not for religious or
ideal goals.
8. Peace in the Middle East
The Islamists: The Islamists reject outright the peace process on the grounds that
Palestine, from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean sea, is an
Islamic territory, and so it is an obligation for all Muslims to fight the
aggression of the Jews.
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The Adaptationists: The adaptationists have developed a pragmatic position towards
peace in the Middle East. On one hand, they do not support the peace
process and its aftermath such as normalization with Israel. On the
other hand, they do not reject it as they do not have an alternative.
Therefore, they compromise and accept the status quo.
The Secularists: They support the peace process as they consider peace as a must for
the people of the region to develop and progress.
9. Democracy
The Islamists: While democracy is alien to Islam, the Islamists developed a tactical
adjustment to this idea. Therefore, democracy is a means to get to
power and implement hidden agenda. It is one man, one vote, one
time.
The Adaptationists: The adaptationists try to reconcile democracy with Islam, and so
Muslims must balance between Sharia goals and human realities.
For example, Muslims must not break away from their rulers, or
overthrow them. At the same time, Muslim rulers have a mandate to
rule according to Islamic laws. In other words, the adaptationists
admire both democracy and the Islamic rules of the political game.
The Secularists: The secularists have a profound admiration for democracy. It is the
best form of government. It is a safety value against oppression,
corruption, and tyranny. The secularists are frustrated by the
113
democratic record of the Islamic world. This view toward
democracy is also shared by Muslim Marxists, who, after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, began to call for free elections, human rights,
and other democratic values.
10. The View of Non-Muslims
The Islamists: The non-Muslims and minorities are viewed with suspicion and
hatred. The Islamists always record the history of non-Muslims
cooperating with the European powers during times of occupation.
Therefore, non-Muslims cannot enjoy the same rights as Muslims.
Also they cannot govern Muslims.
The Adaptationists: Non-Muslims enjoy the Dhimi status, which means they live in the
Islamic state with limited privileges. They are protected by the state
as they pay taxes, but they cannot assume key positions in the state.
The adaptationists proudly point to Muslims' record of tolerance
towards non-Muslims and contrast it with the intolerant attitude of the'
European imperialists.
The Secularists: The Secularists advocate the equal status of non-Muslims and
Muslims in the Islamic state in accordance with their strong beliefs
in democracy, secularism, and nationalism.
11. The Positions of Women
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The Islamists: The Islamists believe in polygamy as part of their strong belief in
Sharia. They reject the idea of equality between men and women.
They believe that a woman's place is in the home and so women
must be segregated and veiled.
The Adaptationists: The adaptationists try to reconcile the Western concept of "feminism"
or "Women's Liberation" with Islamic teachings. For example, their
position towards polygamy is Western as they argue that no one can
possibly treat two, three, four women with equity and conclude that
Islam prohibits polygamy. However, women cannot assume key
political and military positions in the state.
The Secularists: The secularists reject polygamy, and they have a strong belief in
equality of men and women. They emphasize women's rights in
education, employment, dress, and political representation.
12. Population Policy
The Islamists: Reject the theories of family planning and birth control. Such ideas
are part ofthe Western conspiracy against the Muslim population.
The Adaptationists: Argue that Muslims must take advantage of every opportunity to
develop and grow. Therefore, social planning, health care,
contraceptives and the like are desirable as long as they benefit
Muslims.
The Secularists: Accept all theories of limited resources and overpopulation.
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Therefore, they encourage family planning and the use of
contraceptives.
Reconciling Islam
The previous schools differ on all issues concerning the Islamic world. The
differences range from the role of women in society to the view of non-Muslims and
minorities in the Islamic world. However, all ofthem affirm that Muslims must put an end
to their misfortune and decline. Whether Muslims can reform themselves without
abandoning the principles of their faith, or accommodate their religion within the realities
of their societies, as well as the outside world, remain major themes in Islamic debate and
discourse.
A brief look at the Islamic world reveals the following fact: neither the Islamists in
Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, or Afghanistan, nor the secularists in Turkey, Tunisia, Iraq, or Algeria
succeeded in coming to terms with the problems of their societies. The Islamists, like the
secularists, were extremists in their ideologies. Thus, they offered only partial answers to
their nation's needs. Consequently, a reasonable argument can be made that it is only the
adaptationist thought that can provide a moderate solution to Muslim problems and free them
from extremism. The compatibility between Islam and politics, reason, and modernity is
central in the arguments ofthe adaptationist school.
It is the author's belief that Islam as a religion is flexible and adaptive to changed
conditions, and the principles of Islam consider such change a certainty. For example, the
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days have gone when states were based on religion and the world was divided between
the territory of Islam {Darul Islam) and the territory of war {Darul-Harb). Now, states are
based on nationalism and so Islam has to adapt to historical circumstances. According to the
Egyptian reformer Ali Abd al-Raziq:
Islam did not determine a specific regime, nor did it impose on the
Muslims a particular system according to the requirements of which they
must be governed; rather it has allowed us absolute freedom to organize the
state in accordance with the intellectual, social, and economic conditions in
which they were found, taking into consideration our social development and
the requirements oftime.39
Therefore, Islam is compatible with human needs and Muslims are free to choose and
change their sociopolitical arrangements, and reconcile them with the principles of their
faith. In other words, Islam is what Muslims make out of it. It is subject to their
interpretation and understanding. Thus, it can be a religion of tolerance and peace, in
harmony with reason and science, compatible with nationalism, democracy, and
development, and advocate peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims. Also, if Muslims so
choose, it can be a religion of war and violence, based on the pursuit of domination and
power, incompatible with democracy, nationalism, and development, and advocate a hostile
attitude toward non-Muslims.
In this study, the cases of Turkey and Sudan are instructive. In Turkey, Ataturk
forced secularism on the Turkish people and thought that this would be their ticket to enter
39 In Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique ofDevelopment Ideologies.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. 131.
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the civilized world. Decades later, secularism has not fulfilled its promises. It has
declined in acceptability in Turkey and is unlikely to serve indefinitely as an ideological
basis for the Turkish state. Thus, one can argue that the solution to Turkey's problem lies
in integrating Islam in Turkish nationalism and reconciling it with the Turkish needs.
In Sudan, the ruling elite took Islam to the extreme. It declared Islam as the only
basis of identity in a multi-religious country. In doing so, it failed to take into account non-
Muslims as an essential component of the country's political community. This failure led
to the adoption of an inappropriate solution and resulted in a catastrophe in the country.
Thus, one can argue that the -appropriate solutiori required a reconciliation of the Islamic
character ofthe state without denying the southern Sudanese equal membership ofthe nation.
In sum, secularization in Turkey and Islamization in Sudan each represent a radical
departure from the essence of Islam. Furthermore, secularization and Islamization were
forced on the people from above. Both the Islamists and the secularists captured the state
and used its apparatus to implement their ideas. This uncompromising policy is
contradictory to the teachings of Islam and the wishes of the people of Turkey and Sudan.
Thus, it is unlikely to work in either country, as will be examined in this study.
CHAPTER 4
SECULARISM IN TURKEY AND SUDAN
Turkey's Secular Experience
Modern secularism in Turkey is a product of centuries of contacts with Europe. As
has been mentioned earlier, the winds of secular ideas began to blow across the Islamic
world since the French Revolution in 1789. The French Revolution, Bernard Lewis
observed, was very influential upon the contemporary Muslim peoples in general and had
a lasting and a profound influence upon those in Turkey in particular.1
The first seeds of secularism were planted in Turkey in the early years of the
nineteenth century. However, the policies and behaviors ofthe European powers outside the
Empire and the attitudes arid activities of the conservatives inside caused several setbacks
to the development of secularism in Turkey as well as the rest of the Islamic world.2
Therefore, it was only in the early twentieth century that secularism became a dominant idea
in Turkey at the hands of Ataturk.
1 Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), 183.
2 As had been mentioned in chapter two, the hostile attitude towards secular ideas
in the Islamic world was motivated by the hostile policies of the imperial European
powers towards the Ottoman Empire.
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Ataturk was one of the Ottoman soldiers who lived in Europe and returned home
with an obsession with European ideas, especially secularism and nationalism.3 Early in his
life, he made up his mind towards two rivals: religion or Islam in particular and Europe or
the West. Ataturk was born with a horror of all religious fanaticism and he viewed Islam as
the real enemy ofhis people:
The enemy lay within their own ranks. It was the Muslim religion,
which oppressed them and stunned their growth, shutting them off from the
more advanced and enlightened ways of the Christian people. The Ottoman
Empire was a place where the joys ofheaven were reserved for non-Muslims,
while Muslims were condemned to endure the shades of hell.4
Ataturk believed that heaven is on earth, not in the after-life as most Muslims
believe. Therefore, his vision ofchange and progress was essentially one ofreligious reform.
As a secularist, he saw Islam as a barrier to happiness, progress, and modernity.
Consequently, Islam must be eliminated from the sociopolitical structure of Turkey. A
complete separation between the mosque and the state must be achieved if Turkey was to
take its place in the civilized world.5
3 Ataturk served in Sofia in Bulgaria as a military attache, where he was
introduced to the graces and refinement ofWestern civilization. He saw Western
civilization in terms of irreligion, science, and nationalism. For the biography of Ataturk,
see for instance Lord Kinross, Ataturk: A Biography ofMustafa Kemal: Father of
Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1965).
4 Ibid., 30.
5 Kinross, Ataturk, 55.
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Ataturk launched a program of eliminating Islam from the life ofthe Turkish people.
Following is a brief account of Ataturk's secularization program.
In 1923, Turkey was proclaimed a republic. Its sovereignty belonged to the people.6
As a secular state, the second step was to eliminate the old theocratic state. Thus, the
Caliphate was abolished. The Caliphate was a link between Turkey and the rest of the
Islamic world. However, according to Ataturk's vision, the future belonged to the West, not
to Islam. He saw the Caliphate as a symbol and a rallying point for the dark forces of
religious reaction.7 In March of 1924, the Caliphate was abolished.8 A Turkish statesman
expressed his joy as "the bridge attaching Turkey to the Middle Ages was blown up."9
Ataturk continued his drive for secularism. The Ministry ofReligious Affairs as well
as the historic office ofSheikh al-Islam was abolished. All religious schools were transferred
to the secular arm. The tombs and shrines of saints were closed.10 Ofthese acts Ataturk said:
To seek help from the dead is a disgrace to a civilized community. I
flatly refuse to believe that today, in the luminous presence of science,
knowledge, and civilization in all its aspects, there exist, in the civilized
community of Turkey, men so primitive to seek their material arid moral
well-being from the guidance of one or another Sheikh.11
6 Lewis, Turkey, 84.
7 Kinross, Ataturk, 43 8.
8 Niyazi Berkes, The Development ofSecularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1964), 460.
9 Kinross, Ataturk, 439.
I0Davison, Turkey: A Short History, 149-151. Also, Kirkwood, Turkey, ISA.
11 Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 404.
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After laying down the political foundations for a secular state, he pushed his social,
legal, and educational programs. In 1926, a form of the Swiss civil code was adopted and
the Sharia abolished. In the process, polygamy, and Islamic laws that regulate divorce and
inheritance were abolished. Women were given equal rights in all aspects of life.12 Ataturk
believed that modernization required a complete emancipation of women:
Can half a community ascend to the skies; while the other half
remains chained in the dust? The road of progress must be trodden by both
sexes together marching arm in arm as comrades.13
Ataturk saw Islamic traditional dress as a bar to the freedom and dignity ofwomen.
Therefore, he led a campaign against the veil.14 Another campaign was against men's
headdress, the fez. It was Muslim headgear that distinguished them from non-Muslims.
Thus, it meant a great deal to them.15 It was a symbol of Islamic identity. However,
according to Ataturk, it was "an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of
progress and civilization."16 Therefore, it had to go. Ataturk issued the so-called "Hat Law,"
12 Berkes, The Development ofSecularism in Turkey, 470-473.
13 Lewis, Turkey, 93.
14 Kinross, Ataturk, 476-478. Also, Toynbee, Turkey, 243.
15 For a discussion of the impact of the abolishment of the fez on the Turkish
people, see Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Study in National
Development (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), 83-84.
16 Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 263.
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which made the wearing of the fez a criminal offense.
In Ataturk's program of Westernization, another link to the Islamic world was
removed: the Arabic language. Arabic scripts, which had been used by the Turks since their
conversion into Islam, were replaced by the Roman alphabet.18
The final part in Ataturk's agenda to transfer Turkey into a European- style secular
state was the calendar. Turkey must be in line with the West in all aspects of life. The
Islamic calendar gave way to the Western cajerMar. Friday, which was the official holy day
for Muslims, was replaced as a day of rest by the Christian Sunday,19 and finally New Year's
was celebrated on the first ofJanuary every year.
With these radical measures of secularization, Ataturk believed that Turkey had
become legally, politically, and culturally a European-style secular state. There is no doubt
that Ataturk took giant steps to move Turkey Westward. The key questions in this regard
would be: "Was Ataturk consistant inliis program?" and "Were Ataturk and his successors
able to transfer Turkey from one civilization to another and if not, why not?" Another
important question: "Was the secularization of Turkey as complete as believed?" An
evaluation ofthe secularization project will offer some answers to these questions.
17 Berkes, The Development ofSecularism in Turkey, A12>.
18 Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 427-429.
19 Lewis, Turkey, 111.
123
The Ambivalence of Ataturk
Ataturk was opposed to religion, which he held responsible for the backwardness
and misfortunes of the Muslims. Consequently, he initiated his secular program as a
salvation for the Turks. However, Ataturk was ambivalent in his secularized orientation.
He accepted the merits of religion and made decisions on a purely religious basis when it
suited his purposes.20
During the War of Independence, Islam was highly regarded by Ataturk and was
used as a rallying cry against the Christian Greeks. Ataturk considered the War of
Independence a holy war. Furthermore, Ataturk adopted the title Gazi, which means
warrior for the Islamic faith.21
The compulsory population exchange between Turkey and Greece is another
example of Ataturk's ambivalence and opportunism. After the end of the War of
Independence, one of the major problems that confronted Turkey was that of large Greek
minorities in Turkey and Turkish minorities in Greece. After the Greek invasion of 1919,
it became difficult for the Greeks and Turks to live together. Thus, by the Treaty of
Laussane in 1923, a forced exchange ofpopulation took place after which no Greeks
20 It is ironic that playing the Islamic card by Ataturk in Turkey is roughly
equivalent to Sudanese politicians, especially Numeiri and Turabi, as will be examined
later in this chapter.
21 Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 248.
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remained in Turkey and no Turks in Greece.22 Religion was the criterion for this mass
population transfer. In other words, Ataturk associated Turkish identity with Islam,
which was contrary to his secularization project.
While these events demonstrate early contradictions of Ataturk's secular project,
they were not the only problems that the secularization project had, as will be discussed
in the following section.
The Secularization Project and the Insolvable Troubles
Ataturk's idea of establishing a modern secular state in the West's image, based on
constitutional avenues and military and political institutions, had presented a number of
insolvable problems of enduring influence on the Turkish people.
First: The Dual Identity Crisis
While Ataturk's program was in many ways revolutionary, it did not for many years
trickle down to all of Turkish society. The Kurds remained marginalized and isolated and
so retained their own identity.23
Moreover, for the majority of Turkish people, Islam remained an essential part of
their culture and identity. Following Ataturk's death, there were rumors of a religious
22 Kinross, Ataturk, 406. Also, McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introduction to
History to 1923, 236.
23 Further discussion ofKurdish identity will be carried out in Chapter Six, which
will discuss Islam and nationalism in today's Turkey.
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restoration.24 However, such aspirations were not tolerated by the Turkish state at that time,
and so it took a long time until the Turkish people were allowed to voice their religious
aspirations.
Since 99 percent of Turkey's population was Muslim, it was not a surprise that the
majority viewed Islam as the major base oftheir identity, and so they view their country as
part of the East and the Islamic world and not part ofEurope. As it shares with the East its
culture, history, and most importantly, its Islamic religion, it will never be part of Europe.
These thoughts are supported by Europe's rejection of Turkey's application to join the
European Union. The debate over Turkey's accession to the European club frequently
concludes that Turkey's non-admittance is founded on religion. In an interview with a
German magazine, president Ozal asked, "Why we are not yet in the European community?
The answer is simple. You are Christians and we are Muslims [sic]."25
Secularization, as many Turkish people began to see, does not only mean a
separation between mosque and state, it also meant the abandonment of their faith, culture,
history, and identity. Worse than that, it also meant an admission of inferiority. In reaction,
many Turks rejected Western cultural superiority and began to reassert the role of Islam and
develop a great respect for its values and institutions.26 Such changes in the Turkish mood
24 Lewis, The Emergence ofModern Turkey, 411.
25 For a fine analysis of Turkish attitudes to the West and Europe in particular, see
for instance David Kushner, "Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey,"
Journal ofContemporary History, vol. 32, no. 2 (April, 1997): 219-233.
26 Halim Kara, "Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities,"
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were encouraged by the failure of the Kemalist project. As a Turkish scholar wrote:
With the global crisis ofmodernism and the rising challenges against
the universal myths of Western civilization, the promises of the Kemalist
project have begun to be questioned. There is a resurgence of Islamist
political organization and a renewed attempt to devise an Islamic ideology as
an alternative to Kemalist nationalism.27
In fact, from the late 1960s until the present, Islam became the leading force of
change in Turkey. This is reflected in the appearance and success of Islamic oriented
political parties that compete with Ataturk's secularism.
The rise ofthe Islamic political parties was not only due to a desire to restore the role
of Islam in Turkey, but it also was an expression of economic and class frustration.28 A
Turkish sociologist summarized the attractiveness of the Welfare Party in the following
words:
The Welfare is a vehicle that is carrying the marginalized, down
trodden, and neglected to the center of power. It will never lose its grip
because people were not represented before. No political party represents the
people at the political or popular level and there are not grass roots
organizations to influence the state.29
Journal ofMuslim Minority Affairs, vol. 19, no. 1 (April, 1999): 132-138.
27 Haldun Gulap, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah
Party," The Muslim World, vol. 89, no. 1 (January 1990): 23.
28 A recent survey found that 41 percent of those who voted for the Islamist party
consider themselves secular and have great respect for Ataturk. See for instance, Sami
Zubaida, "Turkish Islam and National Identities," Middle East Report, 10.
29 Debbie Lovatt, "Islam, Secularism and Civil Society," The World Today, vol.
53, no. 8-9 (August-September, 1997): 227.
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In sum, the majority of the Turkish people showed a strong desire to return to
Islam—to restore its role and move it from the periphery to the center. In doing so, they
demonstrated a strong hostility towards the secularist project. However, such aspirations
were not tolerated by the secularist elite. Unlike the rest of the Turkish people, who continue
to show strong allegiance to Islam, the secular elite, supported by the military, continues to
show hostile attitudes to Islam and strong commitment to Ataturk's legacy.
The secular elite struggles not only to maintain secularism as the dominant ideology
in the state, but also tries to force the Turkish people to accept secularism as a basis for their
identity. This divides the Turkish society into two opposing groups:
The Kemalist version of secularism has become the basis of identity
for the white Turks. The opposing ideology provided by Islamic networks
serve as a foundation for the black Turks. Democratization empowers the
black Turks and Kurds, yet they are then forced out ofpower in the name of
protecting the state—ironically, the very democracy that gave them a voice.30
As the major battle lines have been drawn between a Europeanized secular elite and
the Islamists, Turkey is split into two forces with conflicting aspirations and different
agendas. The secular elite emphasized the Europeanization and secularization of Turkey.
The Islamists, on the other side, struggled to make Turkey more Eastern and more Islamic.
Consequently, Turkey is in the midst of an identity crisis. In fact, Turkey is more
fragmented because it is torn by other lines dividing the country: new Turkey vs. old Turkey,
30 M. Haken Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere," Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 24.
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Kurds against Turks, and the have-nots battling against the haves. The dichotomies between
these conflicting groups polarized the society and opened the door for violence.31
Similarly, the state as a whole has not found its proper place in the family of the
nations.32 Turkey took giant steps to integrate with the West; however, it remains an ally and
a follower, but not a partner. Turkey is a key member ofNATO. It is also a member of the
European Customs Union, but not a member ofthe European Union. Turkey was the first
Islamic state to recognize Israel, the Jewish occupant of Islam's third holiest city, and later
signed a military pact with Israel.33 Turkey has liberal economic and political systems. It
participates in most of Europe's cultural activities. Therefore, politically, militarily, and
economically, Turkey is part of the Western world.34
On the other side, Turkey is a member of the Islamic Organization Conference, 99
percent of its population are Muslims, it is located in the Middle East more than in Europe,
and it shares with that region its religion, culture, and history. Therefore, in religious,
historical, and geographical senses, Turkey is a Middle Eastern country.
Bearing in mind the previous contradictions, it is not a surprise that Turkey has a
dual identity. Furthermore, it pays a price for that dual identity. Turkey is rejected and
31 Jamie Dettmer, "Will Turkey Go East or West," Insights on the News, vol. 15,
no. 19 (August 1999): 25.
32 Kushner, "Self Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey," 5.
33 "The Turkish-Israeli Affair," The Economist, vol. 348, no. 8080 (September,
1998): 157.
34 Kara, "Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities," 136.
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isolated by its Ottoman history from the West and by its anti-Islamic policies from the East.
Second: The Constitutional Dilemma
The constitution of 1928 was stripped of all religious elements. In 1937, secularism
was introduced into the constitution as a new ideology for the Turkish people. Thus, it
became dominant over all other constitutional principles. In order to protect the secular
nature ofthe state, the constitution contained provisions that could be held incompatible with
the spirit ofhuman rights, democracy, and freedom.35 The most prominent provisions in the
constitution are those that regulate the dress: the hat law and the veil.35 While the
constitution made religious faith a private affair and allowed the Turkish people to change
their faith ifthey wanted to do so, this tolerant spirit was not available when it came to dress.
Democracy and human rights are considered among the pillars of Western culture; however,
Ataturk violated these principles when he forced Turkish men and women to dress in a
Western way.
Unfortunately, the succeeding constitutions of 1960 and 1982, which are still used
today, are not far different from Ataturk's constitution of1928. It is widely agreed that the
present constitution is based on a political philosophy that is clearly incompatible with the
principles of democracy and human rights. The-present constitution contains within it a
35 It is worth noting that such principles were not in Ataturk's mind, though such
principles were the basic foundation of the modern European state. What Ataturk had in
his mind was a strong repressive state that would bring civilization to his people.
36 Lewis, Turkey, 210.
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strong bias towards secularism to the degree that religious freedom and freedom of dress are
not guaranteed in the constitution.37
The uniqueness ofthe Turkish concept of secularism can be best demonstrated by the
headscarf case ofMerve Kavaki. Kavaki, a newly elected member of parliament in 1999,
was denied the right to wear a headscarf in parliament. The constitutional court stated
concerning this issue, "any freedom incompatible with secularism is forbidden to claim."
Kavaki's action was criticized as a challenge to the secular state. Eventually, Kavaki lost
her seat in the parliament.38
In fact, the headscarf and veiling of women have emerged as the most visible
symbols ofthe Turkish life. The Turkish people continue to challenge the secular laws and
the dress code in particular and protest against them. According to reports, in 1998,
approximately 140,000 persons protested the ban on wearing headscarves in universities by
linking hands to form a human chain in more than 25 provinces and several townships
countrywide. However, such desires were not tolerated by the secular state and hundreds of
protesters were arrested.
37 For an interesting discussion of the restrictions on dress and religious
expression in the Turkish Constitution, see for instance Mustafa Erdudan, "Religious





According to the secular mentality, freedom of dress, though part of
human rights, will never be respected in Turkey. [It is] a charge that the
Europeans continue to use in justifying their rejections of Turkey's
membership in the European Union.39
Third: The Civilian-Military Relationship
While Ataturk was determined to separate the military and civilian spheres in the
new state, the supremacy of secularism made this separation impossible. The generals are
the self-proclaimed saviors of the Kemalist secular republic. In the last four decades, the
generals have intervened four times to save secularism in Turkey.40 The guardians of the
Kemalist project view the struggle between the secular and religious forces as a matter of life
or death for Turkey. As a formal divorce of the military from political activity is very
difficult in Turkey, one wonders whether Turkey is really a democracy. The army does not
hesitate to step in every time a democratic election results in an Islamic victory, thus it
constitutes the major deterrent to the establishment of a genuine democratic
state similar to those in Europe. Consequently, unlike Ataturk's expectations, the road to
Europe became full ofthorns.
In sum, there is much evidence that the secularization of Turkey was never quite as
complete as was sometimes believed. Furthermore, Ataturk's project of transforming Turkey
39 Annual report on International Religious Freedom in 1999: Turkey, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, D'.C (September 1999), 4.
40 A good reference on the efforts of the generals to protect the secular nature of
the state is the work ofHowe Marvin, Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islamic
Revival (Perseus: Westview, 2000).
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into a European nation proved to be a difficult task. Finally, the whole project of
secularization is now under attack from all sides, as will be discussed in the following part.
The Future of Secularism in Turkey
The challenges to secularism in Turkey demonstrate the irreconcilable hostility
between secularism and Islam. The Islamists in Turkey use political Islam to pose a serious
challenge to secularism. In 1996, the Turkish republic for the first time had a prime minister,
Erbakan, whose political philosophy was based on Islam.41 To the secularists, Ataturk's
vision of a secular state in the West's image lay in near ruins. Eventually, they engineered
. a political coup that removed the prime minister and deprived the Islamists of the fruits of
their electoral triumph. Even when the Islamists remain outside government, the sentiments
that brought them to power will be a force to be reckoned with on the Turkish political scene
for some time to come. In this country, the key question to consider, therefore, is whether
secularism will survive the challenge or not.
As has been mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the last century, the outlines of
debate moved from development and catching up with the West to issues of identity, values,
faith, and culture. In Turkey, in the face ofthe failures of its extant project of secularization,
41 Erbakan rejects Turkey's dependence on the West, and he advocated closer ties
with the Islamic countries. During his term, he visited the newly independent Islamic
■ countries in the former Soviet Union, Libya, and Iran. He also signed a $23 billion gas
deal with Tehran. See Geges, America and Political Islam: Clash ofCultures or Clash of
Interests, 213. See also, Marvin Howe, "The Islamist Agenda in Turkey," Washington
Report on Middle East Affairs, vol. XVII, no. 7 (October-November, 1998): 18.
the Islamist, became the voice of ffle sikn, majority of ,he Turkish
journalist put it:
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The attractiveness ofme contemponuy Islamic movement in Turkey stems from its
ability to address social and political probiems such as identity, justice, and political
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had nothing to lose but theirpains. A Turkish author exptained the attachment ,o Is,am in
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of stability, all discredit the secular ideology. Therefore, it became less attractive and less
convincing. Furthermore, in this atmosphere of failure and deprivation, religious ideology
can be more responsive to the needs of people and so can achieve its goals much more
successfully than secular ideology. As the Turkish Islamist author states,
For the first time since the rise of modernism, the world has fallen into
serious doubt as to the validity and accuracy of the wide-spread conviction
that all problems can be solved within the Western paradigm.4
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In addition to the bankruptcy of secularism, another reason should be considered in
analyzing the shift away from secular thought in Turkey as well as the rest of the Islamic
world. This factor is linked to the natural cyclical pattern of ideological development. As
Mannheim had argued, ideologies do not appear in a vacuum, but rather interact with one
another. Not only do successive generations of the same society naturally tend toward
opposite ideologies, but ideologies also play out their natural life span. They cease to
respond to the needs ofthe masses and they lose their ability to provide people with sense,
guidance, and a basis of identity. Therefore, ideologies by their very nature lose their ability
to charm and attract over time. In a society where the need for a powerful ideological
response for spiritual and temporal problems remains high, as one ideology declines, another
rises to fill the ideological gap.46
45 Gulalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party," 22.
46 This entire analysis is largely based on Karl Mannheim's work, "The problem
of Generations," in Essays on the Sociology ofKnowledge (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1952), 278-320.
The rise and fall of communism in East Europe and the Soviet Union supports
Manneheim's argument. Therefore, according to Manneheim's perspective, the decline and
bankruptcy of secularism in Turkey and the rise of political Islam is part of the natural
patterns of ideological changing and should not come as a real surprise.
However, it is not to be understood from the previous argument that secularism will
disappear from Turkey overnight. It is fairly accurate to say that the military and the secular
elite who control most ofthe levels ofpower in Turkey have a blind beliefin secularism and
a strong commitment to Ataturk's legacy. Therefore, it is widely agreed that for some time
to come, secularism will remain in Turkey with an iron fist. The recent historical record of
Turkey supports this conclusion.
Islam and Secularism in Sudan
Islam plays a dominant role in Sudan's politics. Throughout Sudan's modern
history, Islam has been the major factor that has affected its evolution. With the coming of
Islam, the nature of Sudanese society changed profoundly. Not only was Sudan sharply
divided along the lines of religion, a Muslim north and non-Muslim south, but it has also
been devastated by continuous civil war, instability, poverty and revolutions.
As Africa's largest country, Sudan is one of the most diverse religiously and
ethnically. The prominent role ofreligion in Sudan's public life has made it very difficult
to reconcile the country's multi-religious identity. Consequently, religion or religious
policies made by its leadership became the underlying factor behind the country's tragedy.
The role of Islam in Sudan cannot be understood without a reference to the Mahdfct
movement and its aftermath. The Mahdist movement was originally a religious revolution
against the apparently irreligious Ottomans. Al-Mahdi established a theological state that
ruled Sudan from 1881 to 1897 « In other words, modern Sudan's first experiment in
statehood was in the shape of an Islamic state. Thus, the seeds of Sudanese nationalism were
planted in an Islamic context. Many Sudanese view Al-Mahdi as the father of Sudanese
nationalism.48
Following the collapse of the Mahdist state, Mahdist sentiments grew strongly
among the Sudanese people, and most importantly the Mahdist family continued to have
power and influence. In fact, the Mahdist tradition was transformed into well-organized
political power. In this context, it is worth noting that the British policy during the
condominium greatly contributed to the popularity and the lasting influences ofthe Mahdi's
family in Sudanese politics.
Among the pillars of imperial British policy was the principle "Divide and Rule."
The British were masters at exploiting ethnic and religious differences in their colonies. In
Sudan, the principle was not only applied by separating the north from the south, but was
also applied among the northern Muslims.
The British sponsored a counter rival movement to Mahdism. This was the
Among the best sources on the Mahdist revolution is P. M Holt's work The
Mahdist State in Sudan 1881-1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). '
48
Deng, War of Visions, 49.
Khatmaih sect, which was founded by the Mirghani family and opposed al-Mahdi. The
Khatmaih, regardless ofreligious aspiration, did not find any problem in cooperating with
the British as long as they would gain more power and prestige.49 Under the British rule, the
Khatmaih became an organized group with mass followers.
However, with the beginning of World; War I, the British shifted their support
towards Mahdism. This time, the British sought the support ofMahdism-the historic anti-
Ottoman movement-in their war against the Ottoman Empire. Like its rival, Mahdism
began to work closely with the British. Consequently, the Khatrnlih and Mahdists
exclusively dominated the political scene of Sudan.50 Their success and influence were not
to be attained without British support. As a Sudanese scholar wrote, "essentially, the legacy
of the nineteenth century accorded both orders, with enough influence for them to become
the major players in sectarian politics."51
In this context, it is obvious that both power groups have politicized Islam. They
cooperated with the British to achieve political gains in pragmatic and Machiavellian ways
divorced from religion. Unfortunately, this strategy has characterized the policies of these
Gabriel R. Warburg, "British Policy Towards the Ansar in Sudan- A Note on a
Historical Controversy," Middle Eastern Studies, vol.33, no. 4 (October 1997) 691-692
on an
w T u analySiS 1S largdy based on Warburg's work, "British Policy
Wowards the Ansar in Sudan: A Note on an Historical Controversy," 675-692.
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groups in the postindependence period. In this case, the Sudanese people were the victims
of such pragmatism.52
Consequently, it is clear that sectarianism in Sudanese politics was a British
invention. The Mahdists and Khatmaih have persisted as major political forces in Sudan.
In the 1940s, with the development ofpolitical parties, these traditional organizations were
transformed into vehicles for political action and so they formed political parties. The
Mahdists founded the Umah party and the Khatmaih founded the Democratic Unionist
Party.53
The Umah and the Democratic Unionist parties remain dominated by-tribal
identification and family ties. Therefore, they were unable to broaden their political base and
attract the Sudanese masses, especially the intellectuals. Furthermore, while both parties
were based on religious ideology, they maintained secular behaviors and advocated
pragmatic rather than ideological policies. As a result, the road was open to create new
ideological and antisectarian political parties. They include the communists and the Muslim
Brotherhood.54
The Sudanese communists were originally students who studied in Egypt and
P />■ ]^^yDeserve^eRoleoftheElite in Sudan
Political Evolution (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1990), 52
533 Peter Woodward, "Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power" in Political Islam •
; 91^ 6d" JOhn L> ESP°Sit0 (B°Ulder md L°nd0n: L>™e Rienner
Af ■ r,p ,T dIe'Religion and Politics in East
Africa: The Period Since Independence (London: James Currey, 1995), 37.
139
returned home with communist ideas. In Sudan, where Islam runs deep, the communists
adjusted themselves to that reality. They had a flexible attitude towards religion. They
argued that Islam and communism were ideological allies against imperialism.55 In any way,
the communists remained an elitist party in Sudan until the 1970s.
Similar to the communists, the Muslim brothers of Sudan were an offshoot of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Like the communists, they remain an elitist political party.
It took them decades to acquire a mass following.56
To sum up, Mahdist and Khatmaih and their rivals the communists and the Muslim
Brotherhood, the major political actors in Sudan, have failed to develop in a way that could
transcend family, tribal, religious, or ethnic loyalties and could be a basis for Sudanese
unity.57 This outcome proved to be tragic for Sudan in the subsequent years.
Islam and Secularism in the Era of Independence
When Sudan achieved independence in 1956, the two holy families of Mahdi and
Merghani were the major political actors in Sudan. Therefore, they had to form a coalition
government after years ofbitter rivalry. This coalition, writes Sidahmed, "was led by greed,
"Deng, War of Visions, 121.
56 Woodward, "Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power," 98.
57 John Obert Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World (New
York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 357.
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a scramble for power and personal interests.
From the very beginning, two major issues have challenged this alliance: A
permanent constitution and the southern problem. A national committee was established to
draft a constitution. As soon as the committee started its work, it received a memorandum
from the attorney general of Sudan urging it to adopt an Islamic constitution:
In an Islamic country like the Sudan, the social organization ofwhich
has been built upon Arabic customs and Islamic ways and of which the
majority are Muslims, it is essential that the general principles of the
constitution of a such country should be derived from the principles of
Islam.59
Contrary to such expectations, what was drafted by the committee was a secular
constitution with Islam as the official religion ofthe state. In adopting a secular constitution,
it is evident that the sectarian leaders were not enthusiastic for an Islamic constitution, as
they preferred to conduct their policies in a secular form. They were preoccupied by their
interests and never conducted policies on a purely religious basis. In doing so, they have
deepened the hatred and suspicion of the Sudanese people in both the north and the south.
Moreover, they opened the door for the military, which was discontented with such
pragmatism and opportunism.
58 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 58.
59 Ibid., 63.
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Islam and Secularism and the Generals
In 1964, General Ibrahim Aboud led the first military coup in the modern history of
Sudan. As in every military takeover, the coup was justified by the failure of the former
regime. This part concentrates on Aboud's Islamic policies in Sudan.
Aboud tried to impress the Islamists of Sudan; therefore, he pursued a vigorous
Islamization policy in the south. Mosques, schools, and Islamic centers were established in
the south, and Arabic became the official language. The day of the rest was changed from
Sunday to Friday, the Muslim's day of rest.60 Aboud believed that Christianity was an alien
religion that foreign missionaries had imposed on the south. Therefore, according to the
Missionary Societies Act, the work of the missionaries was restricted and all foreign
missionaries were expelled from Sudan.61 Aboud went further in fighting Christianity and
imposing Islam, and so he pressured the chiefs of southern tribes to convert to Islam and to
order their followers to also convert.
Aboud believed that cultural (Arabic Islamic) integration would be the base for
ideological unity in Sudan. Therefore, no room was allowed for cultural diversity. Rather
than national integration, Aboud's policies of Islamization unified the southern resistance
and led to the establishment ofthe Anya-Nya, who sought self-determination for the region.62
In the north where the majority is Muslims, Aboud did not make any fundamental
60Mosley, The Sudan, 39. Also Khalid, TheGovernment They Deserve, 188.
61 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 189. Also Deng, War of Visions, 139.
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changes with regard to the role ofreligion in the state. In this case, the concentration on his
policies in the south is a testimony to the fact that the south was the only area in which the
Islamists and the military accept the merits of Islamization.63
However, Aboud was unable to impress the Islamists and so his regime came to an
end with a public uprising in which the Islamists and the communists made a coalition and
played a pivotal role.64
Islam and Secularism and the Civilians
As before, the conventional rivalry continued between the two major political parties.
Furthermore, the Umah party had split inside between the young al-Sadiq al-Mahdi (son of
the deceased leader of the Umah, Sayid Sadiq al-Mahdi) and his uncle al-Hadi al-Mahdi,
who represented the old guard politicians.65 This split weakened the position of the Umah
party vis-a-vis other political parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, from the
1960s onward, the Muslim Brotherhood began to play a more influential role in Sudan's
politics. This role is evident by the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in forcing the
government to ban the Communist Party and to adopt an Islamic constitution.
As mentioned earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood cooperated with the communists
62 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 188.
63 Abdel Wahab El. Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemma for
Islam in Africa," African Affairs, Journal ofthe Royal African Society, vol. 89, no. 356
(July 1990): 373.
64 Woodward, "Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power," 98.
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against Aboud. However, with the removal of Aboud, the Muslim Brotherhood turned
against their former allies and pressured the government until the Communist Party was
banned.66
With regard to the Islamic constitution, as mentioned earlier, from the 1960s onward,
the Islamists—represented by the Muslim Brotherhood—began to play a dominant role in
Sudanese politics. In line with this feature, the draft constitution of 1968 was largely the
outcome of Islamist pressures. The Islamists justified the need for an Islamic constitution
on the grounds that the constitution should represent the will of the people and since the
majority are Muslims, their will should prevail.67 It is ironic that such justification was
secular and democratic.
The secularists along with the southerners who acknowledge the realities of the
Sudanese society came to a different conclusion. They preferred a nonreligious constitution
on the following grounds:
To establish a system of government and law on the basis of a certain
religious ideology would jeopardize the principle of equality of all citizens
before the law and hamper the political and legal rights of citizens of
religious minorities.68
65 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 110.
66 For an interesting analysis ofthe dissolution of Sudanese Communist political
party, see Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in Traditional Society:
The Case ofSudan (London: Frank Cass, 1978), 94-95.
67 Sidahmed, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 105.
68 Ibid., 108.
144
While such reasoning takes into consideration the multireligious composition of
Sudanese society, the Islamists were able to impose their will on the rest and an Islamic
constitution was adopted. In doing so, all hopes of cooperation and coexistence with the
southerners vanished and the civil war continued with little hope of resolution. Moreover,
it drove Sudan into another period of turmoil, which ended in another military takeover.
Islam and Secularism in Numeri's Era
In May 1969, Jaafar Numeri seized power in a bloodless coup supported by key army
units. The question that poses itself in this regard is how did Numeri, who started as a
secular socialist, end up appealing for Islamic support? This shift culminated in the
implementation of Islamic laws and the attempt to establish an Islamic state.
In an attempt to answer this question, this part looks into two areas: the internal
political and ideological development ofNumeri's regime, including the rise of the Islamists'
influence in the Middle East in general and Sudan in particular;, and the personal and
pragmatic motives beyond Numeri's religious awakening. It seems that the two processes
have combined to explain Numeri's shift from secularism to Islamism.
The Developments of Numeri's Political System and the Rise of the Islamists
After assuming power, Numeri, inspired by socialist sentiments, proclaimed the
establishment of a secular democratic republic dedicated to independent Sudanese
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socialism.69 The shift towards socialism was in keeping with the trend in most newly
independent African states at that time. Furthermore, he criticized the Islamists and declared
that one ofthe objectives ofhis coup was to tear off the "yellow paper," in a reference to the
Islamic constitution (mentioned earlier).70
Numeri made an alliance with the communists, who held prominent positions in his
first government. The next step was to crush the Islamists, who posed a real threat to his
power. In 1970, his forces violently crushed the Mahdist movement in their headquarters on
Aba Island. Reports estimated the casualties among the Mahdist movement at 12,000
including their leader, the Imam al-Hadi, grandson of the Mahdi.71
With the removal of the Islamists from the scene, Numeri turned against his former
allies, the communists, who were crushed as violently as in the Aba Island incident.72
Having suppressed the Islamists and the communists, Numeri moved to confront the two
thorny issues that had caused the collapse of several past governments: the status ofthe south
and the role of religion in the state.
In the case of the south, Numeri closed the file of the south by what came to be
69 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 242-249.
70 Sidahmed, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 132.
71 For a detailed analysis of the struggle for power between Numeri and the Ansar,
see Mansour Khalid, Numeri and the Revolution qfDis-May (London: IPI Limited,
1985), 10-21.
72 Peter K. Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan (New Ifork: Prager, 1976), 261-263.
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known as the Addis Ababa Agreement.73 The question ofreligion and politics was resolved
in the constitution of 1973, which, for the first time since independence, stressed the dual
Arab and African identity of Sudan and confirmed the respect for Islam, Christianity and the
noble aspects of traditional Africian spiritual beliefs.74
While these measures were able to bring peace and stability to Sudan for the first
time since independence, opposition to his regime continued unabated. Numeri's rule was
threatened by the Islamists, who were supported by Libya's Qadafi and Saudi Arabia.75
Numeri observed the rise of the Islamic movement in the Middle East. He also lost
a close friend, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who was assassinated by radical Muslims.
Also, the Iranian revolution had a regional impact. All these events made Numeri believe
that ifhe was to survive, he must mend fences with the Islamists. In line with this thought,
nothing better than Islam, the religion ofthe majority, could serve as the base of legitimacy
for his regime. Consequently, Numeri moved towards reconciliation with the Islamists in
what came to be known as the National Reconciliation.76 The Islamists, represented by
Hassan Turabi, found no problem in cooperating with Numeri to further their interests.
73 Further discussion ofthe Adis Ababa Agreement and its impact on Sudan will
be presented in chapter six, which examines Islam and nationalism in Sudan.
74 Khalid, Numeri and the Revolution ofDis-May, 46-47.
75 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 327. Also Holt, A History ofthe Sudan,
207.
76 For an analysis of the National Reconciliation, see Khalid, Numeri and the
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Turabi justified this Machiavellian means by the principle "Necessity knows no rule or law."
In other words, Turabi's principle was more pragmatic than dogmatic and motivated by
material gains more than by religious zeal.77
Numeri's Religious Awakening
While this process demonstrated how Numeri's move towards Islamization was
dictated by particular circumstances of the time, it was combined with a religious
reawakening of Numeri personally. Various explanations have been put forward for
Numeri's sudden Islamism.78 According to Mansour Khalid, who served in key government
positions under Numeri, Numeri met with a Sufi, a very religious man, who claimed to have
communicated with the spirit of the Prophet Muhammed. The Sufi told Numeri that the
prophet had appeared to him in a dream and informed him that Numeri was destined to save
the Islamic nation.79
Revolution ofDis-May, 170-176.
77 Hayder Ibrahim AH, "Islamism in Practice: The Case of Sudan," in The Islamist
Dilemma: The Political Role ofIslamist Movement in the Contemporary Arab World, ed.
Laura Guazzone (UK: Ithaca Press, 1995), 194.
78 Another argument states that Numeri was very desperate as he had only
daughters and no son to inherit his throne. He sought help from doctors at home and
abroad but to no avail. Finally, he took refuge with a saint who told him that if he
established God's law on earth, he would have an heir. Obviously, Numeri believed the
saint and began to act accordingly. The full story is available in Judith Miller's work,
God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting From a Militant Middle East, 137.
79 Khalid, Numeri and the Revolution ofDis-May, 279. Also, see Francis Deng,
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Obviously, Numeri, now the believer, accepted the Sufi's advice and began to act
according to the revelation. As Khalid continued, "Numeri could now say that he alone had
achieved what both Mahdism and Khatmaih had failed to achieve in generations -
establishment of God's kingdom on earth."80
While this story explains Numeri's shift to Islam as a result of divine revelation, it
is believed that any theory that ignored the political motives behind Numeri's Islamism
misses the point. Consequently, Numeri had political and pragmatic motives for his Islamic
tendencies. Based on this argument, Numeri's step was a tactic to divert the attention of his
people from the regime's failure and corruption.81 Either way, it is clear that Numeri's
movement was basically an exploitation of religion for political gains.
Regardless of the reasons, he proceeded with his program of Islamization. First, he
quit drinking alcohol and ordered his ministers and senior officials to follow suit. Then he
published a book called Why the Islamic Method? in which he praised Islam as the best way
to achieve Sudanese unity.82 Finally, working with Turabi, the attorney general, Numeri
proclaimed the September Laws in which the Sharia became the basis of the Sudanese legal
system in both the north and the south for Muslims, Christians, and Animists alike.
The September Laws were bitterly resented by all Sudanese political forces, with the
Seed ofRedemption: A Political Novel (New York: Lillian Press, 1986), 205-207.
80 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 310.
81 John Esposito, Islam and Politics, 232.
82 Miller, God Has Ninety-Nine Names, 136.
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exception of the Muslim Brotherhood. Those Muslims who differed with Numeri were to
pay a heavy price. Among those was Muhammed Taha, a saintly man in his late seventies
who developed a different vision of Islam from Numeri's.83 Taha was arrested, convicted,
and executed.
Taha's execution shocked the Sudanese people who asserted that the execution had
nothing to do with Islam.84 However, Numeri and his allies, namely the Islamists, continued
to believe that these laws had improved the morals ofthe Sudanese people and so should be
followed in other parts of the world.85
Meanwhile, Turabi continued to cooperate with Numeri so as to achieve his own
interests, which meant empowering and expanding his organization - the Muslim
Brotherhood. Contrary to Turabi's hopes, this alliance did not last long. Numeri sensed the
83 For a most respectful and objective analysis ofTaha's views on Numeri's
policy, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, The Second Message ofIslam (New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1987).
84 On Taha's trial and execution, see Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim, "The Islamic
Law ofApostasy and its Modern Application: A Case from the Sudan," Religion, vol. 16
(1986): 197.
85 In an interview with Judith Miller, a correspondent for the New York Times in
the Middle East, Numeri told Miller that Khartoum was the safest city in Africa and if the
American had amputated a few hands now and then, they would be safer. See Miller,
God has Ninety-Nine Names, 140.
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Islamists' plot to replace the fighting Imam (Numeri) with the scholarly Imam (Turabi).
Numeri cracked down on the Islamists, Turabi and the key leaders ofhis organization found
themselves behind bars.87 With the removal ofTurabi and his men from power, Numeri lost
his last power base and accelerated the collapse of his regime. As Numeri suppressed the
Islamists, his days in power were numbered. Numeri was overthrown in a bloodless coup
in 1985 by his chief of staff, General Swir al-Dahb.
Islam in the Post-Numeri Era, 1985-1989
There are striking similarities between the politics of post-Numeri Sudan (1985-
1989) and those ofpost-Aboud Sudan (1964-1969). The trend of events is almost identical.
Political instability and civil war in the south brought down Aboud's and Numeri's regimes.
Then a series of short-lived coalition governments brought to an end the military takeover.88
In addition to this replay of the politics of the 1960s, the underlying problems were
also the same: the role and place of religion in the state and society and the war in the south.
As this chapter is mainly concerned with religion and politics, it will outline the major issues
related to religion in this part and the war in the south will be analyzed in chapter six of this
86 Lesch, The Sudan, 57. Also Khalid, Numeri and the Revolution ofDis-May,
390-394.
87 Sidahmed, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 139.
88 Peter K. Bechtold, " More Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics this Time," in
Sudan: State and Society in Crisis, ed. John O. Voll (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1991), 5.
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study.
As the generals promised to return power to the civilians and honored their promise,
for the first time in modern Middle Eastern history elections were held and the civilians came
back to run Sudan after more than 16 years of military rule. The critical question in this
context is why the September Laws, viewed by the Sudanese people as a "falsification of
Islam, the expression of an absolutist power, and an affront to human dignity,"89 were not
.abrogated by the elected government. In an attempt to answer this question, one must outline
the various views of Sudanese groups toward the September Laws.
As in the 1960s, the Sudanese people were polarized into the Islamists and the
secularists and the major challenges were the same: the issue ofSharia and the war in the
south.90
The Islamists
The Islamic camp was divided among the same traditional groups: the Mahdists, the
Khatmaih, and the Muslim Brotherhood, which was reconstituted as the National Islamic
Front (NIF). Following is a brief analysis ofthe position of each group.
89 Jean Francois Ryer, "The Islamization ofLaw as a Political Stake in Sudan," in
Sudan After Numeri, ed. Peter Woodward (London and New York: Rutledge, 1991), 141.
90 For a discussion of the situation in Sudan following the removal ofNumeri, see
for instance Kamal Osman Salih, "The Sudan, 1985-1989, the Fading Democracy," The
Journal ofModern African Studies, vol. 28,no.2 (1990): 199-224.
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The Mahdists
The position ofthe Mahdists toward the September Laws is best represented by its
political party, the Umah Party. The Umah Party had been led by al-Sadiq al-Mahdi since
the mid 1960s. When al-Mahdi was in the opposition, he was very resentful of these laws.
Later in his election manifesto, in 1986, al-Mahdi promised to cancel the laws upon
assuming power.91 However, when he-became prime minister, his tone had changed. He
suspended part of the laws, but did not abrogate them. This move was criticized by the
Islamists for going too far and by the secularists for not going far enough. Al-Mahdi was
caught between the hammer of the Islamists and the anvil of the secularists. He continued
maneuvering without taking decisive action.92
TheKhatmaih
As has been mentioned earlier, the Khatmaih's Islamism is historically associated
with political expediency. Like its rival Mahdists, the Khatmaih's position towards the
September Laws was vague and pragmatic.
The Khatmaih made an alliance with the NIF at one time and advocated an Islamic
state; however, it also concluded a peace agreement with SPLM in which it agreed to
91 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 368.
92 Ibid.
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abrogate the September Laws.93 Consequently, the Khatmaih's position was ambiguous and
characterized by a degree of inconsistency.
TheNIF
The NIF is the only group that had a clear sense of direction and a very stable
position towards the September Laws. The NIF is the hard-line wing of the Islamists. It
adopted the slogan "Islam is the solution."
The NIF asserted that the creation of an Islamic state based on Islamic teachings was
among the objectives of independence. According to Turabi: ;
The Sudanese people have longed for Islamic law since
independence. The embodiment of Islamic values in Sudanese society was
the objective of independence.... Sudan has been so late in liberating itself
from western pressures and it must now ask for forgiveness by returning to
God's law.94
The Secularists
The secular camp consists of the southerners, Sudanese communists, trade unionists,
feminist groups, and other activists of civil society.
The secularists called explicitly for a separation between state and religion. Religion,
93 The religious and political position of the Khatmiyya during Numeri's regime
(1969-1985) is discussed in Ahmed Al-Shahi, Themesfrom Northern Sudan (London:
Ithaca Press, 1986).
94 Lesch, Sudan, 80.
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«o them, is a matter ofpersonal affair and should no, be imposed by ,he state or the law.
They rejected the concept of a re.igious state and called for a secular, evil, democratic
state." Unfortunately, the secularists were no, in a position to influence the decision-making
or trend of events in Sudan. Consequently, their efforts were to no avail and their ideas
remain wishful thinking in Sudan.
In the end, it is clear that the question ofreligion and state remains one ofthe mos,
controvert issues in Sudan. The failure to repeal the September Laws mdicates the extent
to which religion had assumed central stage in Sudanese politics. I, also shows the failure
of the Sudanese elite to adopt positions that take into consideration the aspirations of the
various ethnic and religious groups within their country. I, was in this atmosphere when the
army took over again, however, mis time, the army was backed by ,he Islamis,s, the NIF in
particular, as will be discussed in the following part.
Political Islam in Sudan Since 1989
Political Islam had been associated with Sudan since 1989, for it was in that year a
coup led by general Omar Al-Bashir tookplace with the support of the NIF. The nature of
the coup, the political programs ofthe coup leader, and it. impact on the Sudanese state and
society are examined in this part.
The coup of 1989 was carried ou, by middle and lower ranking officers, so mere
95
ir' "ResP°nse t0 N™i's Ponies: Some Observations on
geS " Nth Sd" *~«»»* ed Peter
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must have been a political force behind the new regime. The critical question became whose
coup was it? In the beginning, the identity or the political color of the new regime was not
clear. The coup was received with initial welcome regionally and internationally. Egypt and
Saudi Arabia hailed the new power-holders in Sudan and sent large amounts of oil and food
to support the new regime.96
By the same token, the West welcomed the new regime. The London Times was very
optimistic about the new regime in Sudan and expected an end to the civil war:
Given the failure of the civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, the
arrival of the military government promising an end to the war can be
welcome. When the Sudanese has peace, it shall be able to decide whether its
long-term interests are best served by a military rule.97
Unfortunately, this initial welcome turned into universal hatred when it became clear
that the NIF was the only power behind the new regime. However, Al-Bashir tried to mask
his political color and continued to deny the NIF's role in the coup.98 In his first policy
statement, he declared that his revolution ofnational salvation had a Sudanese goal and pan-
96 Sadia Jamal, "Under Bashir's Boot," New Africa (July, 1990): 9.
97 Peter Nyot Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan, 1985-1995: Analysis,
Evaluation and Documentation (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institute, 1996), 99.
98 Two weeks after the coup, Al-Bashir declared that he would head a secular
government and he would not enforce Islam against non-Muslims. He went further and
declared "We have no relations with the NIF before, during or after the coup. We have
no intention of cooperating with them." For more information about the deceit and
tactics of the coup leaders, see for instance, Graham Thomas, Sudan: Strugglefor
Survival (London: Dark Publishers, 1993), 105-106.
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Arabist orientation but not Islamist." On the other side, Turabi, the father of the new
political regime, was arrested shortly after the coup. Furthermore, Turabi, in an attempt to
emphasize his disassociation with the regime, did not play any role in the government until
1996 when he was elected speaker of the parliament.
The previous tactics and maneuvering implemented by Al-Bashir and his ally Turabi
were unable to mask their close associations. The timing of the coup was dictated by the
NTF. The coup was carried out when al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the prime minister, was close to
reaching an agreement with the SPLM in which the September Laws would be canceled.
The NIF rejected the peace initiative as it viewed it as a betrayal of the Islamist mission.100
With the success of the coup, the NIF moved to the forefront of Sudanese politics.
It controlled the top positions of the state to the extent that it began to function as a shadow
government. The NIF embarked upon its programs to reshape the Sudanese state and society
according to its Islamic agenda.101
At the state level, following the coup, religion became the guiding principle of the
government policies: "Religion is one." Islam is the religion guiding the overwhelming mass
of society. It is the law that inspires and guides the government laws, regulations, and
99 Sidahmad, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 190.
100 Gabriel R. Warburg, "The Sudan under Islamist Rule," in Religious Radicalism
in the Greater Middle East, eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London:
Frank Class, 1997), 33.




Consequently, Islamic laws were implemented in all aspects of life regardless of the
price, which included civil war, human rights violations, international hatred, and economic
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the Sudanese state adopted anti-Western rhetoric. Sudan became
the harbor and sponsor of Islamic organizations struggling to establish Islamic states in the
Middle East. This policy put Sudan on the United States' list of terrorist states and earned
Sudan regional and international isolation.103
At the social level, with the Islamization oflaws, the Sudanese people were subjected
to harsher sanctions than the September Laws proclaimed by Numeri. Violations ofhuman
rights for both Muslims and non-Muslims, since Al-Bashir seized power in 1989 are well
■ £ ■ -
documented by human rights organizations.104 In1993, the U.S. State Department Country
Reports on Human Rightsfor Sudan noted "the NIF dominated regime pursued religious,
ethnic, and ideological discrimination in almost every aspect of society."105
After more than a decade of the revolution, the Islamists have brought about almost
the exact opposite ofwhat they promised. At the internal level, the revolution was not for
everybody, only those in power—the NIF and its members were able to reap the fruits.
102 Kok, Governance and Conflict in Sudan, 1985-1995, 273.
103 "Is Sudan terrorism's new best friend?" Time, vol. 142, no. 9 (August 1994):
30.
104 See the Annual Report ofAmnesty Internationalfor the years, 1990,
1991,1992, 1993, 1994 and 1996 (London: Amnesty International Publications).
105 The U.S. Department of State, Country Human Rights Reports 1993: Sudan
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Instead of alleviating the people's suffering and promoting their welfare, the NIF's policies
have hurt almost everyone in Sudan. The civil war has worsened, the economy is in
shambles, and the society is oppressed and intimidated by a police state. At the international
level, with the application of the NIF's program of political Islam, Sudan became regionally
and internationally isolated. Sudan supported Iraq in 1990, and lost a major source of
financial support from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Egypt severed its relations with
Sudan in 1995 after its involvement in an attempt to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni
Mubarak during a visit to Ethiopia in June 1995.106 Sudan's relations with Algeria, Uganda,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia are very difficult. These countries charged Sudan with
involvement in their internal affairs.
In the international community, Sudan remained isolated. The European Union
condemned Sudan for its human rights record and its aggressive policies in the region. U.S.
Sudanese relations reached their nadir inl998, after the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in
East Africa. The story ofthe U.S. attack on Sudan has already been told.
To sum up, since the Islamists came to power in 1989, dissatisfaction with their
policies ran deep in Sudan as well as abroad. The lessons ofthe Sudan, writes Ramsay, the
former British ambassador to Sudan, is of the corrosive effects of a religion traduced and
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).
106 For an excellent analysis of Sudan's relations with Egypt since 1989, see Hilal
Khashan, "The New Arab Cold War," World Affairs, vol. 159, no. 4 (Spring 1997): 158-
168.
misrepresented for po,itical ends » Consequent ,he Sudanese people have los, faithta
TuraWs experiment as i, turned to be worse than the rate it replaced. The target of the NIF
was to control power as an effective tool ofIslamization. Li other words, politics rather than
religion were at the top of the movement's agenda. As a Sudanese scholar put it:
In its eagerness to lay its hands on power, the Sudanese Islamist
movement seems to have endorsed and legitimized the game oTpSt c Th
all of ,ts cyncsm and shameless pursuit ofpartisan interests at the expeTe
ofreligious morality and principles.101 expense
In the final analysis, several things are striking about Islam in Sudan. Foremost
among these is the complete exploitation ofreligion for material and personal gains. The lust
for power, access to government, and personal interests takes precedence over the re.igious
zeal, to the pre-independence period, it had been mentioned how both religious groups -
Khatmaih and Mahdis, - had reconciled themselves with secularism. They chose to work
with the British, who were alien non-Muslim invader, By the same token, in the post-
independence period, the cause of Islam suffered heavily because of the pragmatism and
opportunism ofthe Islamists, fc other words, the Islamists ofSudan are more pragmatic than
dogmatic. They switch allegiance and compromise faith and prove that they are interested
in many things other than religion. In doing so, the Islamists ofSudan were no, only paying
lip service to Islam, but also had presented Islam in a very ugly way.
1618 (Novtl!rer27oSdan: "* ""'^^C—*-- ™.. 277, no.
108 Sidahmed, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 224.
CHAPTER 5
ISLAM AND NATIONALISM
Like secularism, nationalism was and still is a major ideological and philosophical
challenge to the Islamic world-view. To many Muslim intellectuals, it is viewed as a serious
threat to Muslims' faith, identity, and life. For a host of other nationalist figures, the merits
of nationalism are easy to find, as nationalism is viewed as a source of inspiration and a
unifying ideology for the establishment of a political entity that is rich, strong and
progressive. The question then arises: why do some Muslim intellectuals praise nationalism
and reconcile it with Islam while others denounce it and view it as another Western
conspiracy against the Islamic world?
This confusion over the role of nationalism in Muslim life is not difficult to
understand if one recalls what has happened in the Islamic world since the winds of
nationalism began to blow across it in the early nineteenth century. In this regard, it is the
contention of this chapter that nationalism, which was born after the French Revolution in
1789,1 was then an alien idea to Muslims. However, in the course ofthe nineteenth century,
nationalism, this powerful ideological force, became very attractive and familiar to Muslims,
1 Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes
(New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1992), 194.
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and in the twentieth century it became a dominant idea among many rulers and thinkers in
the Islamic world.
Following is a brief analysis of Muslims' different responses to nationalism.
First Response: Rejection
The very first response to nationalism in the Islamic world came from the Ottoman
Empire. As the ideas of the French Revolution began to spread in the Empire, an Ottoman
statesman warned his people against French blandishments and wrote:
The known and famous atheists* Voltaire and Rousseau, and the other
materialists like them, had printed and published various works consisting of
insults and vilification against the pure prophets and great kings, of the
removal and abolition of all religion, and all allusions to the sweetness and
equality and republicanism.2
This attitude toward the French Revolution and its ideas, including nationalism,
should not surprise us as many Muslims reject outright the idea of nationalism on the
following grounds:
First, nationalism is an alien secular idea that is incompatible with the nature of Islam
as a transnational religious ideology. Muslims all over the world are one community united
by the bond of faith and the law of Islam, regardless of differences in language, history,
blood, or territory. Therefore, neither country nor nation, but religion is the core and
ultimate determinant of identity.3
2 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 182.
3 Lewis, The Multiple Identities ofthe Middle East, 30.
Islam is sharply resistant to nationalism, ethnicity, and racism. The Quran confronts
those issues by contending that the standards of excellence have nothing to do with nation,
country, or race but are founded on moral and religious piety. God says:
female AnrfT? Y°U^ * Single (Pair> of a m^ and afemale. And have made you nations and tribes so that you may know one
mother. The noblest among you is the most pious. Allah is all-kfowTng"
Furthermore, it is God's will that the world be divided into different nations and
religions. God says, "IfAllah so willed, He could make you all one people."5
The Prophet also emphasized the prominence of piety in his farewell address and
declared that there is no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab, except through piety and
fear of God.6
In light of .he above, i. is evident that race, territoty, language, etc., has no
significance whatsoever in the Islamic faith. Religion is the decisive factor in expressing or
determining identity. TOe primacy ofreligion has discredited my other factor. This primacy
ofthe sense ofreligious identity makes the Egyptian Muslim see the Egyptian Christian, not
to mention the Egyptian Jew, as a stranger. However, he sees the Iranian Mus.im or the
Indian Muslim as a brother.7
Therefore, all Muslims of all races in all parts ofthe world are members ofthe same
4 The Holy Quran, Section 49, A, 13-14.
5 The Holy Quran, Section 16, A, 92-94.
«Quoted in Ali A. Mazrui, "Islamic and Western Values," Foreign Affairs vnl 7*
no. 5 (September - October 1997): 127. '•"reign Ajjairs, vol.76,
great Islamic community. Also, they are superior ■„ non-Muslim, mis sense of group
solidarity and pride among Muslims is drawn from the Islamic vision ofthe world.
According to tot vision, the world is sharply divided into the House of Islam (Daml
Mam) and the House of War (Daml Harb). The House of Islam is all those lands under
Islamic sovereignty. The House of War is all those !ands and communities outside the
territory ofIslam. m theory, the two houses are in a perpetual state ofwar" Ttas, the battle
lines are drawn on a theological basis.
The House ofIslam was established first by the Prophet and his successors. The city-
state that the Prophet created in Medina was expanded into a large empire. I, was a
transnational, religious.y defined state and community. In this state, Muslim Arabs are
brethren ofMuslim Africans, Persians, and so on. More than that, the unbdieving Arabs
who shared the language, land, history, blood and many more things with the believing
Arabs became strangers and so were excluded? This situation continued for centuries.
Witt the advent of nationalism in the eighteen™ century, the Ottoman Empire
represented the House of Islam and Christian Europe the House of War. More, there was a
constant state ofwar between the two houses. The Ottoman Empire, as pointed ou, earlier,
was a warrior state tha, expanded the frontiers:of Islam and defended Muslims against the
'Lewis, The Multiple Identities ofthe Middle East 112.
50, no. 2 (April
' Lewis, The Multiple Identities ofthe Middle East, 82.
encroachments ofEurope. Furthermore, the Ottomans viewed themselves as Muslims an'd
viewed the Europeans as infidels.10
Second, as mentioned earlier, nationalist sentiments began to reach the Islamic world
at a time when there was a perpetual state ofwar between Muslims and Europe. The timing
ofthe spread ofnationalist ideas made many Muslims believe it part of a Western conspiracy
against the Islamic world. Many antinationalists argued that the West used nationalism as
a weapon ofdisintegration against the Ottoman Empire - the House of Islam. Therefore, it
was purposely exported by the West to facilitate the process of dividing the Islamic world.
In consequence, nationalism was viewed ;as a religious and political threat." The
sympathizers with nationalism were very discredited and viewed with hatred and suspicion.
As they were inspired by the West or the House of War, they could not be trusted. Any
ideas that come from the House ofWar raise doubts for Muslims. Muslims must ignore such.
ideas of secularism and nationalism and avoid anything that might weaken their unity and
make them vulnerable to Western domination.
This hostile attitude towards the House ofWar-its ideas as well as its people-was
very powerful to the extent that the advocates of reform who criticized the Sultan in the
Ottoman Empire were discredited as the priority was the unity and strength of Islam not
reform. As Afghani wrote:
Snitan^^°fWeStem Preachments, unity of all Muslims around the
Sultan is the most important thing. The reforms could come later, but attacks
10 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 202.
11 Esposito, Islam and Politics, 65.
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on the Sultan could only weaken the primacy goal of unity.12
The shift of loyalty from the transnational Islamic state to the narrow modern
nationalist ideas ofArabism, Turkism, Kurdism and the like was viewed as a betrayal of the
Islamic cause. Peter Mansfield pointed out that religious loyalties were still much stronger
than secular nationalist ideas. Arabs, as'"a major ethnic group in the Empire, did not think
in terms of overthrowing the Empire, which was the sole protector of the Islamic world.13
There is no doubt these feelings were shared by other ethnic groups throughout the Empire.
The idea that sets aside one group ofMuslims—Arabs, Turks, Kurds, etc.—and puts
them in confrontation with any other group ofMuslims, Persians, Africans, Indians, etc., was
completely rejected by Muslims. Furthermore, European nationalism was seen in terms of
destruction, war, selfishness, and intolerance:
Nationalism as a religion inculcates neither charity nor justice, it is
proud not humble, and it signally fails to universalize human aims. . . .
Nationalism's kingdom is frankly ofthis world, and its attainment involved
tribal selfishness and vainglory, a particular ignored and tyrannical
intolerance and war. Nationalism brings not peace but war.14
With such an ugly image, nationalism was the last idea that Muslims needed to
borrow from Europe. Furthermore, the Islamic world, as many thinkers argued back then,
12 Cited in Niki R. Keddi, "Pan-Islamism as Proto-Nationalism," The Journal of
Modern History, vol.14, no. 1 (March 1969): 25.
13 Mansfield, The History ofthe Middle East, 125.
14 William W. Hadad and William Ochsewald, Nationalism in a Non-National
State, the Dissolution ofthe Ottoman Empire (Columbus: Ohio State University Press,
1977), 8.
must not look to the West for solutions to its problem, Muslims mus, ,ook for answer^
their problems in their own culture, history, and, most importantly, religion."
Third, nationalism was discredited on the grounds that it was a secular idea.
Secularism is the major base of nationa.ism. If Islam comply rejects secularism as
mentioned earlier, the logical conclusion would be tha, Islam rejects nationalism as well.
Nationalism requires the separation ofreligion and politics. I, shifts sovereignty from God
.0 people. The nation is the source of authority and legislation. As a result, the Sharia
ceases to be the source oflegislation. In Islam, sovereignty belongs to God, who is the sole
source oflegitimate authority." The anti-nationalis, intellectuals called forme rule ofGod's
law in a nonnational state uniting all Muslims through one Mamie community under
submission to God. Therefore, nationalism is contradictory to the nature, mission, and
universal message of Islam.17
In sum, the attitudes of Muslims towards nationalism in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries can be summarized by saying that nationalism was incompatible with
Islam and so it was completely rejected. Muslims saw a zero-sum game between Islam and
nationalism and acted accordingly. Islam was a formidable rival to nationalism and the
historical context in which nationalism emerged was not conducive to accept it.
15 Esposito, Islam and Politics, 65.
Arabic World .^ T w tu ReliSious t0 National Law," in Modernization ofthe
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), 45. Jersey. D.
17 Esposito, /j/flm and Politics, 72.
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However, pan-Islamism, as a movement that emerged towards the end of the
Ottoman Empire, was utilized by the Ottoman leaders for essentially political purposes alien
to the original concept and thus cannot be treated as part or continuation of it.
Ottoman pan-Islamism was primarily a reaction to Western imperialism. The
Ottoman Empire, during the regime of Sultan Abduhamit II (1876-1909), employed pan-
Islamism as a political means to secure the loyalty of Muslims and gain their sympathy and
support against European aggression. It was close to propaganda used by the Ottomans to
mobilize the Muslims and enlist them in their cause.19 In other words, it was exploited by
the Ottomans for motives associated with political expediency rather than the cause of Islam.
In doing so, the Ottomans encouraged others to follow their path. An article in The
American Historical Review suggests that the British, like the Russians, Germans, and
French, made use of pan-Islamic sentiments when circumstances seemed to favor it, as in
combating the Russian advance in Central Asia, The Germans also gave their blessing to the
idea when they found it suitable to their imperial goals.20 Finally, the Arabs in the twentieth
century played a similar game.21 ■ ,
19 The history ofthe Ottomans' pan-Islamic claims is summarized in Bernard
Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," Middle
Eastern Studies, vol. 1 (April 1965): 291-294.
20 Lee, "The Origin ofPan-Islamism." Also, David Forkmin, A Peace to End all
Peace, 17.
21 The Arabs, in their conflict with England and France in the early years of the
last century and Israel later, have appealed to pan-Islamism for help and support. In
1990, Saddam Hussein sought support by appealing to fellow Muslims all over the world.
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Furthermore, pan-Islamism, in contrast to its goal, the unity of all Muslims all over
the world, paved the way for the development of other nationalisms in the Islamic world.
As pan-Islamism was geared against the enemies of the Ottoman Empire, namely the
Western imperialist powers, it emphasized the importance ofunity ofMuslims, the necessity
ofrestoring their glorious past, superiority to others and finally a deep hostility towards the
West:
Pan-Islamism included several features: hostility to the West and
particularly to Western conquest and exploitation, idemifica ion wit^
glorious age m the past, statements of the superiority of the indigenous
culture, this case Islam to a" -il—-- r • ' • indigenous
and liberals for the common goal ofuriity andstrength.22 : H
These features are nearly all cornmbn to all nationalisms. Given the fact that pan-
Islamism or Muslim unity could not be realized, many Muslims, especially the Arabs and
the Turks, began to believe that ifpan-islamism was ever to be attained, pan-Arabism and
pan-Turkism were necessary prerequisites.23 These ideas marked a turning point in the
history of the Islamic world. They opened the gate for a new mode of thinking that ended
by completely accepting nationalism after its penetration of the Islamic world.
The Final Response: Adoration
In this stage, nationalism had penetrated the Islamic world. This part will examine
the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire up to its break up, and the formation of the
22
Keddi, "Pan-Islamism as Proto-Nationalism," 26.
23 Esposito, Islam and Politics, 74.
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Turkish Republic. It will also look at the development of Arab nationalism as a major
nationalist movement that produced disastrous results for the Empire. The following is an
analysis of the development of these two nationalisms.
Turkish Nationalism: From Empire to Nation
As pointed out earlier, nationalism was not a vital force for the Ottomans until the
nineteenth century. Until then, the Turks, like the Arabs, the Kurds, and other elements of
the Ottoman Empire, rejected the emergence of specific racial or ethnic identities at the
expense of Islam.24
As time went on, however, many intellectuals in the Ottoman Empire came to realize
the necessity to adjust to the new realities imposed by European.dominance. This meant the
necessity ofborrowing from the West in order to defend the Empire.25 Nationalism, at this
stage, was viewed as one of the sources of European strength and success. Thus, it should
be adopted as a remedy for Muslims' weakness, failure, and division.26
The Ottomans were challenged by a grave problem. Who were they? Turks,
Muslims, Ottomans? The Ottoman Empire was a European, Asian, and African power.
Thus, it was not an easy task to identify the Empire or it subjects. As far as the Ottomans
24 Caesar E. Farah, "Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism
in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer
1998): 8.
25 Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origins of an Ideology," 377.
26 Lewis, The Muslim Discovery ofEurope, 184.
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were concerned, they were just Muslims. They never called themselves "Turks," nor did
they call their country "Turkey." The words "Turk" and "Turkey" were used only in
Europe.27 Mark Sykes, who had traveled extensively in the Ottoman Empire, began one of
his books by asking:
How many people realize, when they speak of Turkey and the Turks
that there is no such place and no such people in the sense that there are such
countries and such peoples as Prussia and the Prussians, Scotland and the
Scotch?28
In addition, the term "Turk" had been almost a term of abuse in the Empire. As a
British observer of the Ottoman values and institutions wrote:
The surest way to insult an Ottoman gentleman is to call him a Turk.
His face will straight way wear the expression a Londoner assumes, when he
hears himself frankly styled Cockney. He is no Turk, no savage, he will
assure you, but an Ottoman subject of the Sultan, by no means to be
confounded with a certain barbarian's styled Turcomons.29
27 Lewis, The Multiple Identities ofthe Middle East, 13.
28 Sir Mark Sykes, The Caliphs' Last Heritage: A Short History ofthe Ottoman
Empire (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1915), 2.
29 Richard Davy, The Sultan and His Subjects (London: Chatto and Windus,
1907), 209.
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However, when the ideas of the nation and the national homeland as the basis of
political identity and sovereignty began to penetrate the Empire, and exercise a continuing
fascination on many Turkish intellectuals, the term Turk lost its negative connotations.
Furthermore, pan-Turkism became the base of a new ideology in the Ottoman Empire. This
marked a turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire as well as the whole Islamic
world. The four main Ottoman thinkers to consider are Namik Kemal, Yusuf Akura, Zia
Gokalp and finally Ataturk.
Namik Kemal is considered the first Turkish ideologue of nationalism in the
nineteenth century. Like Arabic nationalists, the first generation of Turkish intellectuals
considered Islam as a major component of Turkish nationalism. Thus, Kemal believed that
Islam should be the basis of Ottoman nationalism.
As Bernard Lewis points out, Kemal included Arabs and Persians in his call for
Ottoman pride.30 As the attachment to religion endured, and provided the basis for a
sustained challenge to nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, Kemal could not avoid Islam as
a fundamental element in the historical identity of the Ottomans.
Kemal's ideas marked the penetration of nationalism among Turkish intellectuals.
Therefore, Kemal's ideas paved the way for the emergence of a pure nationalist idea from
other Turkish thinkers.
The intellectual who played a prominent role in the development of Turkish
nationalism is Yusuf Akura. Akura started writing in the 1890s. He belonged to a new
30 Bernard Lewis, "History Writing and National Revival in Turkey," Middle
Eastern Affairs, vol. 4 (1953): 218.
generation who took it upon themselves to revolutionize the Turks and familiarize them with
the merits of nationalism. In his work "An Essay on the Historical Foundation of the
Ottoman Empire," he wrote: « The Young Turks [sic] attempts to found an Ottoman nation
is a cul-de-sac. Nationalism is the only road to take.- Therefore, unlike Kemal, Akura
believed that the acceptance ofnationalist ideas inspired by the French Revolution in Europe
was based on consciousness of language, race, and ancestors but not on religion.
Akura's ideas culminated in pan-Turkism, which aspired to unite all the Turkish
peoples in one state. Pan-Turkism meant that the Empire could survive only on the basis of
solidarity of a nation united by a common language.- It was the first time in Muslims'
recorded history that the unity oflanguage took precedence over the unity ofreligion. With
this dramatic change, the Ottomans, now the Turks, began their endeavor to follow exactly
the path of Europe.
The shift towards adopting a strong Turkish identity was not accepted by many
Turkish intellectuals or the Turkish masses. It was by no means agreed that Turkish
nationalism replaced pan-Islamism. However, those Turkish leaders who,were in favor of
that approach and had other priorities than the Islamic cause were able to push their agenda.
Therefore, a policy of Turkification was adopted in the Empire. Based on this policy, the
Turkish language replaced the Arabic language in the whole Empire," and non-Turks such
t ir- /,i=.?/^' T°P Hal Grey W°lfand Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the
Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 72.
32 Hourani, A History ofthe Arab Peoples, 309.
33 Sidney Nelterler Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A.
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as Arabs, Kurds, Armenians and the like were replaced with Turks in the important
administrative posts.34 This policy aimed at the domination and consolidation of the Turkish
people in the Empire. It was secular and nationalist rather than Islamic. Many Muslim-
Arabs and non-Arabs rejected it as racist and anti-Islamic. Furthermore, most ofthe leaders
of this policy were Freemasons, with close ties to the Jews of Salonika.35 Therefore, they
were viewed as traitors and subversives but not nationalists. However, the policy of
Turkification was an important phase in preparing minds and spirits for the emergence of
Turkish nationalism.
A key figure in the developihent of Turkish nationalism is Zia Gokalp. Gokalp
believed that there was a fundamental contradiction between Islam and Turkish nationalism,
so he called for a separation between the two.36 Gokalp went further in emphasizing the
secular face of nationalism and declared, "the interests of the Turkish nation are always
dearer to him than those of Islam."37 Gokalp is considered as the father of Turkish
nationalism; his ideas became the policies of Kemal Ataturk later. He is described as the
Knopf, 1969), 345.
34 For an illuminating discussion of the impact the policy of Turkification had on
Arab nationalism, see Philip S. Khoury, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life:
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," The American Review, vol. 96, no. 5
(December 1991): 1374-1395.
35 Mansfield, History ofMiddle East, 128. Also Forkmin, A Peace to End All
Peace: The Fall ofthe Ottoman Empire and the Creation ofthe Modern Middle East, 42.
36 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolfand Crescent, 11.
37 Ibid., 79.
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inspirer and the best-qualified theoretician of the national movement called Turkism.38
As mentioned above, Ataturk was deeply influenced by Gokalp's ideas. Therefore,
Islam was no longer a crucial component of Turkish nationalism. On the contrary, it was an
obstacle in the road and so had to be moved aside. In Ataturk's nationalist program,
language, history, and ethnicity were given prominence, while Islam was discredited. Once
the War of Independence was completed, Turkish nationalism under the leadership of
Ataturk hit back at the Ottoman past and pan-Islamism with a vengeance as has been
explained earlier. Pan-Islamism was abolished from the Turkish agenda. To Ataturk and
Gokalp, the burden ofIslamic leadership had proved too heavy for Turkey. Consequently,
it would be an exaggeration to say that Turkey could play any significant role in the Islamic
world after the disestablishment of Islam by Ataturk.39
The divorce between Turkey and Islam at the hands of Ataturk, in adopting
secularism or nationalism, marked the beginning ofwhat has become a continuing tension
between the two Turkish identities: the one Islamic in its culture, history, and aspirations, the
other Western in its orientation. It defines itself not in religious, but in racial and national
terms. As empirical studies have proven, it was not an easy task for the Turks to develop
38 Webster, The Turkey ofAtaturk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation,
154.
39 In fact, to many Muslims throughout the world, the year 1924, when the
Caliphate was abolished in Turkey at the hands of Ataturk, is a black year in history. To
Turkey, the same year is the point ofno return in reconciling Islam and Turkish
aspirations.
national sentiments a, the expense of loyalty to the Islamic communlty.« During Wor]d ^
I, the Turks had proclaimed "Mad" (holy war) against the Allies and called Muslims ,„
fight in the Islamic cause. Even ir, the War ofIndependence, Ataturk had appealed to Mam
so as to gain toe supper, ofthe Turkish masses. However, the idea of a territorial state of
Turkey, the fatherland ofa nation called the Turks, was by no means acceptable to the Kurds.
THey are a people who are no. Turks, and long accustomed to religious rather man ethnic
loyalty to the state.
In the end, it is worth noting that nationalism played a major ro,e in the destruction
of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire was destroyed from within by na.iona.is. forces.
However, i, was not possMe for this powerful ideological force to destroy the Empire
without the participation of the Western powers. It is widely agreed mat most of the
daman subjects were no, seeking separation. Rather, they would have preferred to remain
within an Ottoman state if tha, political entity continued ,o exis. in me following years."
The fife ofArab nationalism is jus. one example in mis case, as will be discussed in the
following part of this chapter.
The Development of Arab Nationalism
Like Turkish nationalism and other nationalisms in Asia and Africa, Arab
41 Lewis, Islam and the West, 138.
nationalism was a reaction against Western encroachments and conquests, and to a J/er
degree against the last years of the Young Turks' rule.42
Toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth
century, most of the Arabic world came under the ru.e of various European insist
powers. The African part was subjugated before the Arab East as par, of what came to be
blown as the "Scramble for Africa." Most of the Arab East remained under Ottoman rale
unti, World War , 0914-1919,, which was then rep.aced by European domination and
conquest; name.y, by France and Britain. Consequent*, the earliest nationalist sentiments
emerged in the Affican par, before the Arab East. However, nationalism as an ideology was
bom in the Arab East. Like Turkish nationalism, the foundations ofArab nationalism have
changed over the course oftime. In this context, Anab nationalism developed ,n,o three main
phases.
The First Phase: Islamic and Arab Identity
The first phase ofArab nationalism can be dated back to the early years of the
nineteenth century. I, was represented by the nationalist movements that appeared in
North Africa. It was directed against the intrusion ofFrance and England as the major
colonial powers in the region. While Islam was known to be hosti.e to nationalism as
providing an incompatib.e focus ofloyalty, mis early stage ofArab nationalism was
characterized by a strong Islamic component. "Islam," writes John Esposito, "played an
42
Quatuert, The Ottoman Empire: 1700-1922, 209
important role in ,he development of anti-colonial independence movements.- This LI
can be seen in the Mahdist revol, in Sudan (1881-1897). in Morocco and Tunisia and
most importantly in Algeria.44
These movements were nationalist and anti-imperialis. a. the same time. While their
concern was self-determination rather than the creation of a, Arab national state, they fought
to get independence and to maintain their Arabic-Islamic identities.
The Second Phase: Less Arab More Islamic Identity
Arab nationalism as an ideology md a political force that emphasizes the identity and
group solidarity ofthe Arab nation started in the Arab East.
As mentioned earlier, the policy of Turkifcation had tagely contributed to the
development of Arab national. Arab disappoint, found expression in a form of
nationalist movement tha, strived to emphasize the merits ofthe Arabs and their special role
in Islam. "The Arabs," writes Albert Hourani. -were the matter ofIslam, the human means
by which Islam expanded in the world. The Prophet Muhammed was ■ Arab, the language
43 Esposito, The Mamie Threat: Myth or Reality? 60
Secularism in North Africa (New York: St. Martin Press 1994) 76 aZI n
History ofAfrica, 176-177. ' }' 6> Also ShlIIlngton,
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of the Quran is Arabic, and the Arabs are the guardians of the holy places."45 In light of such
a view, Rachid Rida argued that the glories of Islam could only be restored through the
Arabs. In the article entitled "The Civilization of the Arabs," Rida wrote:
To care for the history ofthe Arabs and to strive to revive their glory
is the same as to work for the Muslim union which only obtained in past
centuries thanks to the Arabs, and will not return in this century, except
through them, united and in an agreement with all the races.46
Therefore, Rida did not see any contradiction between Islam and nationalism on one
hand. On the other hand, he tried to combine Islam and Arab nationalism. He went further
in reconciling both and argued that Arab unity is a necessary step towards the larger Muslim
unity.
The compatibility between Islam and Arabisrri is central in the ideas of al-Kawakibi
(1849-1902). In his work "The Excellences of the Arabs," al-Kawakibi provides a list of
twenty-six reasons to prove the superiority of the Arabs and why they should be leaders of
the Islamic world.47 Like Rida, al-Kawakibi offered a new interpretation of the role of the
Arabs, explaining how the Arab unity could be a solid base for Muslim unity.
While al-Kawakibi was the man who sowed the seeds of these high thoughts of the
Arabs, it was Sati Al-Husari48 who did most to popularize these ideas in the minds and hearts
45 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 300.
46 Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley, Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1976), 23.
47 Ibid., 78-80.
48 Among the best studies about al-Husari is William L. Cleveland, The Making of
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of the Arab masses. Al-Husari continued the line of thought that started with Rida and al-
Kawakibi. Thus, he argued that Arab nationalism and Islam are in harmony and also Arab
nationalism is easier to bring about than Muslim unity, and the latter is not capable of
realization except through Arab unity.49
This line ofthought was continued by a host of other writers who shared Al-Husari's
views. The list includes prominent figures in the modern history of Arab thought, such as
Amin Fans, Shakib Arslan, Abdul Rahman Al-Bazaz, Abdul Aziz Al-Duri, and others.50
In this phase ofArab nationalism, Islam was a fundamental element in the historical
identity of the Arabs. In other words, Arab nationalism was based on Islam and seen only
through religious or Islamic glasses.
In light ofthe above analysis, it is clear that the extraordinary role ofIslam as a major
component ofArab identity left no room for secular ideas such as national unity based on
language, race or history, and of course, there were no intentions of changing the place of
religion in the society. In other words, Arabic nationalism in its second phase was less
national and more religious or, in particular, less Arabic and more Islamic.51
Consequently, the intellectuals mentioned above were more reformers than
an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thoughts ofSati al-Husari
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971).
49
Ibid., 43,45.
50 See for example, David Dien Commins, "Religious Reformers and Arabists in
Damascus," International Journal ofthe Middle East Studies, vol. 18 (November 1986):
405-425.
51 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 317.
revolutionaries. They did not call openly for a secession of the Arabs from ,he O,«om!n
Empire. They believed that (he remedy of the sick Emp.re could be achieved by
reconciliation between the Arabs and the Turks. Both are Muslims and the Islamic world
needed both ofthem in the face ofthe European aggression. Therefore, these voices could
be interpreted as an Arabic appeal to the Ottomans to acknowledge the specia! position of
the Arabs in Islam and to treat them accordingly."
The Third Phase: More National Less Religious, More Arab Less Islamic
Arab nationalism in its third and final stage of evolution as both an idea and a
movement with philosophy, institutions, and political aims is a twenneth-century
phenomenon.
It was in this stage that the Arab* developed a theory on the* basis ofwhich they were
able to define the meaning of Arab nationalism, what constitutes the Arab nation, the
boundaries of this nation, and finally its eternal mission.53
According to George Antonieus, the seeds ofArab nationalism were sowed by Arab
Christian intellectuals, who established secret societies that worked for the independence of
the Arab countries and their liberation from the Turks. The first of these societies was the
Syrian Scientific Society, established in 1857. Antonieus hailed the society as the first
52
I
Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 193.
^ itWn the b0Unds Of this study discuss all these concepts For
HiSham B SharaW Natili dRZlTllTu tHST RevolutZlWorld: The Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, New Jersey: D Van
Company, Inc., 1966), 95, 97. ^ Vdn
outward manifestation ofa collective nationa! consciousness and the cradle ofa new
movement.54
The Syrian Scientific Soc.ety was ,he firs, ofa series of secret societies es,ab,isned
in .he Arab Eas, ma. demanded the independence of the Arabs from the Ottoman yoke."
These societies were composed ofyoung Arab national who .ook pride in being Arab and
attempted to rally Arabs-Christians, Muslims, or Jews-around a pro-Arab and anti-
Ottoman program.
Along with .he activities of these societies, there were .he efforts of other
intellectuals such as Negib Azouri, Qus.an.in Zurac, Miche. Aflac and many others who
conttbu.ed valuab.y ,„ the maturity ofArab nationalism by their brilliant works."
To mos. ofthese intellectuals, na.iona.ism was a .rue subs.i,u,e for rehgious faM,
Therefore, it was under the impact ofthe writings ofthese intellectuals that national
began .o ,ake a secu.ar form. In me words ofan Arab secular nationalist, The Arabs «dZ
societies, .he mos.
Publishers, Ltd., 2000), 74-82. ' >"e«rao worw (Oxford: Blackwell
195-228.
* See Peter Mansfield, T&^fc (London: Penguin Books, 1990),
before Islam and before Christianity."" The Arabs were Arabs before they became Muslims'
M other words, they are Arabs fc, and MusUms second. Furthermore, in Ms stage, re.igion
i. viewed as a factor ofdivision and so, in the name ofunity and Arab na.iona.ism; i, must
be removed from the scene.
In light ofthe above analysis, it is clear that Arab nationalists at Ms stage saw a zero-
sum game between religion and nationahsm. As .he secular nationalists believe that
anything that stands in the way of nationalism, nation building, and Arab unity-even
Islam-must be pushed aside, Islam was restricted to private .ife and separated from politics.
As the Arabs continued their drive for nationalism, they decided to break away from
the Romans, and Arab nationalism culminated in the Arab Revolt in 1916, led by.Sharif
Hussein against the Turks.'" The Arabs were betrayed by England and France, as the
promises of independence were never fulfilled. Worse, Arab lands were occupied and
partitioned. Like the consequences of Turkish nationalism for the Ottoman Empire, Arab
nationalism came to be a complete disaster for (he Arabs: >'
In the end, i, is clear that nationalism was not a European gift presented to the Arabs
or Turks on a si.ver platter butrather a part ofthe Europeattostility towards these peoples.
According to many historians, the British supported Arab nationalism for anti-Islamic
reasons. They ibrmed the post- war Middle East^ tt,e objective of creating a rival for
57 Haim, Arab Nationalism, 36.
58 Mansfield, A History ofthe Middle East, 156.
pan-Is.amism.» This riva, is Arab nat.ona.ism, Turkish nationalism, Persian na.iona.isn, Z
.he like. In regard ,„ the Arabs, the British wen, further and supported the creation of the
Arab League as a response to growing public opinion calling for M,b unity. Thjs
organization became a weapon against Arab unity. Its charter emphasizing the independence
and the sovereignty of the twenty members of the league made the road to unity Ml of
thorns." Consequently, the goal of creating one Arab state is a my*. As an Egyptian
politician once asked, "ifyou add one zero to another and then another, what sum will you
get?- Also one can argue that Arab nationalism is now dead." Furthermore, the vices of
this idea can be seen in most Arabic countries with[ethnic ^ups other than Arabs, as in Iraq,
Algeria, and finally Sudan, which will be the focus ofthe next chapter.
.has put forward this argument repeatedly in his many writings
in hi« book, England and the Middle East: The nPJuction oft'he
Organization (Pnnceton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967X
61 Haim, Arab Nationalism, 47.
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CHAPTER 6
ISLAM AND NATIONALISM IN TURKEY AND SUDAN
Islam and Nationalism in Turkey and the Kurdish Question
In Chapter Five, it was mentioned that Ataturk's attempt to establish a secular,
European-style state was being challenged by what could be called a retreat from secularism.
This retreat was seen as part of a growing reaction against secularism, and of the rise of the
Islamic movement. At the same time, another potentially important force challenging the
very structure of the state and its legitimizing Kemalist ideology exist in the rise of Kurdish
nationalist aspirations. These two challenges deepen the crisis of Turkey. This part focuses
on the Kurdish question and try to answer several questions: "Who are the Kurds?" "What
do Kurds in Turkey want and what is the response of the Turkish government?" "What
impact does the conflict have on Turkey and the Kurds?" And finally, "Can this conflict be
resolved peacefully?"
This study attempts to offer satisfactory answers to these questions; thus, it provides
significant information to explore the Kurdish question.
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Who are the Kurds?
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After Arabs, Turks, and Persians, the Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the
Middie East. Since the coHapse of the Soviet Union, the Kurds have become the iarges,
stated group of ethnical* distinctive people who share a common language, history, and
common aspirations to bind mem together in an acknowledged homeland. The
constitute a nation.1
Kurds
There are some 25-30 million Kurds, more than half live i
in southeastern Turkey.
The res, are scattered through northern Iraq, northwestern ta, and northeastern Syria, with
aminorityinEuropeasaresnltofmigratioa' The area where Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and ta
meet-where the vast majority ofthe Kurds live-is generally referred ,o as "Kurdistan,"
"Land ofthe Kurds."
The Kurds have their own language, Kurdish. This language has managed to survive
policies of assimiiation, especially in Turkey, and all oppression and bans to which i, has
been exposed. The great majority ofKurds, .bout 75 percent, are Sunni Muslims.'
Finally, the Kurds have their own history. From the tenth century onwards, the
Kurds have played a significant political role in Islam. Tie most famous Kurdish leader was
York: '" (New
David McDowal, A Modem History ofthe Kurds, 10.
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Saladin, the founder of the Ayyubid state. Saladin drove the Crusaders from Jerusalem and
defeated Richard the Lion-hearted in the late twelfth century.
The question, thus, is why have the Kurds, with their rich history, culture, and
aspirations, not attained their freedom, even though they have waged resistant struggles since
the beginning of the twentieth century and paid a high price for it?
While the answer to this question requires a wide research into the Kurdish
nationalist movement in Turkey and its neighbors Iraq, Iran, and Syria, for the purposes of
this study, emphasis will be on the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, where more than half of the
Kurds live.
What Do the Kurds ofTurkey Want?
Kurdish demands in Turkey have changed over time due to several internal and
external events. Kurdish aspirations today are different from those many decades ago, and
are likely to change yet further, depending on events. Kurdish demands will be studied in
three major phases.
The First Phase: The Kurds and the Ottomans
In the age ofnationalism, in the nineteenth century, the Kurds, likernany other ethnic
groups, were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Unlike other ethnic groups, which tried to
break away from the Empire under the influence of nationalism, the Kurds were happy as
citizens of the Islamic state. They thought of themselves more as Muslims than as Kurds.
Their Islamic identity was wider and stronger than the Kurdish identity and so separation
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was not on the agenda ofKurdish leaders. Islam as a source of identity superseded Kurdish
identity. Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire, which was the embodiment of the principles of
Islam, was under attack by European Christian forces. In consequence, the Kurds saw the
unity of the Islamic state as of greater importance than a Kurdish national state.4 Therefore,
one can argue that the constant state of conflict between Christian Europe and the Ottomans
pushed the Kurds into the arms of the Ottoman Empire.
Toward the end ofthe Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were unhappy with the new ideas
of the Young Turks, who brought new secular concepts like "nation" and "state," in place
of "t/mah " and "Empire." "This is the end ofIslam," exclaimed a Kurdish leader on hearing
of the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908.5
In World War I, the Kurds saw the struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the
hostile European powers as purely religious. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Kurds
joined the Ottoman "Jihad" against the infidels.6
In sum, until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the Kurds were
loyal subjects, and nationalism or separation were not favored ideas. The Kurds were very
comfortable when they viewed themselves as Ottoman subjects rather than as Kurds.
4 Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical
Turning Points and Missed Opportunities," Middle East Journal, vol. 1 (Winter 1997):
62.
5 McDowell, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 96V
6 Based on this vision of the war, around two million Armenians, Ottoman
subjects but Christians, were massacred by the Kurds ofTurkey during the war. It was a
case of genocide for the Armenians. By the same token, the Armenians slew any
Muslims that fell into their hands. McDowell, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 105.
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The Second Phase: The Kurds and Ataturk
With the end ofWorld War I, the Ottoman Empire became ancient history, and the
map of the Middle East was redrawn, this time with the possibility of establishing a Kurdish
state inspired by Woodrow Wilson's twelfth point, which emphasized self-determination for
oppressed people. According to the Treaty ofSevres in 1920, the state ofKurdistan was to
be established in the region under the supervision ofthe League ofNations.7 The treaty gave
the Kurds new hope for independence. Howeveri it was never implemented. Furthermore,
Turkey was occupied by the various European powers and efforts were concentrated on
driving the invaders away from Turkey. Ataturk, the leader of the War of Independence,
established excellent contacts with a number ofKurdish leaders. Ataturk convinced them
to join his struggle to liberate the homeland from the enemy. In order to gain the support of
the Kurds, Ataturk stressed the unity ofthe future state as an Islamic entity.8 As a Kurdish
historian notes, the Kurds "got entangled in the Turkish Jihad against unbelievers."9
The Kurdish contributions to the War of Independence (1919-1923) are well known.
7 Bill Bowring, "The Kurds of Turkey: Defending the Rights of a Minority" in
Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East, eds.
Kirsten E. Schulze and others (New York: IB. Tauris Publishers 1996), 25.
8 Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed
Opportunities," 62.
9 A. R. Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds (London: Collet's Publishers,
1965), 44.
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The total Kurdish death toll, including the civilians, was about one million.10 What is
generally unknown is what the Kurds expected from the outcome. The Kurds sided with
Ataturk on the grounds that he was anti-imperialist, pro-Islamic, and had a multi-ethnic
vision of Turkey's future.11 Furthermore, by liberating Turkey from the invaders, the Kurds
would avoid ending up under European rule. The Kurds were unaware of Ataturk's actual
aims.
After Ataturk drove the Greeks from the Turkish homeland of Anatolia, the Kurds
thought that Ataturk would fulfill his promises to them. They hoped that he would establish
a binational state or a national state with a recognized and distinct Kurdish minority, not to
mention establishing the identity ofthe state as Islamic. However, these hopes were dashed
when Ataturk revealed his real intentions. The point here is that the Kurds were betrayed by
Ataturk, since his nationalist objectives conflicted with theirs.
The first blow to Kurdish hopes came in 1923, in the Treaty ofLausanne. Unlike the
treaty of Sevres, where the Allies were able to impose their terms upon the defeated Ottoman
Sultan, at Lausanne, Ataturk was in a commanding position after his victory over Greece.
Therefore, independent Kurdistan was not accepted by Turkish representatives. The Treaty
of Lausanne failed even to mention the Kurds. It included assurances of cultural and
linguistic minority rights without mentioning any of the minorities by name:
10 McDowell, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 109.
11 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 44.
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No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish
national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the
press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings. Notwithstanding
the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to
Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own
language before the courts.12
It is worth noting that the imperialistic interests in Kurdistan were not compatible
with establishing an independent state for the Kurds in that region. British thinking was that
"an independent state for the Kurds would almost certainly destabilize British interests in
Iraq."13 Therefore, Kurdistan was divided among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Kurds
were betrayed by Ataturk as they had sided with him until his victory, and by the European
powers who artificially divided Kurdistan, However, the Kurds bear part of the
responsibility, as Richard Falk suggests:
The lack of any effective appearance ofunified resistance to the treaty
marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Kurds, given that it ratified a
political framework that effectively distributed the Kurdish people among
five distinct political entities.14
One year after signing the treaty of Lausanne, another blow to Kurdish hopes came
through new measures taken by Ataturk. In Ataturk's program to create a new nation, he
embarked upon a racist policy, which proposed to assimilate, rather than to integrate, the
12 Quoted in McDowell, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 142.
13 Schulze, Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Right in the
Middle East, 25.
14 Richard Falk, "Problems and Prospects for the Kurdish Struggle for Self-
Determination after the End of the Gulf and Cold Wars," Michigan Journal of
International Law, vol. 15 (1994): 595.
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Kurds. Ataturk and his followers argued that the Kurds "were mountain Turks" who lived
in east and southeast Turkey but not in Kurdistan.15 Ataturk's vision of Turkey defined the
Turkish nation as a sum of citizens without any consideration to differences in race,
language, history, etc. As a result of this definition of nation, Kurdish existence was
completely denied. Cultural differences were perceived as a threat to national unity and were
strictly prohibited.16 The Kurdish language, the practice of Kurdish culture, even the
concepts of "Kurdish" and "Kurdistan" were forbidden. The Kurds were not allowed to use
Kurdish names. As these measures were not enough to change the Kurds into Turks, they
were supplemented by other policies to assimilate, dominate, and suppress the Kurds. These
measures included: land confiscation from the Kurds, with the explicit purpose of
distributing it to Turks, who were being resettled in Kurdish areas; the deportation and
displacement of thousands ofKurds to western Turkey as well as outside the country; and
the levy of an education tax in Kurdistan to discourage the Kurds from education and keep
them backward.17 Finally, the whole region of Kurdistan was sealed off from the rest of the
country and the Kurds were brutally suppressed.
The final blow to Kurdish hopes came in early 1924. By April 1924, Ataturk had
abolished the Caliphate, religious courts, and religious schools and declared Turkey a fully
secular state. In doing this, Ataturk made enemies of every Kurd who had sided with him
■ 15 Jonathan C. Randal, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters
with Kurdistan (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 14.
16 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in TurkeyrIraq and Iran, 45.
17 Fuller, "Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed
Opportunities," 63. Also, McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 208.
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to drive out the invaders from the homeland. With the destruction of the Caliphate, Ataturk
severed the last bond between the Kurds and the Turks.18 The disestablishment of Islam in
Turkey deeply offended the Kurds and their patience with Ataturk came to an end.
While Ataturk believed that his reforms had transformed Turkey "overnight" from
an Islamic state to a secular one, the Kurds, who adhered strictly to Islam, saw things
differently. The destruction of Islam at the hands ofAtaturk gave the Kurds justification to
rebel so as to restore the Islamic identity of the state.19 The first attempt to restore Turkey's
Islamic identity produced Shaikh Said's revolt in 1925.
Shaikh Said's Revolt 1925
As the Kurds were not comfortable with Ataturk's vision of nationalism and his
secular program, they voiced their discontent in a series of revolts in the 1920s and
1930s. The first revolt was led by Shaikh Said in 1925. The abolition of the Caliphate
convinced Said and many Kurds that Ataturk's program of secularism and his vision of
nationalism were a real threat to the Kurds.20 In consequence, Said declared Jihad against
Ataturk and his government. It was natural for Said, as a Kurdish Muslim, to invoke
Islam to rally the Kurds against the secular government. Said's call for Jihad was
strongly accepted by the Kurds. Within a very short period of time, Said's forces overran
18 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 45.
19 Umit Cizre Sakalli Ogu, "Kurdish Nationalism from an Islamist Perspective:
The Discourse of Turkish Islamist Writers," Journal ofMuslim Minority Affairs, vol. 18,
no. 1 (April 1988): 79-82.
20 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 45.
one-third ofTurkish Kurdistan. The Turks took draconian measures ,o suppress the "*
revolt. Martial ,aw was proc.aimed in all of Turkish Kurdistan. The air force and ground
troops were sen, to suppress the revol,. The repression was, as David McDowa.. Pu, i,
"extremely brutal," estab.ishing a pattern of Turkish response to Kurdish uprisings th*
has continued ,o the present. Tens ofthousands of Kurds were massacred or driven into
exi.e. Hundreds ofviUages were bum, or r^d" Because Islam was me leading force in
the revolt, me govern™, closed a., pilgrimage si.es, religious shrines, and all religious
schools.
Witt such a brma. response from me Turkish s,a,e, one migh, ask what did the
insurgents wan,? The answer to this question divided Kurdish scholars: one group asserted
tha, me revol, was ofmore rehgious and less nationalis, nature. Said and many Kurds were
motivated by religious zea., and were against the secularizing reforms of A,a,urk. Their
objective was ,„ restore me Islamic charaCer ofme s,a,e, which was destroyed by A,atu*s
secular program* Cher scholars argued ma, Said, revol, was mainly na.iona.is, and
concluded tha, Said was an ardent nationalist. Thus, me revol, was primarily a national,
affair and no, a rengious one.- A mird assessment of Said, revo,. combined bom ,he
na.iona.is. and me religious motives. The firs, concern of Said and his Mowers was Is.am,
23 Ciment, The Kurds: State andMinority in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, 46.
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which binds all Muslims together and forms their true identity and solidarity. By the same
token, Said wanted to liberate his people from Turkey's oppressive rule. Therefore, it would
be a mistake to regard Said's revolt as a purely religious movement and ignore the nationalist
cause. Van Bruinessen suggested that:
The primary aim ofboth Shaikh Said and the Azadi leaders was the
establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The motivation of the rank-and-
file was mixed ... for them the religious factor may have predominated. The
planners, and leaders of the revolt, at any rate, thought that the religious
agitation would be more effective in gaining mass support than the rationalist
propaganda alone. Partly for this reason, Shaikhs were chosen as figure
heads for the revolt.24
Unrest continued in the 1920s and later. The next major revolt, known as the Mount
Ararat uprising, took place in 1930. The Mount Ararat uprising represented a further move
from religious zeal to nationalist. As David McDowall wrote, "It was the first time a
nationalist organization, rather than a Shaikh or agha, had taken so central a role."25
Like Said's revolt, the Mount Ararat uprising was brutally crushed. Furthermore, the
Turkish state continued its harsh policies of forced assimilation, cultural proscription, and
mass deportation for the Kurds. This led to the Dersim revolt in 1937, the third major
uprising in Kurdistan in about two decades. Said Riza, the leader of the revolt, mentioned
the following reasons for the uprising:
24 Matira Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political
Structure ofKurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), 186.
25 McDowall, The Kurds: A Nation Denied, 37.
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The government had tried to assimilate the Kurdish people for years,
oppressing them, banning publications in Kurdish, prosecuting those who
spoke Kurdish, forcibly deporting people from fertile parts of Kurdistan for
uncultivated areas of Anatolia where many had perished. The prisons were
full of non-combatants, intellectuals were shot, hanged or exiled to remote
places. . . . Three million Kurds demand to live in freedom in their own
country.26
Like the previous revolts, the Dersim was crushed in a ruthless way. W. G.
Elphinston, a British historian and an eyewitness to the revolt, reported that about 40,000
Kurds, including women and children, were killed. Thousands of families were deported,
and hundreds of villages were destroyed.27
Dersim marked the end ofKurdish revolts against the Kemalist state for almost five
decades. From 1937 until 1984, when the Kurdish Workers Party (PPK) launched its first
attack against Turkish military troops, armed rebellion ceased in Kurdistan.
The Third Phase: The Resurgence of Kurdish Nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s
The memory ofKurdish uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s remained strong, and so
when the Kurdish Workers Party (PPK) emerged in 1984, it was able to enlist the support
ofmillions of Kurds throughout Turkey and Europe. The recent re-emergence of Kurdish
nationalism was produced by a combination of factors, both internal and external.
At the international level, it was the failure ofthe Turkish state to come to terms with
Kurdish demands. This failure manifested itself in what Kurds perceived as the denial of
26 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 208.
27 Nizzan Kendal, "Kurdistan in Turkey," in A People Without a Country: The
Kurds and Kurdistan, ed. Chaliand Gerard (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1993), 58.
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their very existence. Until recently, Kurdishness was a non-issue for the Turkish authorities,
civilian and military. Since the establishment of the Republic, it has sought to eradicate
Kurdish uprisings by a combination of military repression, forced assimilation, and co-
optation.28
The disappointment of the Kurds was also exacerbated by economic hardships.
Kurdistan is rich in agriculture, mineral resources, and deposits ofpetroleum. These are the
engines of development. Still, Kurdistan is the least developed part of Turkey and the
majority of Kurds in the southeast live in grinding poverty. Therefore, Kurdish nationalism
was only part ofthe problem. The unequal distribution of wealth between the Kurds and the
Turks fueled much of the political protest.29
At the international level, the end of the Cold War and the establishment of new
states on the territories of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrated that
peoples' aspirations could be fulfilled by political struggle. Another factor could be the
emergence of an active Kurdish diaspora, especially in Western Europe. These Kurds
provided financial and other forms of support for Kurdish organizations in Turkey.30
In sum, the Kurdish nationalist sentiments in the 1980s were born of economic
deprivation, social injustice, as well as from ideas of self-determination and ethnic identity,
28 For a detailed analysis of Turkish domestic policy towards the Kurds, see Philip
Robins "The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue," International
Affairs, vol. 69, no. 4 (1993).
29 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 434.. , !
30 Osten Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study ofKurdish Refugee
Communities (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999), 41.
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all of which combined to create the conditions for the emergence of the PPK as a Kurdish
mass movement.
The PPK and the Renewal of the Struggle
In contrast to Kurdish uprisings in Turkey thus far, the PPK was a popular political
party that had the following characteristics:
• It represented a complete departure from old religious loyalties as it based its
program on a secular ideology: Marxism-Leninism.31
• The object ofthe party was the establishment of a separate secular state in Kurdistan.
It aimed at driving the Turks out of Kurdistan and establishing a socialist state, not
at the restoration of the Islamic identity of Turkey.32
• The armed fight that the PPK led was based on revolutionary violence as a means of
achieving self-determination. As the PPK attacked the army garrisons, it was the
first time in 50 years that Kurdish rebels were shooting back.
• The PPK was able to enjoy support regionally and internationally. Regionally, the
PPK was able to establish military bases in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and enlist the
support of Kurds in these countries. At the international level, it owned a broad
network in Europe that performed intensive activity there.3
. 33
31 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 418.
32 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 50.
33 Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diaspora: A Comparative Study ofKurdish Refugee
Communities, 159-160.
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The PPK struggle was not only against the Turkish state but also against those Kurds
34
who had exploited Kurdish people for their personal interests.
Within a very short period oftime, the PPK was able to mobilize a large proportion
of the Kurds in Turkey and posed a serious challenge to the Turkish state.
The Government's Response
Denial and repression were the characteristics of the government's response to the
Kurdish insurrection. The basis for the military option for handling the Kurdish problem had
been laid in Turkey's founding years in the 1920s. From that time on, the use of military
power combined with assimilatory policies were the core of Turkish policy to any Kurdish
uprising. The 1980s and 1990s were no exception. Accordingly, draconian measures were
taken to eradicate the "terrorists." These included large-scale military operations, forced
evacuation, destruction of Kurdish villages in PPK-controlled territory, and finally severe
human rights violations against Kurds in western Turkey.35
The Turkish effort to end the war was very simple: massive assault by security
forces, as one Kurdish writer put it "all stick and no carrot."36 Nevertheless, this policy failed
to repress the PPK's ability to mount deadly assaults. Then, there was a necessity to look
34 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 419.
35 Gulistan Gurbey, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey Since the
1980s," in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, ed. Robert Olson (Kentucky:
The University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 17.




The Ozal years (1983-1993) saw the beginning of an opening for the Kurdish
problem. President Ozal took some positive measures towards ending the war and solving
the Kurdish issue. He lifted the ban on the Kurdish language in Turkey. Moreover, he tried
to initiate a dialogue with the PPK so as to end the war. Finally, Ozal sought to achieve
equal economic development between east and west Turkey in what came to be known as
the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP).37
However, Ozal's reconciliatory approach was not accepted by the Turkish political
elite and the military, nor by a large portion ofthe Turkish masses. Ozal was among the few
Turkish politicians who had moved to recognize Kurdish rights and aspirations.38 Shortly
before his death in 1993, he sent a letter to his prime minister, Sulayman Demiral, in which
he warned, "The Turkish republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could
cut one part of Turkey from the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it."39
The earthquake that Ozal referred to was the Kurdish problem. Ozal realized that the
key to a solution to the national Kurdish issue was recognition of the existence of the
Kurdish people within Turkey, with their own language, culture and their share of the
"Ibid., 122-113.
38 Fuller, "Turkey" Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed
Opportunities," 67.
39 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, 1.
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Turkish pie. Ozal's new orientation on the Kurdish issue was a great opportunity to integrate
the Kurds and solve the problem. Unfortunately, the political elite and the military missed
the opportunity because they believed only in the military solution.
The contradictory policies of the Turkish elite were not only manifested in their
belief in eradicating the Kurds, but also in their attempt to use religion as a means to discredit
the PPK fighters. While the founders of the Republic rejected religion as a unifying force
in the state, in the early 1980s, religion was brought back to the forefront of Turkish politics.
As mentioned earlier in this study, religious sentiments had flourished all over Turkey in the
last two decades. As the PPK based its ideology on Marxism-Leninism, the Turkish elite
used religion as a weapon to fight the PPK. The government claimed that the PPK's
ideology was anti-Islamic and the PPK was portrayed as satanic. The politicizing of religion
by a secular state led the PPK to counter that strategy by emphasizing social liberation within
the context of Islam.40
The Ceasefire of 1993
As the government gained the upper hand in the conflict, it continued to take hardline
positions and refused to acknowledge the Kurdish reality. For their part, the Kurds realized
that they could not achieve their goal by military means. The PPK showed flexibility and
adjusted to this reality. Accordingly, it turned its back from the ultimate aim of establishing




Our goal is not to divide Turkey, but to share it. I do not see it as
either reasonable or necessary that a Kurdish region should be detached from
the country as if cut by a knife. But the Kurds will determine their own
fate.41
In 1993, Ocalan announced a unilateral ceasefire and called for a national dialogue.
Ocalan emphasized that repression alone was incapable of ending the violence. The use of
force did not allow the Kurds or the Turks to solve the problem. Thus, it proved that the
solution had to be a political one. However, the Turkish government missed this
opportunity. Rather, it escalated repressive measures against the Kurds. The Turkish
government, dominated by the military, believed that the only answer to the Kurdish
question was to wipe out all the PPK fighters. In doing so, the Turkish government closed
the door to another opportunity to end the conflict peacefully and encouraged the Kurds to
resume their struggling. Ocalan, the leader ofthe PPK, became a charismatic figure for his
people, but the most wanted man in Turkey. Ocalan lived in exile after 1984, mostly in
Syria. In 1998, the Turkish government pressured Syria to turn him over to Turkey. Ocalan
left Syria and after several attempts to get political asylum in Europe, he fled to Kenya,
where he was captured and brought back to Turkey. Ocalan faced trial and received the
death sentence. The European Union pressured Turkey not to carry out the sentence.42
Ocalan became the Mandela of his people and his capture fueled a growing sense of anger,
41 Aliza Marcus, "Turkey's Kurds After the Gulf War: A Report from the
Southeast," in A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, ed. Gerard
Chaliand,241. ? '' "'■
42 For an analysis of the impact of the Kurdish problem on Turkey's relations with
Europe, see Mattem Muftaler-Bace, "The Impact of the European Union on Turkish
Politics," European Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 2 (Summer 20,00): 159-179.
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frustration and hostility against the state.43 The Turkish government, on the other side,
claimed that the capture of Ocalan would mark the beginning of the end of the Kurdish
problem. These claims rapidly evaporated as incidents of violence have continued to be
reported daily in Turkey.
The Impact of War
It is beyond the scope ofthis study to discuss all the scars ofwar on Turkey and so
only a brief analysis will be presented. Since 1984, more than 37,000 people have been
killed, the majority ofthem from Kurdistan, where all the fighting takes place.44 The effect
of war on the Kurds is revealed in the number of refugees and displaced. More than two
million people were forced to leave their villages, farms, and properties and flee to western
Turkey and Europe in search of security.45 Tragically, their situation in western Turkey is
not much different. They are the first to be arrested, searched, and humiliated.
Discrimination against the Kurds has led to a growing alienation of the Kurds from the state
as well as between the Kurds and the Turks:" The destruction of Kurdish villages is another
reason for mass migration of Kurds, According to reports, hundreds of villages were burnt
and cleared.46 ;
43 The Turkish Times, March 1, 1999: 1.
44 Washington Post, January 9, 2000.
45 Wahlbeck, Kurdish Diasporas: A Comparative Study ofKurdish Refugees
Communities, 50.
46 Ciment, The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, 52.
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Human rights violations are typical features ofwar, however in Turkey human rights
abuses reached the extent that members of parliament lost their immunities and were
sentenced to prison because of their exercise of free speech.47 The overall impact ofwar on
the Kurds has been summarized by human rights organizations to have been:
A staggering list ofhuman rights abuses, arrest, torture, assassination,
mass deportations, expulsions, appalling conditions in refugee camps, denial
of ethnic rights to language, literature, and music, and destruction ofvillages
and towns.48 ,i.\V
On the economic level, the war had its cost, too. Turkey spent an estimated $8
billion fighting the PPK in 1995 alone,49 not to mention the economic losg as a result of the
destruction of the infrastructure, agriculture, tourism, and transportation.
On the political level, the war had serious consequences for Turkey's relations with
the rest ofthe world. At the regional level; the Kurdish question figured strongly in Turkey's
relations with its southern and eastern neighbors Syria, Iraq, and Iran. These countries have
large Kurdish populations. Consequently, they were able from time to time to play the
Kurdish card against Turkey. The tension between Syria and Turkey in the 1990s over
Syria's support ofthe PPK falls under this category. In fact, Syria, Iran and Russia exploit
47 Criminalizing Parliamentary Speech in Turkey, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (Washington, D.C.: May 1994), 6.
48 Situations ofKurds in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe" (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 1993), 9.
49 Aram Nigogosian, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Recent Trends" in The Kurdish
Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, ed. Olson, 44.
the Kurdish card to put pressures on Turkey to compromise on other issues" ^
Finally, the impact ofwar on Turkey's relations with Europe is the most expensive
Price that Turkey pays for the war. Turkish hand.ing ofthe Kurdish question has outraged
many in Europe and stands in the way ofTurkey's entry into Europe." The European body
prides itselfon being a Cub ofdemocracies. Turkey, severe treatment of the Kurds and its.
record ofhuman rights visions ofboth the Kurds and the ethnic Turks represent a major
obstacle to Turkey's membership in the European Union.
Towards a Lasting Solution
For many years, the Turkish authorities, civilian and military, had announce, the
victory of the government forces over the PPK and the end of the Kurdish problem. The
capture of Ocalan intensified such claims. However, i, is evident from this study that the
Kurdish problem cannot be solved by poncies ofrepression and denial. Rather, Turkey must
look for a solution that wou,d remove the grounds of Kurdish opposition and achieve a
lasting peace between the Kurds and the Turks.
Lasting peace requires compromise and some degree of sacrifice. Both the Kurds
and the Turks need to rethink some of their fundamental assumptions. For example, the
Kurds must accept the fact that Turkey is committed to its unity at al. costs. Therefore,























hostility, and distance to the position of the northers' v.ion on the othef
Furthermore, this conflict serves as a case in pomt when discussing the failure of Sudanese
leadership in understanding the realities of Sudan. In this regard, both northern Arab and
Islamist nationalists, and African nationalists in the
south committed deadly mistakes from
which Sudan suffered much, and from which it has never fu,,y recovered. I, is ironic that
the southern Sudanese had fought for se.f-determination on the eve of independence and in
the ear* ,960s; now, however, they are strugg,ing for a united, secu,ar, democratic Sudan
By the same token, the fslamists ofthe north who fought for a vision of a united ,s,amic
Sudan in the ,950s and ,960s, ,a,er, in the ,970s and the ,980s up to Represent, began to
beheve tha, their goa, is unattainable and a separated sou* mign, be the
solution.52
To understand this dramatic change in Sudanese pohtics, and for a carefu,
examination ofconflict ofnationahsm in Sudan, i, is important to present the views ofboth
northerners and southerners.
The View of the North
Northern Sudanese va,ue the unity of Sudan and so they resented deepiy the British
separation ofthe south. According to the northern view, "this po,icy aimed no, a, creating
non-Islamic culture, but an anti-Islamic one."" The southern
region was open to Christian
Islam in Africa," 372.
El. Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas
for
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missions in order to establish spheres of influence for crusaders among the non-believers,
"who if they were not saved for Christ, would at least be lost to Allah."54 Therefore, after
independence, the northern Sudanese:
... exhibited a romantic attachment to the South, "the lost brother" snatched
away by the aliens, and long due back. .. . There was a general feeling of a
need to make up for lost time by spreading the 'national' (Arabic-Islamic)
culture in the south as a basis for unity. This conception pre-supposed that
the south would act as an inert mass, waiting to be reshaped anew.55
While this perspective ignored the fact that the south had its own culture, customs,
values, and traditions, the northerners' identification with Arabism and Islamism has largely
influenced their attitudes towards the region. Thus, they sought to impose Arabization and
Islamization on the south in an attempt to achieve national unity. The commitment of
northern Sudanese to Arabism was best represented by the first Sudanese president, Ismail
Azhari, who commented that:
We are proud of our Arab origin, of our Arabism, and of being
Muslims. The Arabs came to this continent, as pioneers, to disseminate a
genuine culture and promote sound principles which have shed enlightenment
and civilization throughout Africa.56, ; >
In line with this perspective, Sudan's prime minister in 1966, Sadiq al-Mahdi, went
further in expressing his strong belief in Arabism and Islam and asserted:
54 Ruth First, Power in Africa: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d 'Etat
(London: Penguin, 1971), 127.
55 Abdel Wehab El. Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for
Islam in Africa," 372.
56 Deng, War of Visions, All.
"
Northern Sudanese pride in Arabism had its justification. Several inteilectuals had
addressed this ,ssue and provided various explanations for the status auo in favor of
Arabism." According to Mohammed Omar Bashir, Sudanese identification with Is,am and
Arabism was natural because:
ides^ TS Und°ubtedly mo^ Arab than African in their culture
I« is clear that northern Sudanese
were more Arab than they might need to be.
However, what ma,,ers is that they should no, ac, or behave nva racist way to the
disadvantage of the non-Arabs. In ,his context, several studies continue ,„ support the
argument ma, the average northern Sudanese ci,i2en is no, ac,ive,y invo.ved in imposing
Islamism and Arabia on me non-Arab and non-Muslin, people of,he Sou,h. However,,,
is the members of the ruhng ehte who see themselves as having a special role to play in
" Quoted in Lesch, Sudan: Contested National Identities, 42.
exposed to this process." Deng, War of Visions, 421.
59
Conf,ic,
promoting Arabism and Islam in Africa.60 2 ] °
To sun, up, northerners' exaggerated identification with Arabism and Islamism had
historical, psychological, Apolitical grounds. The northern ruling elite ,n Sudan believed
that Arabisn, a,d Islamism were superior to the indigenous culture ofthe southerners, and
so they sough, cultural integration base, on their perspective as a meMs ofattaining nationa!
unity" As Arnold Toynbee observed over thirty-five years ago, -Northerners equate the
spread of Arabism and Islamism to a nation building mechanism.- Unfortunately, this
approach, rafter than achieving national unity, antagonized the south and widened ,he
cleavage between the two parts ofthe country, leading to a brutal civil war.
The View ofthe South
In sharp contrast ,„ the north, the people ofme southhave an African as distinct from
Arab identity, and so Islam and Arabisn, are irreievan, to mem. As Dunstan M. Wai
explained, although the people of southern Sudan belong to various ethnic groups, they
identify culturally with Africanism. Their va,ue systems preclude the possftility of
they vaewed at as a symbol ofnorthern domination and southern submission




63assimilation into Arab culture. Their religion is indigenous to Africa with a Christian elife'
In other words, the southern people of Sudan view themselves as Africans, raciaHy and
culturally, with Western influence reflected in Christianity." Jus, as Arabism and Islam had
been the source ofpride and basis ofunity in the north. Africanism became the core principle
in consolidating the defense against northerners' attempts ofmolding ,he nation into their
image. In other words, Christianity was seen as a source ofdefense against Islam.
As the Arabs in the north used Islam in their battle and declared "Jihad" against the
south, indigenous beliefs and Christianity in the south were brought to the forefront ofthe
conflict. Southerners' resistance to northern attempts of Arabization and Islamization took
two forms: one military, the other religious. Southerners' miseries and sufferings had driven
them toward religion in general and Christianity in particular. As a result, the conflict has
been viewed in religious terms.65
When Sudan achieved independence in 1956, there was an absence of any sense of
national belonging on the part of southern Sudanese. In fact, independence meant to
southerners that the struggle for self-determination had begun. The treatment ofthe southern
Sudanese as a minority group in the post-independence Sudan had a far reaching impact on
« Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York- African
Publishing Company, 1981), 19. K •Atncm
t rfv M^TfnSt°Deng'aSOUthemer'Sconversionto Christianity from h^
tradifconal beliefs is viewed as a price to be paid in order to achieve two gods first sain
support from the church; and second, it is a means of gaining modernity Sch as S
medicine, employment, literacy, skills, and so forth. In other words, it was not a relieious
transformation, but rather, as a means of salvation. For more information see Dent
War of Visions for the Nation" in Sudan: State and Society in Crisis, ed.'vol. 1, 29
65 Ibid., 25.
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the north-south relationship. It has sharpened African-Arab cleavages and made it more
difficult to develop a sense of unity between the two.
According to Dunstan, the northern ruling elite carried out a series of malicious
policies that led to the buildup of frustration among the southern people. Dunstan described
these policies and their impact on southern people in the following words:
Patterns of social and economic discrimination reinforced the
minority status of southern Sudanese within the independent Republic of
Sudan. Their political weakness in turn reinforced their social and economic
patterns. . . . They perceived themselves to be socially and economically
deprived in comparison with the north. And they suffered humiliation.66
Dunstan went on to describe one form of southern reaction to this treatment:
As the propensity of the north to engage in discrimination,
oppression, and violence against the south increased, the southerners felt that
there was no justice in the political system, there was no legitimate state and
no obligation to obey. They wanted to go their own way free from Arab
domination.67
Perhaps this decision would not be taken if the northern elite had tried to understand
the causes of southern fear and frustration, but this did not happen. Even during the
honeymoon period between the north and the south after the Addis Ababa agreement, the
southerners' attitudes towards the north changed very little. As Francis Deng observed,
when southern leaders were asked about the prospects ofnational integration, their responses
were striking. One southern leader saw the differences between the Arabs and Africans as
inherent and sacrosanct:
66 Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict in Sudan, 182.
67 Ibid.
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Those people are brown and we are black. God did not create man at
random. He created each people with their own kind. He created . . . some
people brown and some people black. We cannot say we want to destroy
what God created; all this is in God's hands. Even God would get angry if
we spoiled his work.68
It is clear that the southerners never believed in the arguments of integration with the
north. Their historical experience, which can be summarized by memories of bitterness
towards, and fear and hatred of, the Arabs, persisted from generation to generation and
offered them little hope in a united Sudan.
The north and the south are two different areas, geographically, religiously,
culturally, and, to a large extent, economically. In other words, it would be easy to conclude
that there is nothing in common between the northerners and the southerners. This makes
national integration a task next to impossible and war almost inevitable. In this regard, the
conflict of nationalisms in Sudan will be examined in three distinct historical phases
following independence, with emphasis on the southern Sudanese quest for self-
determination.
The First Phase: Struggle for Self-Determination: 1956-1972
Before the declaration of independence in January 1956, southerners' fears of
northerners' domination were expressed in the divided march to independence. In August
1955, a mutiny by southern soldiers was triggered by a widely shared fear in the south that
independence was just a change of masters from the British to the Arabs, a second colonial
68 Deng, War of Visions, 203.
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era in the history of southern Sudan.69 The southern soldiers, who were ordered to travel
north to participate in the independence celebration, decided to disobey their orders, stayed
in the south, and organized resistance to the new masters.70 This mutiny was suppressed
violently by the northern Arabs, thus confirming southerners' worst fears that independence
was not for them. In this context, one might argue that many African countries were
challenged by ethnicity on the eve of independence, and national integration is still a major
challenge for these countries. However, most of these countries, regardless of their ethnic
problems, were united in their march to independence in the 1950s and the 1960s.7'
Unfortunately, this spirit was absent in Sudan before and after the declaration of
independence in 1956. As mentioned earlier, while British policy was considered as a
perpetual source of division within Sudan, it was the Sudanese political elite that should be
held accountable in the post-independence period. Consequently, southerners' patience came
to an end, and southerners demanded the separation ofthe South as an independent state. In
1963, the southerners founded the Anya-Nya guerrilla army movement, deriving its name
from that of a poison concocted in Madi country from snakes.72
With the establishment ofthe Anya-Nya, the Arab-African schism in Sudan reached
a level beyond the point of political solution. The southerners became convinced that war
69 Ibid., 125.
70 Lesch, Sudan: Contested National Identities, 36.
71 Francis Deng, "Ethnicity: An African Predicament," The Brookings Review,
vol. 15, issue 3 (Summer 1997), 28.
72 Holt, A History ofthe Sudan, 180.
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become more involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel provided more assistance to the
rebels.77
As is common among failing leaders to blame their internal problems on external
factors, the ruling elite of Sudan blamed Israel and the imperialists for the southern problem:
The South is known as the weakest link of our revolutionary defense.
We are in competition with world imperialism and zionism. Since
September 1964, the imperialists and the Israelis have started to pour in arms
via the frontiers of Ethiopia and Uganda.78
There is no doubt that Sudan's efforts to unite the Arab world against Israel not only
contradicted the violent division within the country represented by the civil war, but they
gave Israel the justification to intervene and support the Anya-Nya as a tactic in its war
against the Arab countries. Either way, the Sudanese people were the victims of the policies
of their leaders.79
77 Sudan's involvement in Arab politics after the war of 1967 culminated in
hosting the first Arab summit following the defeat. The summit adopted a resolution
with the famous three nos: no recognition of Israel, no negotiations, and no peace treaty.
For more information about Sudan's solidarity with the Arab world after the defeat, see
for example Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al- Nasir and His Rivals
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
78 Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in Traditional Society,
175.
79 To the discredit of the Anya-Nya leaders, they were fighting for self-
determination and Africanism, yet at the same time Israel was their friend and strongest
supporter. Israel was among the very few states that cooperated and established a strong
relationship or an alliance with the apartheid government of South Africa, and so many
separatist movements in Africa maintained political distance from Israel as it supported a
racist regime. For more information about Israel's involvement in Africa's affairs, see for
example Olusola Ojo, Africa and Israel: Relations in Perspective (London: Westview
Press, 1988).
The Second Phase: From Confrontation to Accommodation:
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ation: 1973-l983
In . 969, Jafar Numeri seized power in a mi.itary coup. m his conduct of southern
affairs, Numeri recognized the bankruptcy ofearlier pohcies and provided a new reading of
the southern issue, and declared that:
These words were backed by actions as Numeri committed his government to the
region ofthe north-south conflict. Numeri appointed Abe, A,ier, in whom souths
bad great confidence, as a minister ofsouthern affairs. Furthermore, Numeri gave a green
.igh, to Alier ,„ negotia,e with the rebels to end the civi, war. Once the ta,ks were started
both sides saw an opportunity for a setflemen, Afta^ weeks ofnegotiatims>
were able to overcome the .egacies ofthe past and reached a peacefu, settlement known
•he Addis Ababa Agreement. According ,„ the
self-governing unit within the republic of Sudan.81
agreement, the southern region became a
Sudan a"s «f *e dual identity of
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The agreement recognized the dual identity of Sudan as an Arab and African country.
It was the outcome of compromise between the northerners, who were able to ensure the
unity and territorial integrity of Sudan, and the southerners, who gained a considerable
degree of autonomy that was enough to preserve their identity. In other words, it brought
peace with justice for the south and honor and dignity for the north.
The question then arises, why did the Sudanese people from north and south, after
a long period of bitter conflict, change their attitudes and reconcile their differences?
Muhammed Omar Bashir, who devoted much ofhis scholarship to the problem ofthe south,
listed four major reasons that brought about the change from confrontation to
accommodation and led to the success of the Addis Ababa negotiations.82
First, both sides reached a military stalemate; therefore, they were convinced by then
that no military solution was possible.
Second, the war was a continuous drain on the poor resources ofthe country. Numeri
came to realize that the enormous amount of resources geared towards war could be used
beneficially in development.
Third, the conciliatory policies ofNumeri convinced the southern leaders that there
was a better chance to reach a peaceful settlement with Numeri than with: any future leader
in the north.
of birth. Finally, a special provision stated, "the southern people shall strive to
consolidate the unity of Sudan and respect the constitution." For a detailed account of the
Addis Ababa Agreement, see Muhammed Omar Bashir, The Southern Sudan: From
Conflict to Peace (London: C. Hurst, 1975).
82 Bashir, The Southern Sudan: Background to the Conflict, 129-131.
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Fourth was the appointment ofAbel Alier as vice president and minister of southern
affairs. Alier, a gifted lawyer, enjoyed the trust and confidence ofboth sides of the conflict.
Alier convinced the southern leaders in Addis Ababa that separation was not a viable option
in Africa.
It is clear that these factors emphasized the internal context and the role of Sudanese
leadership. Numeri decided to re-order his priorities in a way that put Sudan's national
interests before any other obligations. He realized that pan-Arabism was incompatible with
his attempts to solve the southern problem. However, one cannot ignore the external context.
Sudan's openness to key African countries, the containment of the Israeli influence and
finally the role ofEmperor Haile Selassie were no less important than the internal context.83
The most significant thing about the agreement, apart from termination of the civil
war, was that for the first time in the history of independent Sudan, the southerners were
fully integrated into the body politic of Sudan. The agreement enhanced the sense of
national unity, and fears and hostility between the north and the south were replaced by
mutual trust and co-existence. The Arab-African cleavage was replaced by a spirit of
African brotherhood. Finally, the agreement paved the way for a period of relative stability,
and for the first time since independence, a permanent constitution was promulgated in
1973.84
83 In Sudan as well as in many African countries, evidence continues to show that
external involvement in civilian wars always promote conflict, reinforce hard line
positions, and cripple efforts toward peace. For further discussion of this point, see for
instance Smock, Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa, 82.
84 Sidahmed, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Sudan, 115.
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Numeri was able to achieve this only when he neutralized the religious forces in
Sudan. The wisdom of this policy was not without fruits for Numeri. It enhanced his
legitimacy and increased his popularity. The people's admiration of Numeri raised his
stature to something akin to a Sudanese Lincoln.85 Numeri, the man of the people in every
sense of the term, was proposed as a candidate for the Noble Peace Prize.86
The Third Phase: Struggle for Recognition: 1983 - present
While the Addis Ababa agreement marked an important stage in the north-south
relations, it could not alone ensure peace and unity in Sudan. In fact, the agreement was not
accepted by three major groups in the country.
First, there were some southerners who felt that the agreement had betrayed the
African Sudanese cause. This group viewed the agreement as a virtual surrender and chose
to remain outside the settlement.87
Second, opposition to the agreement came from the advocates ofpan-Arabism. This
group saw the agreement as an attempt to Africanize the Sudan. This group was strongly
supported by Libya. Qadafl, outraged by Sudan's drive in Africa, made several attempts to
convince Numeri to let the south go its own way.88
Third, the Islamists, represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, were very suspicious
85 Bechtold, Politics in Sudan, 273.
86 Deng, War of Visions, 159.
87 Ibid., 166.
88 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 272.
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about the agreement, and were certain that it had secret clauses of an anti-Islamic character.
Therefore, they never gave it their support.
El. Affendi reported that after the agreement became a reality that could not be
ignored, the Islamists started a serious debate about allowing the south to go its own way if
it was necessary to establish an Islamic state in Sudan:
The call for a united Muslim front was justified by Muslim brothers
because ofthe need to meet the new challenge of the south which demanded
from the north unity in defense of its interests and its cultural identity against
the Christian missionary, imperialists, racist monster.89
Therefore, in 1983, when Numeri abrogated the agreement, as he divided the south
into three regions and imposed Islamic laws in Sudan, the Addis Ababa agreement became
part of history. Consequently, southerners' fears and suspicions were confirmed and the
second civilian war had started.
Numeri sent Lieutenant Colonel John Garang to suppress the south. Instead, what
Garang heard and experienced there was more than enough to make him change his mind and
join the rebels. Thus the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) was born.90 The
new nationalist movement listed twelve reasons for the renewal of the war in the south,91
among them:
89 El. Affendi, "Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,"
378.
90 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 302.
91 Ibid., 355-356.
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• Abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement
• Rampant corruption in the government and ruthless suppression of freedom in Sudan.
• Failure of the regime to solve the question of national identity of Sudan
• Discovery of oil in the south
Unlike the Anya-Nya in the 1960s, the SPLM under the leadership of Garang was not
a secessionist movement, aimed at the solution of the southern problem. Rather, the SPLM
made its position clear to the Sudanese people that it was committed to the liberation of the
whole Sudan, and to the unity of its people and its territorial integrity. Furthermore, the
objective ofthe movement was to establish a new and democratic Sudan in which equality,
freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are not slogans but
concrete realities. Finally, the movement promised to solve the national and religious
question to the satisfaction of all the Sudanese people within a democratic and secular
context in accordance with the objective realities of the country.92 Therefore, the SPLM's
goals were national, not regional, and Unitarian, not secessionist.
Garang appealed to all Sudanese people to join his movement in order to achieve
those objectives. Consequently, a few northern politicians, outraged by Numeri's
contradicted policies, joined the movement. Later, Numeri was overthrown by a public
uprising; however, the plight of the Sudanese people never ended as war escalated in the
south.
The struggle for a secular, socialist, democratic Sudan as envisaged by the SPLM
took a new dimension after 1989. As mentioned earlier, in 1989,,the Islamists, under the
92 John Garang, The Callfor Democracy in Sudan, 26.
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leadership of Hassan Turabi, seized power and tried to implement their own agenda in
Sudan. The Islamists declared Jihad against the south, effectively removing any hope that
the government in Khartoum might agree to a secular Sudanese state.
The sharp contrast between Garang's emphasis on the absolute necessity of the
establishment of a secular state and Turabi's insistence on an Islamic state led to the failure
of all attempts toward peace:
The mediator had decided to tackle head-on the issue of religion and
state. If that issue could be resolved, then other issues would fall into place;
if not, then no accord was possible. . . . The government delegates accused
SPLM of seeking to abolish religion. . . . The SPLM, in turn, rejected
religious apartheid and stated starkly that the south could be part of an
Islamic state only if it were defeated militarily.93
To Turabi and his associates, if the choice had to be between continuing the Islamic
experiment or maintaining Sudanese national unity, Turabi would opt for the Islamic
experiment rather than a Sudanese national cause.94
In the end, as the Islamist alternative expressed by Turabi was less likely to
compromise its Islamic mission for the sake of unity and peace, the war continued to rock
the country with devastating effects, especially for the people of the south, as will be
presented in the coming part.
93 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Makers ofContemporary Islam (Oxford and




The Impact of War
The cost ofwar for Sudan's people is grave. Measured in terras of deaths, refugees,
displaced people, lost economic opportunities, and violations of human rights, the war in
Sudan is the most costly in Africa.
The most immediate impact of war is the increasing suffering of civilians, whose
death toll exceeds that of the soldiers ofboth sides.95 From 1983 until the present, the civil
war in Sudan has resulted in the death of over two million people, and the displacement of
around six million.96 The majority of these people are from the south, where all the fighting
takes place.
The role ofwar in promoting famine is a major factor contributing to the increase in
death rates. The tragedy is exacerbated when food is used as a weapon of war.97 According
to Judy Mayotte, the war in Sudan proved to be the most vicious and deadly in the African
continent. In 1988 alone, more than 250,000 southern Sudanese died of starvation as the
military leaders on both sides refused to allow food to reach civilian populations believed
95 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 161.
96 See Majda M. El. Sanousi and Nafisa Ahmed El-Amin, "The Women's
Movement, Displaced Women, and Rural Women in Sudan," in Women and Politics
World Wide, eds. Barbara J. Nelson and Najma Chowdhury (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1994), 683.
97 For an in-depth treatment of this aspect, see Francis M. Deng and Larry Minear,
The Challenges ofFamine Relief: Emergency Operations in the Sudan (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992). See also Bruce Van Voorhis, "Food as Weapon for
Peace: Operation Life Line Sudan," Africa Today, vol. 36 (nos. 3 and 4,1989): 29-42.
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to be loyal to one side or the other.98
The effect of war on the south is revealed in the number of refugees and internally
displaced people. More than six million people were forced to leave their farms, villages,
and most of their possessions and move to the north in search of peace and safety.
Unfortunately, their situation in the north is tragic to such an extent that the international
community has harshly criticized the Sudanese government for its unfair treatment of these
people."
A consistent pattern ofhuman rights violations is a typical feature ofwar, and Sudan
is not an exception. In fact, human rights violations have exacerbated since the Islamists
came to power in Sudan in 1989,100 These violations can be summarized as the following:
• Promulgation of laws contravening international standards ofhuman rights.
These laws included capital punishment, public crucifixion, public flogging and
denial of freedom of religion.
• Governance by intimidation and oppression. This means common use of torture,
summary executions, arbitrary detention, arrests, disappearances, and confiscation
ofproperty.
• Violations of the rules ofwar by killing civilians or taking them as hostages.
• The re-emergence of slavery.101
98 Judy Mayotte, "Civil War in Sudan: The Paradox ofHuman Rights and
National Sovereignty," 507.
99 Anonymous, "A Nation's Holy War," The Christian Century, vol. Ill, no. 21
(July 1994): 672.
100 For a first-hand account on the view of the Islamists in Sudan towards human
rights see Abdelmoula Adam M., "The Fundamentalists Agenda for Human Rights: The
Sudan and Algeria," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 1 (Winter 1996).
101 See the 1994 publication by Human Rights Watch, Civilian Devastation:
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The war has economic effects too. By the late 1980s, it cost Sudan an average of one
million U.S. dollars per day.102 With the escalation ofthe war, military expenditure increased
to the extent that in the early 1990s, 25 percent of government expenditure was allocated to
the military. This left the government unable to reform according to the instructions of the
IMF or to meet the demands of its people. Furthermore, the war was highly destructive to
the infrastructure, the agriculture, transportation, industry, and mining and further drained
the national economy. Finally, as a general rule, donors and investors are not likely to be
very interested in investment in unstable environments; consequently, Sudan was deprived
of foreign funds and foreign investment.
Towards a Lasting Solution
A peaceful settlement of the Sudanese conflict has not been possible, despite
numerous attempts by both parties to the conflict and the good offices of neighboring
countries, especially Egypt and Libya. The main obstacle to peace has always been the hard
line positions adopted by both parties concerning the role of religion in Sudan. The
government of Sudan seeks to establish an Islamist Arab state despite Sudan's manifest
religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity. The SPLM seeks to establish a non-theocratic state
Abuses by All Parties in the War in Southern Sudan (New York, 1994).
102 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 162.
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in a united Sudan. Under these circumstances, the people of Sudan have limited options
from which they can choose to end war and achieve peace. Three options are suggested to
end the stalemate.
The First Option: One Sudan, One System
This option requires the establishment of a national framework with which all can
identify without any distinction based on race, religion, tribe, language, and so forth. This
pluralistic approach means restructuring national identity to ensure that the Sudanese see
themselves first and foremost as Sudanese rather than Arabs, Africans, Christians or
Muslims. They would value the unity of Sudan and make transition from Arabism,
Africanism, Islamism, and Christianity into Sudanism.103
This approach requires a separation of religion and politics, and democracy that
respects human rights and fights all forms of racism. A near approach to this option was
tried following the Addis Ababa agreement and proved highly workable.
The Second Option: One Sudan, Two Systems
This option means the creation of a confederal system in Sudan, where an Islamic
state can be established in the north and a secular one in the south. This confederal
solution would achieve peaceful coexistence oftwo systems with one Sudan. A one
Sudan, two systems formula gives unity a considerable advantage and at the same time
103 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 4\2>.
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respects the aspirations of both Arabs and Africans.104
The Third Option: Partition
If the Sudanese people cannot live together and cannot restructure their concept of
national identity and value their unity, it may be more practical and in every one's interest
to divide the country. In other words, as the prospects for a united or confederal Sudan are
not encouraging in the light ofhistorical experience, partition would be the final option that
the Sudanese have. While partition as a solution is far from perfect, partition with peace is
more favorable than unity with war given the expensive cost of such war.
104 Deng, War of Visions, 507.
CHAPTER 7
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings to the Research Questions
Primary Questions
1. Can Islam be separated from politics,and ifnot, why not?
Muslims' responses to secularism Have varied. Some have preached rejection and
resistance, as they be.ieve that Islam is both temporal and spiritual, mosque and state.
Otters have Wed to reconcile Islam and secularism. A fed group advocates
complete separation between Islam and politics, as religion is considered a major
hindrance to political, economic, and socia, deveiopment. This confusion over the
role and place ofreligion has its impact on a number of issues of great sigmficance
to Muslims' politics, including Muslims' view towards national, democracy, and
the position ofwomen in society.
2. What is the role and place ofMam in the politica. process, both in domestic and
foreign affairs, of Sudan and Turkey?
Mam plays an extraordinary role in Sudan's political life in both domestic and
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external affairs. By the same token, the centrality of Islam for the Turkish and
Kurdish peoples has remained unchanged since their conversion to Islam, and it is
unlikely to change in the future regardless ofAtaturk's legacy of secularism or of the
Turkish elite's desire to integrate into Europe.
Secondary Questions
1. What are the underlying reasons for hostility and rivalry between Islam and the West?
Does the West use double standards when it comes to Islamic issues? What roles
have Western powers played in the crisis of Sudan and Turkey?
The hostility and rivalry between Islam and the West should not be a surprise as both
religions claim a universal mission—each is a transitional community based upon
common belief. Theological differences put the two on a collision course. The
historical evidence tends to support the argument that the West uses double standards
when it comes to issues related to the Islamic world. This could be seen in pan-
Islamism, pan-Arabism, the Kurdish problem, and problems in many other places
throughout the Islamic world. The Western imperialist powers in general, and
Britain in particular, contributed to so many problems in the crisis oftoday's Turkey
and Sudan. Many Sudanese and African scholars and politicians agree that the
southern problem in Sudan is a British legacy. In Kurdistan, British interests led to
the fragmentation of the region among various countries and prevented the
establishment of a Kurdish national state.




a correction between Turkish attempts of Westernization and the return
Turkey? Why was Turkey able to deve,op a milita^ re.ationship with the West,
•hus becoming a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO,, bu,
could not build a pohtical, economic, and socia, relationship with the West to join
the European Union? FinaUy, can Turkey reconcile Islam with modernity?
Several factors explain the fai.ure organization in Turkey. One is tha, Turkey
important* its religion. In addition, the Turkish peop.e have great respect for the,
own culture and value, Therefore, they are no, compietely satisfied with the so-
called Westernized Turkish e,i,e who had blindly taken Europe as a mode, of
modernization. Turkey's membership in NATO was bom in the CoM War
the end of the Cold War, Turkey is no longer a bulwark against the Soviet threat.
Consequent Turkey's status as a European a,,y is being reevaluated. The rise of
the Islamic movement in Turkey shou.d not be a surprise in light ofthe fai,ure ofthe
Europeanization project and the crisis ofsecuiarism in Turkey. Turkey's attempt to
reconcile Mam with modernity is Suites. I, is impossiWe to modernize and not to
Westernize. The majority of the Turkish people refuse to eHminate their own
traditional and cultural values in the name ofmodernization and Westernization.
e or accord
Should the government of Sudan favor Islam and the Arabic languag,
equal citizenship to people ofall faiths and races? Are the Sudanese people
satisfied with the Istaic experiment, and if no,, how do they express their
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content with their government?
The government of Sudan should end its assimilative approach and seek a pluralistic
Sudan, free from prejudice, oppression and social injustice. This approach will
establish common ground on which all Sudanese—Arabs and Africans, Muslims and
non-Muslims—can stand united. The majority of Sudanese people are outraged by
an Islamic regime that claims to know what God wants. They express their anger
towards the government in a variety of ways: protest, migration, revolt, and war.
4. What are the prospects for establishing nation states for the Kurds in Kurdistan and
the southern people of Sudan? What roles do regional and foreign powers play in
those ethnic conflicts? What are the humanitarian, economic, and political impacts
ofthese civil wars? Is there a possibility for reconciliation between these conflicting
parties, and if not, why not?
The prospect of establishing independent states for the Kurds and southern people of
Sudan are not promising. The Kurds and the southern people of Sudan are no longer
fighting for self-determination. Rather, they struggle for democracy, equal
distribution of wealth, and respect for their distinctive identities. Regional and
foreign powers contributed to the escalation of war. The Kurds and the southern
people of Sudan were used by regional powers to put pressures on Turkey and Sudan.
The war in both countries had devastating effects on all walks of life (humanitarian,
economic, political and social.) The possibility of reconciliation and resolving the
conflict through the rational exchange of ideas has not vanished yet. However, the
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conflict in both countries demonstrated that it could not be solved by the military
option.
Conclusions
This concluding part addresses the fundamental issues that emerged repeatedly in the
preceding analysis of the dilemma of Turkey and Sudan. The current developments in both
countries and at the international level make this summation even more relevant.
In Turkey two major incidents took place in the 1990s that captured the headlines of
news throughout the world. The first was the rise and fall of the Refah (Welfare) Islamic
party and the second was the capture and trial of the PPK leader Ocalan in 1999.
For the first time in the modern history of Turkey, the Islamists, represented by the
Refah, achieved a political victory in the 1995 parliamentary elections and won 20 percent
of the vote. After briefly participating in a coalition government, Refah was pushed out of
power and suppressed.1 The Islamists recreated their political movement with the Virtue
Party. In 1996, Erbakan, the leader of the Virtue Party, became Turkey's prime minister.
Erbakan's pro-Islamic policies convinced the secular elite that the Islamists were Turkey's
internal enemy and Erbakan was forced to resign in what came to be called a modern
political coup. Furthermore, the Virtue Party was closed down and Erbakan was banned
from politics for five years.2
40-56.
Ayata, "Patronage, Party and the State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey,"
Caulap, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party," 22.
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In 1999, Ocalan was captured in Kenya after an international plot in which the
intelligence of Turkey, Israel, and the United States participated and was brought to trial in
Turkey. During the trial, the Turkish elite debated Ocalan's fate. Most Turkish politicians
pressed for the execution of the PPK leader for leading a 15-year war for the autonomy of
the Kurds of Turkey. The Kurdish diaspora launched violent demonstrations in various
European capitals, and a wave of violent attacks by PPK supporters rocked Turkey. After
a short trial, Ocalan received the death sentence. The Kurds saw the event as a disaster and
several Kurds burned themselves alive in protest of the verdict. However, many Turkish
politicians saw the event as a historical victory. So far, Europe's pressures on Turkey have
deterred the latter from executing Ocalan,
A number of major points emerge from the previous developments. First, the
centrality of Islam in Turkish politics remains in spite of more than 76 years of
secularization. Islam has been the religion ofthe Turks for more than ten centuries. It has
been rooted in the hearts ofthe Turks, who played a historic role in expanding and defending
the frontiers of Islam against the dangers of colonial Europe. Throughout ten centuries,
Islam was the primary guiding and the leading force in social development.
The current crisis in Turkey is the outcome of antagonism between secularism and
Islamism. Ataturk disestablished Islam and imposed his secular program on the Turkish
people to the extent that he proclaimed a ban on clothing identified with Islamic traditions
such as the veil for women and the fez for men. The Turks could not challenge Ataturk's
authority and secularism was implemented with an iron first. The Kurds, on the other side,
were more outraged by Ataturk's secular policies and they voiced their discontent through
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a series of revolt in the 1920s and 1930s. Religious grievances were one of the principal
causes ofthese revolts. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, when the political climate became
more relaxed in Turkey, the Turks took the opportunity to demonstrate their strong
commitment to Islam by establishing several Islamic political institutions such as political
parties, charitable organizations, Islamic centers and so forth. The return ofIslam in Turkey
is meant to revive a way of life that was discouraged by an authoritarian secular elite.
When the Islamists gained power in democratic elections in the mid 1990s, they tried
to put Turkey's focus on its natural and historical hinterland, the Middle East or the Islamic
world. Erbakan opposed any further integration with Europe, arguing instead that Turkey's
national interests would be served best by strengthening ties with the Islamic world.3
However, such aspirations were not tolerated by Turkey's secular elite and Erbakan was
forced to resign.
Second, the idea of secularism has long been sold to the Turkish people as their best
guide for prosperity and development. After decades of secularization, Turkey failed to
become a truly secular, European-style state. Turkey remained an Islamic state outside the
European club. Furthermore, secularism began to decline and lose its glitter in Turkey. One
manifestation ofthe growing reaction against secularism is the return of Islamic uniform in
Turkey and the veil in particular. Turkish women were determined to demonstrate their
3 When Erbakan assumed power in 1996 as the first Islamist leader in Turkey,
many Westerners believed that Turkey would become the next Algeria or Iran. To their
credit, the Islamists of Turkey showed their respect to the rules of the political game and
refused to use violence to gain power or maintain it. The secularists, on the other side,
proved that they were less democratic than the Islamists when they forced Erbakan to
resign and banned his political party.
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commitment to Islam by covering their head with scarves.4
The secularists—who were outraged by this phenomenon—pressured the state to
issue a dress code that prohibited female students and government employees from covering
their heads, another manifestation of the fragility of the democratic experiment of Turkey,
where people cannot dress the way they desire. Secularism does not only involve the
separation of religion from politics, it also includes the process of modernization,
urbanization, and most important, democracy. The contradictory policies ofTurkey's secular
elite demonstrate that Turkey's secularism is different. On three occasions, in 1960, 1971,
and 1980, the military intervened in the name of secularism. However, in the 1990s, the
secular elite viewed religion as an effective means to counter the PPK and encouraged
religious sentiments among the Kurds. These contradictory policies enforced the
polarization in the ideological competition between the secular elite and the Islamists and
deepened the crisis of Turkey's identity.
Third, the role of leadership is essential in Turkey's current crisis. Historically, it
had been demonstrated that when the Ottoman Empire was blessed with great leaders, they
were a major source of the Empire's power. Seeds of decline began to grow when the
Empire was deprived of wise and gifted leaders. In contemporary Turkey, the impact of
leadership is so profound that one can argue that the most crucial factor in the plight of the
Turks and the Kurds is the role played by the leadership.
After the establishment of the Republic, Ataturk thought that what worked in the
4 A good reference of the return of Islamic uniform in Turkey is the book of
Elisabeth Ozdalga, The Veiling Issue: Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern
Turkey (United Kingdom: Curzon Press, 1998).
237
West, i.e., separation of church and state, was definitely going to work in Turkey. Therefore,
he launched his Europeanization project. The Turkish politicians continued to demonstrate
their strong commitment to Ataturk's legacy regardless of the cost. From 1920 until the
present, unity with Europe has remained the major concern for the Turkish leaders.
However, the Europeans on more than one occasion have demonstrated that Islam was not
welcome in their continent. Turkey took giant steps westward at every opportunity so as to
convince the Europeans that she truly belongs to Europe, but to no avail. Turkey's
membership in NATO was born in the Cold War. With the Cold War over, Turkey's
importance is being reevaluated and Turkey might never become a member of the EU. A
Turkish writer expressed Turkey's discontent over Europe's rejection of its membership in
the following words:
Followers of the Ataturk dictum to look West persist in joining EU
even after repeated rebuffs by that outfit. The most humiliating rejection,
however, was when the former Warsaw Pact members were given priority
over Turkey's for admission to the club. These were the very countries from
whose wrath Turkey had protected Europe for 45 years of the cold war. It
was a severe slap in the face to Turkey.5
The Ozal years (1983-1993) witnessed a new era in Turkish politics. Ozal realized
why Europe rejected Turkey and so he tried to look eastward and strengthen Turkey's ties
with the Islamic world. Furthermore, Ozal recognized the failure of policies of
"Turkification" and provided a new reading to the Kurdish problem. Ozal's reconciliatory
approach might have brought peace to Turkey, but the Turkish elite refused his approach and
insisted on eradicating the PPK supporters as a solution to the Kurdish problem.
The Turkish Times, July 1,1999.
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Finally, the capture and trial of Ocalan demonstrated bitter facts for Turkey. First,
after 76 years of "Turkification," Turkey had failed to turn the Kurds into Turks. Therefore,
the Kurdish problem could not be solved by force. The execution of Ocalan would in no way
solve the Kurdish problem. The rise of PPK was not only due to a desire to fight for the
national cause, but also an expression of economic and social frustration. Turkish leaders
should look for methods that would remove the grounds of Kurdish opposition rather than
eradicating Kurdish rebels. Ocalan, after hearing the verdict, set out the reasons for this
struggle and the solution to the Kurdish problem:
I reject the accusation of treason. I believe'Tarri struggling for the
unity of the country and freedom. I believe that my struggle was for a
democratic republic not against the republic. I hope that the problem which
has begun as a result of historic mistakes will reach a solution. I am
repeating my call, the determined promise I made at the onset, for a fair and
honorable peace and brotherhood in line with the democratic republic. The
future of the country lies with peace not with war.6
In addition, Ocalan's plight demonstrated that the Europeans used the Kurdish card
against Turkey for their own interests. Ocalan's political asylum was rejected in Italy and
he was forced to leave Europe. While most Europeans view the Kurdish leaders of Iraq as
freedom fighters, they considered Ocalan a terrorist and he was wanted in Germany. As the
Kurds are one nation divided among several states, one could not find any justification for
Europe's position to Ocalan but hypocrisy and double standards. When Ocalan received the
death sentence, Europe warned Turkey that his execution would jeopardize Turkey's entry




into the Europe Union.7
In sum, the majority of the Kurds showed a strong desire to achieve equality,
democracy, and development, if self-determination was not achievable. In doing so, they
demonstrated a strong loyalty to the Turkish state. The question then arises, would the
Turkish politicians realize this fact and acknowledge the Kurdish reality? The answer to this
question is left for the Turks. If Turkey wants to join the ranks of Western democracy, it is
the author's beliefthat Ocalan alive can cause no harm to Turkey. However, if the mentality
of revenge prevails among Turkish politicians, Ocalan's execution and policies of
"Turkification" would cost Turkey much. In the end, it is the choice of the Turks.
Finally, in the light of the previous analysis, one must consider the prospects for
change in Turkish politics and examine the role ofthe forces of change internally,
regionally, and internationally.
At the internal level, as examined in this study, in the last two decades there has
been a growing feeling among the people of Turkey that there must be change. The
pressures for change have been increased in recent years by the failures of both the
Westernization and the nationalist projects. Turkey remains outside the European Union
and the Kurdish conflict is ongoing. The realization by the people of the failures of such
projects is a force for change by itself. Furthermore, this change requires the cooperation
and participation of several actors in Turkey: the Islamists, the secularists, and the
Turkish masses.
In this regard, it is the author's belief that the type of change that should take
7 The Turkish Times, January 1, 2000.
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place in Turkey should be something of an Islamic sort. In a country where 99 percent of
the population are Muslims, Islam as a religion must be brought back to the forefront of
Turkish politics. This does not mean that Turkey should try suddenly to introduce a full
scale Islamic system. Rather, it means gradual and slow change in both domestic and
foreign policies so that Turkey would become more Islamic and less secular.
The Islamists of Turkey can play a very constructive role in the process of change
by means ofcompromise and cooperation. The Islamists of Turkey, for example, must
not oppose Turkey's integration with Europe. They should realize that Turkey can not
afford to abandon Europe.
Based on such a vision, Turkey would change in a way that would balance
between the country's interests and the wishes of the Turkish people. By the same token,
the secularists of Turkey must recognize the necessity of democratic change. This change
would require radical reform to the constitution and the whole structure of Turkish
politics. For example, the dominance of secularism must be brought to an end. In doing
so, the Turkish government would show that it is more responsive to the needs of its
people, more answerable to them, less coercive and less corrupt. Ultimately, social
changes are not just matters of government initiatives. They also require the full
participation of the masses. Therefore, the Turkish masses must push for change and be
ready to pay its price.
At the regional level, the forces of change can be found in Turkey's
neighborhood. Turkey's foreign policyhas been influenced by the Kurdish problem and
Turkey's relations with the West and specifically its alliance with Israel. As examined in
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this study, Turkey's Kurdish problem had weakened its relations with Europe as well as
with its neighbors with Kurdish minorities, namely Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The previous
countries play the Kurdish card against Turkey every now and then. Therefore, in order
to contain the influence ofthese countries on the Kurdish problem, Turkey must
cooperate and compromise with these regional powers on other issues such as the
problem of water supply and the peace process, to name just a few. There is no doubt
that such issues are of great concern to the whole region. By the same token, Turkey's
neighbors must take the initiative to bring Turkey to their side. For example, Iraq and
Syria can solve the problem of water supply with Turkey by means of compromise and
cooperation.
At the international level, Turkey is now viewed by the West as a bulwark against
Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey's alliance with Israel can be explained only in terms of a
deterrent power to Arab nationalism. There is no doubt that Turkey's identification with the
West and its alliance with Israel has severely restricted its ability to develop friendly
relations with the Islamic world. Therefore, Turkey must adjust its foreign policy and
balance its relations with the East and the West. For example, Turkey can employ its
friendly relations with Israel to support the peace process in the Middle East. By the same
token, key Islamic countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan can maintain friendly
relations with Turkey and use it as an example of a moderate Islamic country that can
integrate with the West and at the same time support the E,ast-
In Sudan, the power struggle between Hassan Turabi and al-Bashir is an outstanding
example of the failure and bankruptcy of Sudan's Islamic experiment. Turabi helped al-
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Bashir to seize power in 1989, and masterminded Bashir's political program since then.
However, rivalry between the two came to a head in 1999 when Turabi tried to use his power
in parliament to push for limits on presidential power. Bashir reacted by dissolving the
parliament.8
Turabi, on the other had, called for popular uprisings against al-Bashir's government.
Turabi went further in his opposition to the regime and, at this time, changed his colors
completely and signed an agreement with SPLM to overthrow the regime:
The two sides have agreed to work jointly for putting an end to the
Sudanese crisis and to establish a democratic system, just peace and federal
government in Sudan. These objectives will be pursued through peaceful
means ofpopular resistance against the government authorization methods.9
Later, Turabi, the uncrowned king of Sudan, was arrested. Turabi, the leading figure
in Islamization in Sudan, ended his alliance with al-Bashir in a very tragic way.
A number of major points emerge from these developments. First, one can say that
the most crucial factor in the plight of Sudan is the role played by its leadership. The errors
made by the ruling elite account for most of Sudan's problems. The Sudanese leadership has
repeatedly failed to address the country's thorny issues: political stability, national identity,
and the southern problem. These issues are of fundamental importance to Sudan. However,
these issues were overshadowed by ideological differences, cultural prejudice, economic
8 For a brief analysis about the struggle between Turabi and Bashir, see Stefano
Bellucci, "Islam and Democracy: the 1999 Palace Coup in Sudan," Middle East Policy,
vol. 7, no. 3 (June 2000).
9 Reuters, February 21, 2001.
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interests, and worse still, personal rivalries. The ruling elite in Sudan failed to come to grips
with the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of Sudanese society. Consequently, one can
say that the essence of Sudan's dilemma revolves around the question of leadership.
Mansour Khalid, a Sudanese scholar and statesman, commented on this failure in the
following words: "The failure by the most qualified section of Sudanese society to develop
a consciousness of the nation as a whole can only be marked down as an intellectual
failing."10
Khalid chose India as the most obvious example to prove the role of leadership in
serving real national interest and solving a country's problems. India is a country with much
greater diversity than Sudan. However, right calculations and wise policies adopted by
Gandhi and Nehru enabled India to survive its division of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs.
"Unity in diversity and justice for all" was the Indian Congress Party's slogan, and so India
was able to find agreement on many issues hard to reach. Unfortunately, the Sudanese
politicians were unable to tackle Sudan's relatively small cultural and ethnic differences. Of
course, Sudan had no Nehru and so it was never able to reconcile its differences.11
The years from 1972-1983 marked a turning point in Sudan's history. These were
the years when the country was put on the right track and peace visited Sudan for the first
time since independence. These years raised Numeri to the status of prince of peace in
Sudan. Unfortunately these years came to an unhappy end by the disastrous step taken by
Numeri in 1983. Numeri's decision was an outcome of miscalculations and wrong




Two, the success of Turabi and Garang in overcoming their bitter rivalry and
fundamental differences was strong evidence that the southern problem was not
insurmountable. This problem can be solved by genuine recognition and careful study of
those components that were the roots of the conflict. In this regard, one can say that Sudan
can identify with both Arabism and Africanism at the same time. Sudan had often been
called a "microcosm of Africa" because of its diversity. Therefore, it is not quite clear to
understand what it means to be Sudanese. The northern Sudanese see Sudan as part of the
Arab world. For the southern Sudanese, the issue of identity was never a problem: they are
part ofAfrica. The failure ofboth the northerners and the southerners to agree on a common
and inclusive identity has cost Sudan much. The question arises why the Sudanese people
cannot be Sudanese, Arabs, and Africans at the same time? There is no contradiction
between being Sudanese, Egyptian, and African at the same time. As Ali Mazrui had
observed, Nasir identified with both Arabism and pan-Africanism. He told his countrymen
that they were Arabs, Africans, and Egyptians at the same time:
We cannot in any way stand aside, even if we wish to, from the
sanguinary and dreadful struggle now raging in the .heart of continent
between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot
do so for one principal and; clear reason: we*6urselves are in Africa.12
Nasir, Nkrumah and Nyerere were all Africans. Nasir's solidarity with Africa
consisted of granting scholarships to African students, allowing Cairo to become the capital
12 Quoted in Ali A. Mazrui, "On the Concept ofWe are all Africans," The
American Political Science Review, vol. 57, no. 1 (March 1963): 90.
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of national resistance for nationalists from colonial Africa, and converting Cairo Radio into
an instrument of anticolonialism in Africa as well as the Arab world.13 Nasir proved his
credentials for pan-Africanism and that was never at the expense of his commitment to pan-
Arabism. Egypt is an African country in the same sense Nigeria is one. By the same token,
northern Sudanese people must acknowledge the fact that they are closer to Africans than the
Egyptians. Furthermore, the genetic composition of the country does not support any claims
to racial purity. And so W. E. B. DuBois could make the following observation:
Anyone who has traveled in Sudan knows that most of the "Arabs"
he has met are dark skinned, sometimes practically black, often have negroid
features, and hair that maybe almost Negro in quality. It is then obvious that
in Africa the term "Arab" is misleading. The Arabs were too nearly akin to
Negroes to draw an absolute color line.14
Consequently, Sudan is an African country not only in terms of the geographical fact,
but also in racial features. The black Muslim Sudanese are closer to their fellow Christian
Sudanese than to their fellow Arabs in Lebanon, Iraq or Morocco. Finally, if the cause of
unity was so dear to northern Sudanese people, one might ask why the Sudanese people
voted for independence in 1956 and refused the option ofunity with Egypt, "The unity ofthe
Nile Valley," then rejected Libya's offers for unity in 1980 and 1990? The answer to this
question could be found in the words of Sir James Roberton, the last British administrator
in Sudan, who remarked, "To understand Sudanese politics one had to be either a Prophet
13 AH A. Mazrui, The Black Arabs in Comparative Perspective: The Political
Aociology of Race Mixture, in The Southern Sudan: The Problem ofNational
Integration, ed. DunstanM. Wai (London: Frank Class, 1973), 50.
14 W. E. B. DuBois, The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa
Has Played in World History (New York: International Publications, 1965), 184.
246
or a fool."15
Three, the agreement between the two extremes of Sudan's political spectrum is
evidence that the problem in Sudan is political and not religious. If Garang, a strong
supporter of secularism and socialism, was able to reach an understanding with Turabi, the
Khomeini of Sudan, then one can conclude that the struggle in Sudan is not for any religious
cause. Thus, it is not a conflict between Islam and Christianity. Rather, it is a struggle for
earthly objects. In this context, it is necessary to point out that regardless of centuries of
mutual hostility between the north and the south, the Report of the Commission of Inquiry
in 1955 concluded that the real trouble in the South was
Political and not religious; and neither slave trade nor the differences
in religion played a part in the disturbances In the extensive disturbances
that took place in Equatoria, Christians, Pagans as well as Muslims took part;
in fact some of the leaders of the anti-Northern propagandists are Southern
Muslims."16
Peter Woodward reached a similar conclusion thirty-five years later, and in 1990, he
mentioned that "the resulting inequality in the distribution of power and the perquisites
thereofhas provoked the ultimate in alienation: civil war."17
When Sudan achieved independence in 1956, the Sudanese administration invested
considerably in the political, economic, social, and cultural development of the north, while
the south remained isolated and underdeveloped.. , Furthermore, the south was
15 Harold D. Nelson, ed., Sudan: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: The
American University, 1983), XXIV, ■ ! -
16 Quoted in Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in Sudan, 78.
17 Woodward, Unstable Sudan, 235-: :.
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underrepresented: of the 46 members of the National Constitutional Committee, three
members were from the south. This oppression and exploitation led to rebellion. In other
words, the northern elite had failed to establish a national identity and to offer political and
economic models of development that all Sudanese could support. Naturally, this failure was
the breeding ground for southerners' resistance, and the struggle to break away from what
could be termed as internal colonization.
In sum, the war that has shattered the country since independence is by no means a
religious war between Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather, it is a struggle for power and
interests between the oppressors and the oppressed.
Fourth, the prominent role ofreligion in Sudan's public life made it very easy for the
northern politicians to cover their economic, political, and worse still, personal interests with
a veil of religion. Throughout Sudan's modern history, all Sudanese politicians, Islamists,
Marxists, military and civilians, repeatedly manipulated religion as a device of government.
This not only led to opportunistic factionalism and sectarian divisions, but the Islamic cause
has suffered heavily because of such exploitation of religion for worldly goals or political
ends.
The present Islamic experiment in Sudan is just one example to support the previous
argument. Turabi, the spiritual father of Sudan's Islamic experiment, proved that he was
interested in other things than Islam by signing an agreement with his former enemy Garang.
A few years before that event, Turabi had declared Jihad against the south and issued
many tickets to paradise for those who went to fight in the war and lost their lives. However,
Turabi later signed a deal with Garang. Turabi, like many Sudanese politicians, switched
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allegiance, compromised his faith, and paid lip service to Islam in his quest for power and
influence. This cynical exploitation of religion for political ends is just an action of
pragmatism and opportunism. Therefore, religion is just an excuse for Turabi's maneuvering
and tactics. In the course ofhis involvement in politics, Turabi had cooperated with different
leaders, from Numeri to Sadiq al-Mahdi, from al-Bashir to Garang, and all of this in the
name of Islam. Turabi, like many Sudanese politicians, had used Islam when it had suited
his purposes.
Finally, the Turabi-Garang deal supports the argument that secession as an option for
the southern people is far from perfect. The Sudanese people were able in 1972 to reconcile
their differences and put an end to the war. Therefore, it is safe to predict that, sooner or
later, the Sudanese people will find a solution to this problem. The question is how much
more destruction will it take before peace can be achieved? The answer to this question is
left to Sudanese politicians; However, it is clear that the solution requires understanding,
tolerance, and imaginative leadership. These are the keys to Sudan's crisis. These keys can
only be found in Sudan and by the Sudanese people. Otherwise, Sudan will continue to
bleed dangerously and the Sudanese people might live in hell for long years.
However, it is not to be understood from the previous argument that the crisis of the
Islamic world in general, and Turkey and Sudan in particular, is mainly internal. We cannot
attribute to the ruling elite or any other internal factor most of Sudan's and Turkey's failures
and ignore the external factor. Sudan's and Turkey's problems would not have been as bad
as they are without external involvement.
It is the thesis of this work that the causes of the plight of the Islamic world in
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general and Turkey and Sudan as examined in this study, were at their root internal, and that
anti-Islamic Western policies played a contributory role, helping to deepen the crisis of the
said countries.
A closer examination ofthe later developments in the United States would prove this
fact. Islam was viewed during the Cold War as a bulwark against communist aggression.
In 1995, then-American President Bill Clinton rejected the view of confrontation between
Islam and the West. He addressed the Jordanian parliament, and delivered the following
message:
Islam can be a powerful force for tolerance and moderation, and its
traditional values are in harmony with the best of western ideals. . . . The
United States has a great respect for Islam and wishes to work with its
followers throughout the world to secure peace and a better future for all our
children.18
However, this harmony and coexistence between Islam and the West came to an end
on September 11, 2001, after the attacks on New York and Washington. Islam was
associated with violence, and Muslims and Arabs were associated with terrorism in Western
eyes. Memories of the crusades came back. Italy's prime minister urged Europe to
reconstitute itself on the basis of its Christian roots and declared that:
We should be confident of the superiority of our "civilization. The
West is bound to occidentalize and conquer new people. It has done it with
the communist world and part of the Islamic wqrid, but unfortunately, a part
ofthe Islamic world is 1400 years behind. From this point of view, we must
be conscious of the strength and force of our civilization.19
18 Quoted in Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of
Interests, 94.
19 New York Times, September 27, 2001.
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With such remarks, it is evident that Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations
is about to become a fulfilled prophecy. However, history has shown that it is only from
deep crises that great solutions have emerged. As an Arab Muslim, the researcher is
convinced that the atmosphere is better now for re-evaluation and mutual understanding by
both Islam and Christianity. I believe that what binds them together is more than what
divides them and responsibility for understanding and cooperation should be shared by
Muslims and non-Muslims.
Recommendations
After studying and analyzing the dilemma of the Islamic world and the struggle
between Islam and secularism and nationalism in Turkey and Sudan, the following
recommendations are suggested:
Religious Reforms
Since religion and politics are subtly intertwined, it is Muslims' duty to solve this
paradox. Muslim intellectuals should take the initiative to interpret Islam in a modern way
so religious ideas would fit contemporary social, economic, and political issues.
In Turkey, Ataturk adopted secular nationalism as the legitimizing ideology of the
state. As the premises of such an ideology are being challenged, Turkish intellectuals must
acknowledge the centrality of Islam in Turkish politics. Throughout history, Islam has been























cultural, and social rights. In addition, as Turkey strives to join the EU, democratic reforms
would increase the chances of its membership in this political community. In other words,
democratic reforms are a must ifthe Turkish government wants to enjoy legitimacy from its
citizens and the outside world.
The restoration of a democratic government in Sudan and adopting a tolerant attitude
towards the opposition whether-in the north or the south, are among the prerequisites for
peace, development, and stability in Sudan. The democratic reforms must acknowledge the
pluralistic composition of Sudan and must function as a safety valve to ensure the full
political, cultural, and social rights of all different ethnic groups in the country. Furthermore,
democratic reforms will help Sudan to improve its image in the international community and
put an end to its isolation.
Economic Reforms
In many Third World countries, ethnic conflicts are fueled by gross disparities in
economic and social development between different ethnic groups in the country. Therefore,
equality in distributing the sources ofthe country among its citizens is a prerequisite for the
state to gain legitimacy and enjoy stability and peace.
In Turkey, this study found that the ethnic conflict between the Kurds and the Turks
is being exacerbated by the disparities in economic and social development between the
eastern region, where the majority of the Kurds reside, and the rest of the country. Thus, the
Turkish government must allocate development aid to the eastern region to assuage Kurdish
frustration. By the same token, the conflict in Sudan is partly the outcome of the northern
exploitation ofthe resources ofthe southern region, to me neg,igence ofthe southern people
and their needs. Thus, a fair al.ocation of Sudan's resources wou.d help to eliminate the
frustration ofthe southern people.
These steps would bring Sudan and Turkey closer to the realities and needs of their
societies aud increase the potential for peace, freedom, and development.
A Western Initiative
This study established,hat continuity rather than change characterized the
relationship between the east or the Islamic world and the West. The burden ofhistory is ail
on the Islamic side. Turkey's relations with Europe are still haunted by me Ottoman legacy.
The events in Bosnia in the las, decade give credence to such an argument Bosnia-a
secular, Westernized state with a Muslim population-was no. permitted ,o survive,
apparently because Europeans do no, wan, Muslims in their neighborhood, however
democratic and secularized they might be. Thus, one wonders whether Turkey will everjoin
a Christian dub like the EU. However, i, is the author's belief tha, Turkey's membership
in the EU would be a gian, leap for Turkey and a small step for Europe. Europe can lose
nothing by opening the door for Turkey and gain nothing by keeping i, closed. Turkey's
membership in the EU might help overcome the country's democratic and economic
shortcomings. At the same time, such a European overture would be a significant step for
bom Islam and me Wes,. „ means ma, me eas, can mee, ,he West and Muslims and
Christians can integrate, cooperate, and coexis, together regardless of cultural differences.
In Sudan, this study found that the north-south conflict is a British policy.
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Furthermore, since 1983, the Western powers in general and the United States in particular
continued to support southern demands for secession and to block all attempts at national
reconciliation. The churches and right wing in the United States provided all kinds of
support for the southerners, and the U.S. government supported such efforts by placing
Sudan on the list of terrorist states. In other words, the western policy towards Sudan was
all stick and no carrot. However, it is the author's belief that the carrot policy—providing
incentives for Sudan's government—might work better to mend fences between the north
and the south and between Sudan and the West. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks
on the United States, the Bush administration gave up the old policy towards Sudan and
began to play a constructive role to achieve reconciliation in Africa's largest country. This
new approach toward Sudan is more likely to be efficient and Sudan's response was more
cooperative with the U.S. to confront terrorism.
Consequently, with a Western initiative towards the Islamic world in general and
Sudan and Turkey in specific, the clash of civilization would be replaced by peaceful
cooperation. Finally, the West must distinguish between Islam as a religion and radical
movements such as the National Islamic Front of Sudan, the Taliban, and many other
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